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THE SECRET OF PERSONALITY

THE PROBLEM OF MAN'S PERSONAL LIFE AS VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF AN HYPOTHESIS OF MAN'S RELIGIOUS FAITH

BY

GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD, LL.D.

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TO THOSE WHO AT PRESENT
LAMENT THE APPALLING WASTE OF
PERSONAL VALUES
THIS BOOK
IS IN SYMPATHY DEDICATED

UNITED THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
SEP 17 1938

PREFACE

THERE are no more profound and difficult problems than those which concern the personal life of man. Indeed, it might successfully be argued that all other problems are in some sort largely included in the answers given to these problems. This is not true alone from the theoretical point of view, as affecting our conclusions touching all the fundamental issues of philosophy, religion, and the positive sciences. It is pre-eminently true as touching all the practical issues of life. What shall I think of myself, my origin, the meaning of my life, the values which it seeks to realize, and my destiny; — these are inquiries, than which no other lie so near to the vital interests of every man.

And surely, at no other time in human history has the pressure of the inquiry into the secret of human personal life and the measurement of its fundamental and eternal values — if indeed it has any such — been more insistent and spiritually disturbing. All the advances of modern science and art, and all the recent increases in the material prosperity of the human race, as well as all the tenets of morality and religion,

seemed only a short time ago to be enhancing the values, while deepening the mystery, of the personal life of the race and of the individual man. And yet, in the light of the most recent events, how awfully cheap does human life seem to have become; and how fatefully ruthless its destruction!

The discussion of this great problem, as attempted by this little book, makes no claim for itself of an indisputable scientific certainty, or even of an effort to arrive at such certainty. It offers itself, the rather, as an earnest of those faiths of religion in which, as it seems to the author, a suggestion that gives to the intellect some light and to the heart much comfort may be found. That the suggestion is not contrary to, but is in conformity with, the truths of science and philosophy, as they bear most directly on this problem, the author firmly believes.

GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD

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"Intellect relies on Reason, Faith on Authority; opinion defends itself by probability alone. These two comprehend the sure truth; but faith, in closed and involuted, intelligence, in exposed and manifest form."

BERNARD.

"What tho' the destined goal seem faint and far?
The patience and the toil are not in vain.
What thou hast given in love, thou shalt regain
If not on earth, on some diviner star."

THE SECRET OF PERSONALITY

CHAPTER I

WHAT IS IT TO BE A PERSON? THE EVIDENCE OF FACT

EVER since man began to reflect, his thoughts, cares, and practical activities have centred around, and grown out from, his conception of himself, in ways quite different from those of the lower animals. His entire life has been arranged and, however dimly, recognized as having much to do with a welfare other than the merely physical. Even his more fundamental instincts, his so-called "natural" strivings for an improved existence, his most spontaneous impulses, have been concerned with the invisible, the distant future, the spiritual forces in his environment, if we may use these words in their more sensuous and almost semi-materialistic meaning. His appetites, including especially those of food, drink, and sex, and his acquisitive propensities, have always had for him something more than their most obvious significance, something different from and higher than their temporary value. His ideas of his own origin, nature, development, and destiny,

have progressively formed themselves after improved types, which could not be conjectured or inferred from the concrete examples afforded by the behavior of things; but which, the rather, were bestowed upon things — inorganic and organic, having some form of consciousness or wholly devoid of any trace of conscious activities, as modern science might say — by a process of personifying. He has insisted upon putting his Self into all of them.

These contentions could be amply illustrated by an extended appeal to anthropology and psychology. To make this appeal in a way to justify a scientific induction would require many volumes. We must content ourselves with illustrating it in a very partial way. And let us begin with that class of the emotions in which man, perhaps more closely than in any others, resembles the lower animals; is indeed himself largely an animal. I refer to the emotions of fear. As in the case of all the animals, the presence through generations of the species of natural forces and living things hostile to life and welfare and happiness, begets and nourishes in man certain emotions of fear. Like the birds, he recoils timidly at the presage of oncoming storms; like the rat he shrinks from the poisonous snake; like the hind, he inclines to run at the growl of the bear, the roar of the lion, the bark of the wolf. If he fights, he must fight like a man, with a man's courage and craft. But man's

fears are human fears. They are not by any means wholly after the analogy of animal fears; and of these the most haunting and distressing arise from his superstitions, which are themselves the outgrowth of human imagination working in the fields of moral and religious consciousness. The objects to which they attach themselves are the results of man's objectifying his own personality. They are outputs of his own personal traits, embodied in some event, some animal, some tree; or cast naked into the sky, the darkness of the cave or of the midnight air. It is this kind of fear which throws into convulsions the Samoyeds when a sudden and unaccountable blow is struck upon the tent within which they are seated. It is the same kind of fear which compels the natives of Northern India to worship the Bhûts, or malignant spirits which have emanated from men who have died a violent death; and makes the Ceylonese strive by magic and bloody sacrifices to propitiate or overcome the endless variety of harmful deities which infest the fields in which they work, the groves in which they rest, the homes in which they eat and sleep. In improved form it expresses itself in the Gilgamesh epic:

> "I came to a glen at night,
> Lions I saw and was afraid,
> I raised my head and prayed to Sin."

With the development and uplifting of personal life this fear becomes that reverence for Divine

Being which is the beginning of all wisdom, or ultimately gives place to the love which banishes all fear. But whatever form the emotion takes, and whatever the goal in which it terminates, the emotion itself retains the characteristics derived from man's personal life.

If we may use for convenience' sake a term which a sound authority has called a "pure fiction, however convenient a fiction it may be," we will say that the appetites even of "primitive man" are seldom or never indulged in a merely animal way. When he drinks, whether it be in private or with others, he thinks it not a waste of good material to pour out a cup in libation to the god; or if, as is more likely, it is an occasion of social and ceremonial feasting, he invites invisible beings to share the feast with him, or saves the bits for them, if only they will refrain from doing harm in recognition of this consideration; for they are persons with appetites and passions like himself. He even personifies the intoxicating cup and imagines Indra drinking its sweet juice; and so he originates the cult of Soma, in which gods and men get drunk together. Or, in more truly pious and humble way, in the peasant's home the salted cake or bowl of gruel is left to be enjoyed by the ghostly or the ancestral spirit of a nightly visitor. All this is indeed far enough from primitive man, strictly so named; but as nearly as we can get back or down to him, we find in essentially the

same meaning more gross and crude forms of the same elementary fondness, — or shall we not say, necessity, for proclaiming himself a person surrounded by an invisible personal environment, even in the gratification of his appetites. His eating and drinking has a reference possible beyond itself. When carried to excesses, and even to orgies, it may mean something more than animal gluttony or drunkenness.

Still more significant of personality is in man's case the mating of the sexes. The human male may fight for his mate, capture and carry her off by force, and wreak his lust upon her, as a veritable brute may do. The human female may captivate, embrace, and then sting to death her mate, as the Mexican tarantula is said to do. But this purely lustful behavior is not the normal way for human beings to mate; nor does it comprise all of the essentials to human mating as they are embodied in the ceremonials of even savage and primitive man. Some kind of obligations to personal fidelity and mutual co-operation is customarily included in the forming and carrying out of the marriage relation. The man *ought to* hunt and fish, and if need be risk his life at it, in support and defence of his woman and their offspring; and the woman *ought to* cook, or perhaps work in the fields, bear and care for the offspring. It does not matter how unjust the arrangement may seem to be from our modern point of view. What does matter from our

present point of view is the fact that there is understood to be *some arrangement;* and that this arrangement is either implied or proclaimed in some ceremonial manner. Our inquiry is not, whether that uniformly or generally is which ought-to-be: our inquiry concerns the meaning of the fact that some idea of something which ought-to-be, enters into the matter. For nothing of ceremonial, or the obligatory, can come into existence, in thought or word or deed, which does not derive from man's personality. Even the sexual relation itself is widely personified so as not only to apply to the gods themselves, but also to create divine beings who are the especial exciters, patrons, or guardians of the sexual relation. We scarcely need mention in this connection Astarte among the Phœnicians, Aphrodite among the Greeks, Venus among the Latin races; or the worship of the phallus and the lingam in India and the Old Japan, and ceremonial prostitution or promiscuous intercourse in the temples of the classic periods of Europe and the Orient, as well as among the islanders of the South Seas.

It would be absurd to suppose that the more patent facts of generation, growth in the womb, and birth of offspring, have not been observed and understood in their physical significance by the most unreflective intellects among the adults of the human race. But these facts, and the understanding of them, have never sufficed to

explain the mystery of the origin of human existence. In all time, something beyond these obvious physical facts has seemed to be needed in order to lift the veil that shrouds the origin of man's personal life. But the question, "Whence have I and my ancestors come?" has not been put to physiological science; neither has its answer been considered as satisfactory, or even wholly to the point, when given in terms of this science. There has always been the invincible belief, or the naïve suspicion, that impersonal forces alone could not altogether account for the manufacture of a person. In other words: Man is not a merely natural being. Invisible agencies of a personal sort must be assumed to have taken part in the generation and endowment with personal attributes of the human race. Heroes are sons of the gods. At some time in the past, if not in the instances of every child of today, the myth of Genesis, the book of Origins, has been true in fact: "The sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair; and they took them wives of all that they chose." As said W. Robertson Smith in his "The Religion of the Semites" (p. 30): "A man was born into a fixed relation to certain gods as surely as he was born into relation to his fellow men."

In not a few cases, in his groping after an account of the origin of his own life and that of his ancestors, man has found the answer to his problem by personifying some form of animal

life. Hence there are individual totems, and family totems, and totems of the clan or tribe. Animals of superior strength, cunning, swiftness, or deadly powers, have been invoked to explain the awful mystery. These "other-selves" have been made "Over-Selves." And when this process of personifying and deifying has gone on for centuries, no development of philosophy, science, or art succeeds easily in casting its superstitious products out of the human imagination. Thus we have in India today, side by side with the most transcendental philosophy and a subtle psychology, a frightful jumble, a motley mixture, of personified beings, all concerned in the begetting and conservation or destruction of man. As Sir Monier Williams has said: "It is difficult for any believer in Hinduism to draw a line of demarcation between gods, man, and animals." All are intermingled in a whirlpool of personal life flowing from a personified Universe as its inexhaustible source.

In the supply of his daily wants man also shows himself a person, and so insists on imagining that he stands in personal relations with a personified Nature. Even primitive man does not fish as does the cormorant, or hunt as does the wolf. And it is not the manner of his craft which constitutes the striking difference. Besides the alleged superiority of his intellectual resources, the more important thing for our present contention is that his attitude toward

his task, and its success or failure, is quite unlike that of any of the lower animals. His sense of dependence and helplessness, and his hopes of relief, go out toward invisible personal agencies who are of like conscious wants and ways of planning with himself. Thus, men who live by hunting have their special kinds of gods; and fishermen employ kinds of prayer suitable to their craft. Success in these occupations is due to divine favor; lack of success is attributed to the divine displeasure. When, at a later stage of his economical development, he turns to agriculture, it is Osiris, than whom the Egyptian pantheon knew no god more good and great and worthy of divine honor, who shows men how to water and till the fields, and who rewards their labors with plenty. In China it is the Heaven-descended Emperor who invokes the favor of his ancestor Heaven, to grant its blessing upon the agriculture of the nation. Nor must we fail just to mention the influence of the same process of personifying in establishing and fostering the earlier institutions and orders devoted to the different kinds of handicraft and trade. All of them were inclined at their origin to ascribe themselves to invisible divine personalities as their founders and patrons. "In the course of time," says Jastrow of the Babylonians, "all the great temples in the large centres became large financial establishments."

It is customary to suppose that the develop-

ment of the various kinds of science in their bearing upon all forms of human industry and practical endeavor have by right, if not in reality, banished from the field of rational thinking, along lines of actual causal relations, all these superstitions which were formerly created by the busy but easily beguiled imagination of man. But the most pious, and not necessarily less intelligent portion of mankind still continue to believe that some Divine Being gives "seed to the sower and bread to the eater." And do not nations, even those which boast most bravely of their scientific attainments and practical efficiency, pray for food and prosperity in trade and business and war, when they are in need, and give thanks when their need is supplied? We are not now concerned with the hypocrisy or practical value of all this, but with the deeper import of the fact that it is so; inasmuch as this fact seems to us to throw some light on the problem, "What is it to be a person?" and upon the persistency of human nature in its cunning trick of personifying in behalf of the better understanding of all its many-sided experiences.

In passing we call attention to the grotesque fact that those who have avowedly passed beyond the limits of every trace of these and similar superstitions, are no less prompt and vociferous than others in cursing their luck when it goes against them, and in "patting it on the back," so to say, when it turns up in their favor. As

though, indeed, the wholly Impersonal could be fit object for either cursing or commending.

There are, however, other and more subtile and profound differences which characterize man as a person, and, being a person, a creature not wholly to be understood or explained after the analogue of any animal. One of the most startling of these distinctions appertains to his own beliefs as to the way he receives his knowledge, and the nature and extent of its application, however received. Both anthropology and comparative religion assure us of the wide-spreading, if not altogether primitive and universal belief of man that he receives part of his knowledge — and this the most important and mysterious part — from some other source than his own reflections. Invisible divine beings, personifications of himself, are engaged in teaching him about the significance of present events, the things they portend in the future; and even the profounder truths about his own origin, duty, and destiny. Indeed, he often inclines to dream, if not dogmatically assert, that much of the most certain of his knowledge comes in this superhuman but not supernatural way. For it is in his thought the most "natural" thing in the world that the over-beings and under-beings whom his imagination, taking up this task of personifying in the interests of explanation, should, if favorable to him, lead him into truth; but, if hostile, why, then, of course, lead

him astray. Hence oracles, inspired wise men and women who have uncanny powers, due to their possession of coveted secret mysteries, ancestral warnings, vague or clearer messages through the lips of diviners from those who are dead, and signs and omens innumerable, all of which, if they have not in themselves knowledge, or suggestions of knowledge, are at least intimations of truths not derivable from the unaided intellectual activities of living men.

As these facts are themselves subjected to further reflection they give rise to different theories as to the origin and nature of the "rationality" so distinctive of human personal life and its development. Man is an animal; but he is something more. He is a "person," a *rational animal.* He has beliefs and principles of cognition, which are distinctive of his selfhood, but which are not wholly self-acquired. Out of this fact, religion constructs its theories of revelation and inspiration. Philosophy analyzes the mental operations and discovers elements which it calls by any one of fully two-score of different equally mystical terms, — such as intuitions, naturæ judicia, semina omnium cognitionum, seminæ æternitatis, zopyra (living sparks), categories of thought, innate cognitions, transcendental truths, innate or *a priori* cognitions, primary laws of human reason, etc., etc. But science, forgetting — what the sure but vague and naïve instinct of primitive man recognizes — that you cannot get

the rational out of the irrational, or the personal out of the impersonal, tries to explain them as merely the summing-up of the concrete experiences of countless generations of men. Let it be for the moment granted that the very conditions of all reflection are gained by exercising an already matured reflection, at some far-off time in the history of the race. It still remains true that for the individual person, as far back as we can discover him, elements of his knowledge, and certain instinctively affirmed facts of knowledge, are *given to*, rather than *acquired by*, his own thinking.

In this connection it is interesting to note — a fact the importance and truth of which will be discussed in another place — how modern psychological science is reviving the view that so-called "intuition" is more fundamental and more sure in its conclusions than the logical processes, in certain realms of truth. Indeed, the belief of the Zulus that their seers can veritably exercise the power of "opening the gates of distance" is being revived by some of the students of telepathy and clairvoyance. In philosophy and art none are surer that they have the truth given to them than those who meet all objections with the couplet:

> "But God has a few of us whom he whispers in the ear;
> The rest may reason and welcome: 'tis we musicians know."

Whatever remains true, or proves false, as to the views of savage and so-called primitive man,

or of the modern scientific man, regarding the sources and the surety of his cognitive attainments, he gains all he really knows, and all he mistakenly thinks he knows, by a process of personifying. In this sense of the word, "anthropomorphizing" is as necessary for science as it is for superstition: it is the person's only way of knowing.

An extension of the problem, "What is it to be a person?" and some further suggestions toward a preliminary answer to this problem, may be gained by considering how the person, man, distinguishes between the good and the bad, and between the better and the best. And here some reference to the obscure and complicated practice of tabu may profitably be made. If by *tabu* we understand "a system of restrictions on man's arbitrary use of things, enforced by a dread of supernatural penalties," we find instances of this practice among all so-called primitive peoples. But the *tabu* is a form of command, or a species of warning, which can appeal only to the imagination, emotions, and practical interests of a Person. In this form you cannot say "Thou shalt not" to any animal. For the command must arouse the picture of that which is invisible and inaudible to sense. "It is forbidden"; and if you disobey you will be shut up in some enclosure, or tortured, or whipped, — this is a comparatively gross and sensuous way of controlling the conduct of man

or animal. But the *Noli me tangere* of the *tabu* is of a much more distinctly spiritual sort. "I want this thing or that; for it looks good to eat, or wear, or somehow possess." "You cannot have it; for it is *tabu*." "But why can I not; and what makes it *tabu?*" "The thing is sacred"; or, "It is unclean and polluted." The Sâl and bamboos at Barmdeo in Northern India are never cut, as they are sacred to the local Devi. This other thing also is owing to the gods; it is *Corban;* it must be burned, or thrown away, or left for the gods to carry off; or if it is to be enjoyed at all, this enjoyment should be only for the priests or others connected with the divine service.

The "must-not" for reasons which are not wholly clear, and which in part at least lie outside of a definite experience with the pleasure or the pain connected with the use of things, is not as yet, perhaps, an undoubted form of a developed moral consciousness; but it is closely akin to, and almost inevitably passes over into, a form of moral consciousness. Its sanctions of reward and punishment lie partly in the world invisible: they are such as only a personal being has the imagination to create, the intuition to appreciate, the sense of time and the conception of the continuity of personal life, to make practically available.

The personal qualities which belong, as of inexorable necessity, to all human artwork are

even more clearly to be discerned. The office of the creative personal imagination is essential for even the lowest and beginning forms of art. For art does not begin until imitation is transcended. This is true of the basket-weaving of the Redskins, the *kava*-bowls of the Samoans, the pottery of the ancient Mexicans, the native music of the Chinese and Japanese. He who sits at the potter's wheel, or carves his canoe, or embellishes his bow, or holds the reed to his lips, or the brush in his right hand, is a person; and his artistic conception must partake of his personality. Whatever work of his hand expresses or excites the sentiment of beauty necessarily conforms to the characteristics of his personal life. This statement is most obviously true when we come to study the higher things of art, and especially as art ministers to the ideas and ideals of religion. The bird may build its nest, the spider weave its web, and the beaver build its dam, in a manner to excite our admiration for the constructive skill which our science, for want of a more intelligible explanation, attributes to instinct rather than to the conscious operation of the logical faculties. And much of the work done by human artists is achieved in a not wholly dissimilar way. But this very fact only makes the clearer how different are the most fundamental of the human artistic impulses from anything attributable to a merely animal life. The curious and sometimes monstrous or

grotesque forms of the decorative art which recent excavations disclose as having adorned the temples and dwellings of ancient Assyria and Babylonia, centuries before Christ, and which show their derivation from the East as they linger in Spain till the present day, illustrate the same truth which Plotinus declared to have motived the work of Phidias: "He did not create his Zeus after any perceived pattern, but made him such as he would be, if Zeus deigned to appear to mortal eyes." The colossal statue of Buddha at Kamakura, with all its suggestive impressiveness as to the depths of personality, is a joint product of the æsthetical and the religious imagination. So is the Taj Mahal, with its religious meaning as a tomb and its quotations from the Koran. These are products of man's aspiration, as himself a person, after a knowledge of, and communication with, an Ideal Personal Life. How could he construct any pictorial or other representation of *this* life otherwise than after the analogy of his own life?

Anthropology is the doctrine of man in his race characteristics and racial development. Psychology is the science which undertakes to depict and explain the nature and the evolution of the mental life, the mind, or soul, of the individual man. These two studies of man co-operate and can neither be entirely separated theoretically nor kept wholly apart in their active pursuit. For, the individual person cannot come

into existence apart from the race; and the mental life of the individual cannot develop normally except as subject to social influences. On the other hand: our scientific knowledge, and even our unclassified and not strictly proved impressions of the anthropological order, cannot interpret the general facts of this order, except through the conscious processes of some individual mind. This interpretative process is therefore itself a personal achievement. Even as more emphatically true must we apply the same statement to what a recent writer has called those "dull collections of sweeping generalizations that are called sociology."

It appears then that everything which the human being feels, or thinks, or does, evinces his personality. His impulses, his instincts, his appetites, all have the personal stamp. His knowledge of the more ordinary practical type, and his science and his art, are penetrated through and through with qualities of the same stamp. Instead of its being true, if we are willing to accept the truth as clearly expressed in deeds and institutions and mental and emotional attitudes, that man ever considers himself as a mere thing or a mere animal; the truth is the rather, that he invariably considers things and animals — especially if they give tokens of life, and, What thing or animal does not at some time manifest some token of some kind of life? — as more or less like himself, and thus at the least endowed

with a partial and incomplete personality. The naïve and only half-conscious, the little self-recognized philosophizing reflection of the primitive man, coincides in his attitude with the philosophy of the poetry of Browning:

> "Mind seeks to see,
> Touch, understand, by mind inside of me,
> The outside mind — whose quickening I attain
> To recognize."

In a word, man's most fundamental and primitive beliefs and activities involve, if only in a very discursive and inferential way, certain ideas and corresponding attitudes toward, each one, his own Self, toward other selves, and toward one or more Over-selves.

CHAPTER II

WHAT IS IT TO BE A PERSON? THE WITNESS OF WORDS

THE crowning achievement and supreme definite expression of the reflective powers of man is to be found in his articulate speech, in the languages he has developed. We might then appeal to philology with even greater confidence than that with which we have taken our appeal to anthropology and psychology for an answer, or at least suggestions looking toward an approach to an answer, to the question: What is it to be a person? Books on either of these three studies of human nature we have not undertaken to write at the present time. We may start the trail, however, and follow it a step or two into the jungle of confused and contesting opinions, or toward some sort of a pioneer's clearing, where perhaps a humble cabin may be reached, by way of an outline sketch of three English words which have now become intimately connected with the conception of personality in our present usage. The first and lowliest, but not least interesting and important, of these three words is the word "Body."

Now in certain circles of a hyper-sentimental religiosity, or among those much devoted to a rarified psychology or a mystical metaphysics, it is assumed to be a non-essential, if not a positive disadvantage for an animal who aspires to be a person, to be also a body; or even to have a body, if only he could somehow get rid of it and remain and develop as a personality. We may readily discover, however, that it is impossible to conceive of a real *person* of the type afforded by human beings, as existing or developing without a body.

Let it not be forgotten that our inquiry is not, what it is to be a disembodied soul, much less an angelic or glorified spirit; but, the rather, what it is to be a person as the human being is a person, and is known to himself and to other selves as personal.

The word body, in the significance which we are seeking, died out in German and was replaced by the word *Leib* (originally meaning "life"). But this word, *Leib*, may itself be used as the synonym for a person (*die Person*) or a man (*der Mensch*). If we follow it, not so much in the order of time as in the order of its rising significance, we find that in the older English a "man" is called "a body" when viewed as an organic unity, or as having a material frame. In this respect, of course, man resembles the lower animals. But even in early use the word was almost exclusively applied to man rather than

any animal, and to the whole man. As says Caxton: "He shold come fyght with hym body for body" (or man for man).

For obvious reasons, the body of man easily becomes contrasted with the soul of the same being, — both together being thought of as necessary and complementary for a complete man. Thus Pope, in pompous and mystical, semi-pantheistic language, can proclaim the doctrine:

> "All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
> Whose body Nature is, and God the soul."

And the Apostle has it to say of his ecstatic vision: "Whether in the body I cannot tell, whether out of the body I cannot tell." Through all its usage, however, the word retains a large share of claim to be the equivalent of the person, man or woman, high or low, as made known through sense-perception to himself and to other selves. Thus a man swears by his Self, as the real thing, so to say, when he utters the oath "body of me"; and expresses his belief in the substantial reality of the Divine Being, when he blasphemes by "God's body." Especially notable, however, is the usage which raises and universalizes the conception by making "a body" the synonym for an individual human being of either sex. The conception then includes the entire material being of man as a sign and tangible part of his personality, taken for the whole; and chiefly in legal phrases or referring to social

relations. In this meaning the word conveniently combines with several very significant prefixes that give it a tinge of familiarity, pity, or contempt. Thus, "anybody" may be a "nobody," or make of himself a "somebody"; but "everybody" must be "somebody" in particular; and "nobody" can possibly be just "anybody" — that is without the individuality of personality — no matter how much of a "poor body" he or she may be.

Somewhat contemporaneously, and always in mutual dependence upon the full-orbed conception of what it is to be a person, we may trace the meanings given to the word "Soul" as applied to the individual man. In its most vague and general form the soul is the principle of life, whether in man or animals, or even in plants. Thus Dryden, in rendering the Georgics of Vergil (III, 744) can say: "The thriven Calves . . . render their sweet souls before the plenteous Rack." And in mystical or poetical fashion one may speak of a "soul of the world," an *anima mundi.*

Then follows in the case of the word soul the same contrast which was noted as following the more advanced use of the word body. The principle of thought, the conscious, — and now in modern psychology as of old, — even the subconscious mentality, the spiritual part of man, comes to be regarded as having a sort of entity existence separable from the bodily organism.

The soul is the "seat" of the emotions, feelings, sentiments. It is the part of man to which intellectual or spiritual power belongs. We may also include under this term the moral nature of man; may indeed emphasize this side of his complex personality as most of all the important part of the functioning of the principle of man's life. We may discuss its relations to other fellow souls, to invisible spirits, and to God and his Law, or the Divine Will concerning the relations of persons. We may ascribe immortality to man's soul, and regard it as surviving after the death of the body, and in this condition as susceptible of happiness or misery in a future state. We may even in our loose phraseology consider the having, or the being, a soul, for purposes historical, legal, or theological, the equivalent to being a person.

By none of these devices, nor by any other devices of thought or imagination, however cunningly contrived, shall we justify the identification of the two conceptions, soul and person, as affording any satisfactory answer to an inquiry into the origin, nature, development, and destiny of man's personal life. Man thinks of himself as a person and as "having" a soul. But he has a body as well as a soul; and he speaks of himself and other selves as having souls, but not of his soul, or of their souls, as *having* him, or *having* them.

Moreover, one person may have more than one

soul; indeed, in the reflective judgment of the great majority of the thoughtful, man, considered as a person, absolutely needs more than one soul. You cannot explain all that he is and does as the experiences and performances of a single soul. The natives of West Africa have four souls each; the Sioux have three souls; some Dakota tribes rejoice in the sacred number four; other tribes of savages are proud of, or troubled with, no fewer than six or seven souls. It is not, however, savages only who think themselves entitled to claim such a rich variety of souls. In ancient Egypt the "darling idea" of the people was the continued existence of their souls after death. But at least three entities of a soul-like character must be secured against decay in order to make sure of this supremely desirable result. Man's *Ka* was a self-existent entity which by its presence bestowed upon him life and health and joy. But the *Ka* itself needed food and drink to preserve it, and to prevent hunger and thirst. And besides this soul there was the *ab*, the immortal heart of man, which stood in somewhat the same relation to the material heart as the *Ka* to the whole body. The third immortal part of man was his *Ba*, or soul considered as the principle of life. Its symbol was a human-headed bird (or, later, a ram-headed scarabæus), which at death flew away to be with the gods. So Taoism in China provides each individual with three souls; one remains with the corpse,

one with the spirit's tablet, and one is carried off to purgatory. The Platonic philosophy recognized somewhat radical distinctions in the various psychical functions of man's nature; and it thought necessary a *thumos*, an *epithumia*, and a *nous*, in order to explain them all satisfactorily. The Hebrew distinction as prevailing in the Biblical writings, of the animal (*nephesh*), the distinctively human (*ruach*,) and the divine (*neshama*), three principles as existing in man, is not so radically different from that of the Platonic philosophy.

Let not the modern psychologist dismiss all this wandering of human reflective thinking about its own nature, as without a significance worthy of attention in our effort to unravel the secret of personality, much less treat it with patent scorn. For do you not, my friend, talk glibly of double and triple personality, of subconscious and even of unconscious psychoses, of the proper use of the word "mind," if we throw out of our vocabulary, or leave to the theologians, the objectionable word "soul"; and do you not discuss the difference between intuitions and conscious logical processes, and whether the animals have any experiences corresponding to the moral, religious, or strictly æsthetical ideals and aspirations; and, in fine, raise and attempt to answer scores of questions that reveal the richness and range of personal life as rather too vast to make it comprehensible under any one of the current conceptions of *A Soul?*

There is another word, however, which more than either of the two already analyzed has become in our English usage the most prevalent substitute and equivalent synonym for the metaphysical conception underlying the word "personality." This is the word "Self," — a word of obscure etymology, but found in early Gothic and Scandinavian as implying an emphatic reference, whether to thing or to human individual, as the only one of its precise kind in existence. It speaks, therefore, of sameness and not merely of similarity. It emphasizes the mysterious fact of identity. Not infrequently in the older English, but rarely in more recent English, one may read such sentences as this: "If a man do perform any praiseworthy action the *self* deed will commend him though he hold his peace." Very naturally, indeed quite inevitably, this word combines with all the personal pronouns, and thus affirms the invincible authority of self-consciousness, which attributes to every individual human being a peculiar and continuous sameness of his own. But it is social as well as selfish in its courteous implication. For the "my own self" of the friend or lover recognizes the "loyal self," or "your dear sweet self," of the friend or mistress. And finally, the pronoun, with the freight of much reflective thinking on its bosom, rises above "the threshold of consciousness" and reveals its bulk as a carrier of the varied wealth of man's personal life. It comes to mean

the real "and intrinsic person"; the permanent and identical subject of all the changing states. This more modern meaning, which justifies its use as a noun, is of all others, most important, most convenient, most consonant with the mysterious facts of the personal life. It enables every one who has attained to the appreciation of himself as a person, to say:

> "A secret Self I had enclos'd within,
> That was not bounded with my clothes or skin."

"In reality," says Meredith, in his *Harry Richmond*, "the busy little creature within me whom we call self, was digging pits for comfort to flow in of any kind, in any form." And surely we may agree in full confidence with what a champion of theological orthodoxy has said: "You cannot call up any wilder vision than a city in which men ask themselves, if they have any selves." "Ask themselves!:" Yes, but who are the selves that ask themselves? and, What does this really amusing question have to tell us about the true nature and current activities of a Self? This, at the very least: *A Self can ask itself questions.* This, in the same way, no animal can do.

English metaphysical philosophy, especially from the time of Locke onwards, begins seriously to debate what it is to be a Self; and its inquiry amounts to about the same thing as trying to find a satisfactory answer to the problem: What is it to be a Person?

The combinations of the word self with all

sorts of adjectives, participles, adverbs, pronouns, and other nouns, follow in bewildering confusion, — all with the seeming attempt to describe the endless variety of things which any real and fairly well-equipped Self may be, attempt, and do. One may find such compounds by the score in any large dictionary. Any one who is even moderately ingenious and inventive, may make a new combination to suit himself; and if he have good luck as an author, he may possibly get his invention adopted by one or more other selves. We will ourselves make a venture in this direction and call this the "self-deploying" and "self-exploiting" faculty of the self's real Self.

All these and other suggestions are confirmed and more amply illustrated by the history of the word we have chosen to define our inquiry. And fortunately, the history of this word is, in the line of its tradition to our present uses for science and philosophy, tolerably clear and full. In the Latin a *persona* was a mask used by the actor in a play; and the *persona dramatis* was the character assumed and acted by one who played or performed any part in a dramatic representation. This meaning did not descend in the English usage; probably because here its earliest usage seems to have applied it to the legal or juridical person. A quite similar thought, however, belongs to the word as Shakespeare uses it, when in "Midsummer Night's Dream"

he refers to one actor as "he who speaketh under the person of Phœbus"; and declares of the player with a lanthorn: "He comes to disfigure, or to present, the person of Moon-shine." And Jeremy Taylor affirms in one of his sermons: "No man can long put on a person and act a part, but his evil manners will peep through the corners of his white robe." In all such applications of the term person to the individual human being, it is what the man appears to be, his *representation* to others, rather than his real character, which is brought to the fore. This is conspicuous enough in the facetious sentence of Fielding: "There is a certain person in the world, who in a certain person's eye, is a more agreeable person, than any person, amongst all the persons, whom persons think agreeable persons."

Perhaps the first stage to be noted in the development of the more profound metaphysical significance of the word person and its kindred terms is reached when, in legal usage, persons are distinguished from things. "The objects of dominion or property," says Blackstone, "are things, as distinguished from persons."

When followed along this line of development, the importance of what appears to the eye as revealing the invisible in the nature of man clings persistently to the conception of personality. Bodily presence or bearing, and so something like the legal meaning of a "body corporate," is necessary for all organizations of

persons which are to have legal or social standing in the sight of their fellows. The individual man or woman who appears to others worthy of some particular notice — somehow distinguished — is not simply a person, but has become a *personage*. And without pronouncing, otherwise than slyly, on the worth of the title, Gilbert can announce some of the characters in his comic opera, "The Mikado": "They are not young ladies, they are young persons."

It is philosophy and theology, however, which have lifted the conception attached to the word Person into its loftiest, if at the same time most mystical and metaphysically profound meaning. As early as the beginning of the third century of our era the Latin Church-Father Tertullian used the word *persona* to designate one of the Trinity. But its inadequacy in this relation has in general been acknowledged even by the authorities among the theologians who accepted the title of Trinitarians. This has not been because of their doubt about applying the conception of personality to the Divine Being, but because of their inability to conceive of a strictly *personal* three-foldness consistent with the unity of a perfect personality. This inability is frankly acknowledged by Cardinal Newman, and attributed to its source, in the sentence: "The mysteriousness of the doctrine evidently lies in our inability to conceive a sense of our word person, such, as to be more than a mere character,

yet less than an individual intelligent being." Perhaps we shall find it more correct and illuminating to say, when speaking from the metaphysical point of view, that it is possible for a Person of the most exalted conceivable capacity, to manifest his personality in more than one quite distinctly different way, without at all sacrificing the essential unity of his personal being or personal life.

Whatever of truth or vain speculation there may be in what has just been suggested as to possible developments of any satisfactory doctrine of man's own personal life, and of his limitations of knowledge by his constitutional compulsion to gain knowledge by a process of personifying, from the point of view of philological fact — and this is the point of view we are now taking — the truth is tolerably clear and immensely significant. To be *a person*, as every normally developed human being is a person, is to have a body and soul, or mind, that can be distinguished from all other however similar beings, a consciously separate or individual existence with an intelligence and will "of its own," as we are wont to say.

All the answers which have been given or only implied in the facts examined hitherto leave in very indeterminate and somewhat confused form the solution of the problem, What is it to be a person? and What are the essential characteristics of a truly personal life? The facts do not

organize themselves into the form of systematic philosophy or of the formulas and laws, so-called, which bear the stamp of inductive science. They do, however, represent the results of the primary stages of man's reflective powers, as these results are recorded and expressed in his most natural and fundamental emotions, thoughts, and practical activities. And when we consider more carefully the language which men have employed to embody in a more definitive way their self-consciously expressed opinions as to the nature and capacities of the selfhood that is in them, the selves they really are, we are consulting guide-boards whose fingers indicate several roads along which we may hope profitably to institute a search for the more expanded, logically arranged, and argumentatively defensible answer to the question: What is it to be a person?

But before setting out on any of these roads it would seem well worth while to gather into the form of definite propositions the naïve doctrine of man, reflecting about himself in the manner of involuntarily philosophizing rather than that of the metaphysics of the "philosopher of the chair." Even in doing this, it is not altogether unlikely that we may encounter the secret discontent, if not open scorn, of those who *a priori* reject all attempts at what they call metaphysics. We are believers in metaphysics, and in the partial and relative value of metaphysical system. But we also believe in the propriety, and even the

obligation, of basing metaphysics on scientifically established facts. We shall undoubtedly have to acknowledge at the end of investigation that the deeper mysteries of man's personality, are left largely unexplained. But such is the end of every investigation, however ably and however far conducted, into every form of existence and, as well, into every simplest event of our most ordinary daily experience.

The most obvious truth which seems to be impressed upon man by the primitive use of his reflective powers is the two-foldness of his nature as a person. He cannot avoid thinking of himself as having a body and as also having a soul. Indeed, when considering this twofold existence from one point of view, he does not hesitate to speak of himself as "a body"; from the other point of view as "a soul." He finds little difficulty in speaking of himself as *having* a body, and also as *having* a soul. In all ordinary activities and experiences he has no great difficulty in distinguishing the part which each of the twofold beings that unite to make his selfhood is taking in the particular transaction. By the same activity of imagination he abstracts one or more of his souls from his own body, and straightway clothes it for the time with another and perhaps quite different body; or he imagines another soul, more or less similar to his own, and not always cordially welcomed, entering in and taking possession of his own body. But ordi-

narily, for non-mystical performances, the same body and soul remain on terms of limited co-operation and cordial alliance. If he wishes to manifest his personality, and fish, hunt, dance, go to war, appear at court or in the halls of legislation, or in the place of social festivities, he must do it through a body; but when his soul is parted from his body, the body becomes useless for these purposes unless it is somehow ensouled again.

This two-foldness, however, does not destroy a certain unity of the person or Self; on the contrary, it constitutes that unity. Whether one speaks of being a body or of being a soul, or speaks of one's self as having both body and soul, some sort of a tie or bond, or law of unity, or formal, or causal and real relation, between the body and the soul in the individual man is necessarily implied. Complete and permanent dissociation of the two would dissolve the personal life as that of a human being acting in self-like ways. Such a dissociation would be equivalent to a total change of personality. The common-sense view of the nature of this bond has, for all practical purposes, been not difficult to ascertain. But the metaphysics of it makes it necessary to set the voluntary activities of man upon a plane so distinctly higher than that allotted by science to the changing interrelation of mere things as to introduce an endless discussion of a metaphysical sort. How can body

and soul act and react on each other so as to constitute the unity which belongs to a personal life and personal development? This question has afforded an unsolved riddle to the reflective powers of man.

But whatever answer must be given to this riddle, and whether any answer at all can be given, or even be attempted, the evidence of his deeds, and the import of the language which he employs, show plainly enough that man regards himself as having an individuality that is beyond comparison with that of animals or things. The individuality of personality is peculiar. It implies *self*-differentiation and *self*-identification. This conviction of so peculiar an individuality of existence and development is a distinguishing mark of every person. It furnishes the most essential content of the word *Self*. Essentially to confuse or confound one's Self with some other Self is to do dishonor to the proudest claim to the possession of a real personal life. One person may be similar to another in a great variety of more or less important ways. But to lose the capacity of differentiating one's Self from that of any other, or to identify one's Self with that of any other, would abolish all claim for any body or soul to be a true and complete person.

Here again, the attempt to tell in what precisely this identity consists, and how the differentiating act and habit of practice actually works, involves the inquiry at once in the mazes

of psychological analysis and subtle metaphysical dispute. This common-sense assumption — universal and inevitable as it undoubtedly is — constitutes another of the mysteries of the personal life. Its solution, even as regards the differentiation and identity of the individual man as a body, is not purely a question of physics or physiology; as regards the identification and differentiation of the individual man as a soul, it is not merely a question of descriptive and explanatory psychology. For it is the reality and fundamental significance, and the final purpose, of the identity which is claimed for the human person that invites and demands our most strenuous use of the powers of reflection.

The very word "Personality" is an imperative demand for that use of the reflective powers out of which springs metaphysics, whether of the naïve and unintentional, or of the trained and systematic sort. Like other words in "*ity*," this word smacks of a claim to express reality, to suggest and embody the quality or qualities which make a thing to be what it really is. But we have already seen — a truth which will continually appear more clearly — that a great and almost bewildering variety of capacities and aptitudes is assembled, so to say, in the conception of human beings in general, and of every particular human being, every individual person, and then bound together in a kind of unity by the activity of self-differentiation and self-identi-

fication. To show how this can be possible, or at any rate how, as a matter of experienced fact, this is accomplished, is in large part the problem concerned with the nature and development of personality.

CHAPTER III

THE CENTRE OF PERSONALITY

THE uncriticised opinions as expressed in the actions and language of the multitude of men are, indeed, far enough from affording a final answer to our question: What is it to be a person after the fashion of every normal individual man? The opinions themselves are expressed in the form of assumptions, the ground in fact and validity of which cannot be *a priori* assumed. When we raise the question of right, however, we undertake that difficult task of self-criticism to which, in more modern times, the philosopher Immanuel Kant turned the attention of the most profoundly reflective minds of the Western world. The thinkers of the Orient and of classical Greece had centuries before approached the same question in a different way.

As regarded from the point of view held by biological evolution, man assumes in fact the attitude toward himself of the reflective mind. But the earlier products of this attitude are a host of assumptions which must themselves be subjected to further examination by higher and more thorough processes of disciplined reflection.

We should be ungrateful, however, and unreasonable in our ingratitude toward the commonsense of humanity at large, if we did not acknowledge the helpfulness of its crude but shrewd analysis of the more fundamental elements of the conception of personality. To enumerate some of the results of this analysis: Every person has a body and also a soul; and both body and soul have some sort of reality. But what is the nature of the reality of each; and do they both possess the same kind of reality? The assumptions of naïve reflection do not answer either of these questions. Body and soul are somehow bound together, are in reality so related that they develop under conditions of mutual dependence, and thus constitute the unity of a personal life. But how shall we conceive of the nature of this so-called bond, or relation in reality, so as to accommodate it to what we know of the nature of bodies in general, of human bodies and souls, in particular; and of the actual relations in which different bodies and souls stand to each other in the world at large, so far as known to man? Surest of anything connected with his personal life is every man that he has some kind of separateness from all other individuals; that he is a self-possessed individual; and that this individuality includes and depends upon the identity of personal life through its various stages of development. A certain kind of self-sameness is essential for the very constitution

of a real Self. But what sort of identity can that possibly be, which knows its self subject to incessant change? What kind of self-sameness can truthfully be predicated of a Self whose very existence at all depends on an unceasing adaptation to environment, conditioned upon an equally unceasing change of associations and habits of action and reaction? Here indeed is a problem which may well give, and which in fact has given, stimulus to the loftiest flights of the speculative powers, and to the most profound and mysterious of metaphysical speculations.

Under all these separate problems, as furnishing the foundations upon which they must all rest, if at all in security, and penetrating them all like the most subtile of atmospheres, and above them all, hanging like an impenetrable cloud of mist, or as a quiet sky through the fleecy clouds of which rays of the sunshine of faith and hope are breaking, is the problem raised by man's claim to the reality of his knowledge, the essential truthfulness of the ideas he attains of himself, of the world in which he lives, and of his actual relations to that world. Something must be attempted in answer to all these questions, if any approach is to be made, by whatever method of approach, to the secrets of man's personal life.

We shall, first of all, have something to say of the origin and nature of that unity which man as a person supposes himself to possess. What is it really; and how is it actually brought about?

Such, however, is the nature of this inquiry that it inevitably leads the inquirer on into every other one of the particular problems, the solution of which, if it could be made, would help to unfold the truth as to the origin, nature, development, and destiny of man's personal life. We seek now some sort of a centre, or simple conception, to serve as an area, rather than a point, around which we may group the other considerations that will throw added light on the unity implied in the very title to be a "person." In this search psychology must be our principal and unfailing guide. But it must be psychology, not merely as experimental and descriptive, but as including also something from the philosophy of mind.

The most obvious mental operation which lies at the base of all the process of assembling, grouping, and so unifying the life of both body and mind, is the so-called process of association. In its more primary forms, it is passive rather than active, and does not demand any definite activity of will, at any rate in the form of deliberate selection or other manner of choice. As considered in its effects it differs little or not at all from the similar processes in the mental life of the more intelligent of the animals. Under its influence different stimuli of the same sense, successive or nearly simultaneous, become fused or united in such a way as to arouse and guide the mind into its primary judgments as to the

meaning and uses of the different parts of one's own body and of other things. By the refinement and subtlety which practice gives, the blind are enabled to substitute associations of the sense of touch for those which others obtain only or chiefly through the sense of sight. The various combinations of sight and touch which are essential for the recognition in practical ways of environing things, and for the uses of things, are made possible for the most part by passive and relatively uncontrolled associations. Without entering further into details along this line it may be said, that in a world which afforded the mind no fixedness of associations — if such an inconceivable jumble of outside phantasmagoric existences could be called a *world* — no personal life could, so to say, *centre* itself, much less develop the unity of a rational selfhood.

But the action of the uncontrolled principle of association results in errors of sense and of judgment, just as truly, if not as frequently, as in facts of perception and intuitions of the nature of reality. By covering one eye and wearing before the other an optical instrument which gave an inverted image of objects, Professor Stratton succeeded in creating associations between visual objects, and between such objects and the movements of the body, as served in a way for practical purposes, but which were quite false when compared with what we are wont to consider truths of fact in such matters.

The whole psychological doctrine of what we call "errors of sense" is based upon our knowledge of the influence of passive associations.

Something important must be added, then, to our ideas of the principle of association as it operates in man's case to bring into a sort of unity the personal life. And this is what we call the Will. Attention, which is an act of will; memory directed to the results of past experiences by an act of will; selection of the moments or aspects of every experience in which some interest is involved; all these, and other forms of intelligent and more or less deliberate activity, must be evoked, if the principle of association is to contribute what is demanded of it as a unifying factor in the personal life.

In its earlier and less intelligent forms, the word "fusion" pretty well describes, though in a figurative way, the passive character of the associative process. Feelings *fuse* with feelings; sensations of one sense with those of another sense; feelings with sensations, and feelings and sensations with mental images or so-called ideas.

Both in animals and in man, *learning* as distinguished from what in our ignorance we call "instinct" is dependent upon the formation of new and more complex associations. These secure more prompt and accurate responses to stimuli by "cutting out" the delay, the pause of hesitation, required for an act of will. Even in uni-cellular animals a certain modified reaction may be

temporarily induced by persistently changing the character of the customary stimuli. Yet with such low forms of life, it is difficult or impossible to secure any evidence of that *retention* which is necessary to any approach to a true "learning." But the higher animals may be trained to an extent which in some cases startles us with its resemblance to the higher and more intelligent reactions of human beings as modified by passive associations. As long, however, as intelligent will is not put into the process of learning under the principle of association, its tendency is to reduce the man to a machine rather than to elevate him into the ranking of a real person.

Various suggestive divisions have been made of the kinds of association in man's case, and various attempts to bring the different kinds under some one psychological principle. Even when we approach the subject from the more purely physiological and experimental rather than the speculative or metaphysical point of view, we are obliged to recognize a class which merits the title of "controlled associations." Thus we emphasize the activity of personal will. For learning as involving controlled associations, the "setting of the mind" as a preparatory adjustment is indispensable. *Voluntarily to give oneself up to learning is human.* Feelings of recognition, such as we have reason to believe are in the case of the personal life different from any experiences of the animal, are implied in the active associa-

tions of human beings. The deliberate act of selection involves the activity of a personal will. Under the influence of the higher social, artistic, moral and religious sentiments, associations are created and sustained in the individual person and in collections of persons; such as the development of the sciences and the improvement of civilization demands. These associations are well worthy to be called "will-full,"—not in the meaning of being irrational and arbitrary; but, the rather, in the meaning of being centred in, and springing out of, the intelligent and purposeful will of a developing personal life. *The will to science is essentially a personal will.*

There is another factor, or set of factors, which seems to be even more primary and animal-like in its relation to the production of a sort of individuality than is the principle of passive association. For this we have need of an altogether satisfactory word. In the older psychology it bore the title of "Temperament"; and a somewhat elaborate doctrine of temperaments was discussed at length. By a temperament was ordinarily understood any marked type of mental constitution and development due to inherited characteristics of the bodily organism. Some of the words used to describe the different types of men referred to this physical conception of the nature of temperament; others bore relics of old-time superstitions as to the influences of the heavenly bodies over the prenatal life, or

over the infant at the date of its birth. Thus the "sanguine" man was full-blooded; the "choleric" man was full of bile; and the unfortunate possessor of a "melancholic" temperament was full of black bile. Do we not read in Shakespeare's "King John"?

> "Or, if that surly Spirit, melancholy,
> Had baked thy blood and made it heavy-thick,
> Which else runs tickling up and down the veins."

When the beliefs of astrology were still rife, there was found in the determining power of the planets a reason why some men were "Jovial," others "Saturnine," and still others "Mercurial," in temperament. Today the scores of combinations effected by the attempts to solve the problem of heredity have not made us much wiser as to just how it is that the original individuality of the personal life and development of man has its basis laid in the past; and as to telluric influences upon the constitution and functions of the nervous mechanism, we have little more positive information than had the men of former generations.

In spite of our ignorance when it comes to demanding a precise and verifiable science of the subject, there is not the slightest doubt that there are endless differences in the capacities and tendencies with which the millions of human beings born today, and born through all the past generations of human history, enter upon the realization of a personal life. There is as little doubt that

upon these differences the differences in personal character and personal development largely depend. But this is far from proving that the variations in the grades of richness in human thought and feeling, and in the degree of lofty attainment, are strictly conditioned upon such factors. There still remains at the centre the shrine consecrated to a *personal will.*

For those influences which do not find their centre in a personal will, the rather vague but convenient word "disposition" is frequently employed. This word has the advantage that it does not, like the word "temperament," imply any particular theory as to its origin and application to different individuals. In all the races of men, and even in the breeds of the higher animals, the facts force us to recognize marked differences of disposition. The individual members of the different races and breeds are just *naturally disposed* to certain characteristic forms of reaction under a given set of circumstances. The reactions may be in the form, not only of unconscious movements and so-called innate habits, but also in notably different types of emotion. It seems also to be a general fact of zoölogy that the higher in the scale of evolution any animal species is placed, the more variation in the natural disposition may be traced in the individual members of the species. The disposition of dogs and horses is more nearly *personal,* in the more loosely defined use of the word, than is the

disposition of cobras and spiders. As a species of conscious reaction, we probably have no reason to attribute disposition to any one amœba or other animal of the uni-cellular type. Disposition in every individual man, whether it be the so-called natural or the so-called acquired, is, however, an exceedingly complicated affair. Its influence extends to all the movements of a bodily sort, and to the entire involved life of emotion and ideation. Converted by a convenient figure into a sort of independent force, residing as it were outside of the Self, we speak of this complex of natural aptitudes and tendencies, as though it dominated and controlled the personal life. But such personification of disposition should not be allowed to obscure the important truth that the centre of this very complex is the will. Thus we speak a profound metaphysical truth, when we characterize some men as born with a weak will, and others with a strong will; some with a bad will, and others with a good will. The kindly disposition and the malicious disposition, the generous disposition and the selfish disposition; the truthful disposition and the crafty and deceitful disposition; — all dispositions have their centre in the will.

That the native disposition of any person may be either strengthened or weakened by the passive associations due to environment, is a popular opinion confirmed by all that we know of the way

in which men think, feel, and behave. A kindly disposition is cherished by fortunate and sympathetic surroundings; or it may be soured by surroundings of the opposite kind. The disposition to cruelty, except perhaps in the cases of those degenerates which are sometimes called "monsters," may be modified by the steady influence of association with kindly souls. But as soon as the activities are aroused on which the evolution of a more strictly personal life depends, we begin to recognize and to emphasize more and more the control of disposition by deeds of will.

There are acquired as well as native dispositions. Every experience modifies, in however slight degree, both the nervous system and the mental habit, and so contributes something toward the forming of what Professor Stout has significantly called a "disposition" toward new experiences. In this way reproductive tendencies and aptitudes are produced in every individual. It is the character of these tendencies and aptitudes which gives individuality to the personal life and personal development. Again in our attempt to account for this class of phenomena, and to determine the laws which explain them, we come upon that central mysterious area of the human being which we call his Will.

As resulting from the action and reaction of disposition and association, habits are formed. By all consent, every man may be known as just

that sort of a Self and no other, by knowing what his habits are. Although we recognize the fact that it is possible to form, within comparatively narrow limits, new habits that are to a degree inconsistent with their native tendencies, in the lower animals, this must be done mainly by the pressure of outside influences. In quite strictly similar manner we correct the baby's habit of sucking its thumb, or the child's tendency to left-handedness. This way of forming and changing habits, regarded as a pretty purely mechanical affair, has aptly been called a process, now of "stamping in" and now of "stamping out." The fundamental idea of all habit-formation is that of securing the retention of the results of behavior in the past, in the form of more or less decided and fixed tendencies to repeat the same kind of behavior.

If, however, the forming of habits in man's case were confined to the effects of an external sort, its mechanism might give an appearance of, but could not give reality to, the unity of a truly personal life. In man's case, what Mr. Bagehot has so expressively called "the making and the breaking of the cake of custom" must be constantly taking place. And the hammer that forges or shatters the substance of however hardened a character must strike from within, must signify nothing less than the aroused energy of a personal will.

In the more complicated habits of human

beings, such as are motived and guided by æsthetical, moral, social, and religious ideas, we recognize in still higher degrees those considerations which serve to contrast the simpler reactions required in all acts of learning, as performed by man, with the corresponding reactions as performed by the more intelligent of the lower animals. These are greater fertility in association; greater selective attention; more intelligent recognition of the purposefulness of behavior; but above all, a larger sphere of self-control, — if, indeed, any animal body that is not also gifted with a touch of personality can be said to be capable of a genuine *self*-control. To these advantages will have to be added, in the sequel, a multitude of sentiments and ideas, to which the animal can make no response in the form of habits of behavior; because these sentiments and ideas never enter the horizon of the animal consciousness.

In psychological circles many elaborate and interesting attempts have been made to reduce the nature and unfolding of man's mental life to a mechanism of ideas. The most successful of these attempts was probably instituted by Herbart, and carried, with an immense store of learning and admirable ingenuity, to its highest form by his great pupil Volkmann von Volkmar in his "Lehrbuch der Psychologie." When criticizing the so-called Herbartian psychology we can in fairness no more agree with Professor James in calling

it "glib jargon," "exploded psychology," "hideously fabulous performances," than with those adoring disciples who have founded their so-called "pedagogy" upon it as a unique and exclusive basis.

If we regard "so-called ideas" in their passive aspect solely, there is no doubt that much of man's learning and growth in knowledge is founded upon — to employ the Herbartian phrase — "the action and reaction of ideas." Partial psychical processes of ideation, and tendencies to such processes, or representative images, do in fact combine to form complex fields of consciousness over which we have little or no control. The possible oddities and whimsicalities of the mechanical fusion of ideas are almost limitless. Who of us is there, whatever his attainment in self-control and in the profoundest activities of the reflective consciousness, that does not feel himself hampered and almost enslaved by some of his "ideas" thus passively formed? One would gladly throw them off. But did Immanuel Kant by writing in his diary "Remember to forget Lampe" (his discharged body servant) really succeed in forgetting Lampe? We read of one learned man who, when a boy, in order to lose no time, had practised committing books to memory while on the full run. Years afterwards the sight of a book mastered in that way brought up the recollection of its contents *fused* with the flitting images of the palisades and hedges by which he

had run while reading it for the first time. Another, who in his youth had worked as an apprentice for a hatter, could never look on black wainscotting (like that of the room in which he had worked) without the collective heterogeneous mental picture of all former sensations and feelings — smell of varnish, etc. — being reproduced. Conversely, at the smell of varnish, all the composite picture of his old disagreeable life arose into consciousness. The learned Jew Maimon is said always to have accompanied any very strenuous mental effort — for example, studying Euler's mathematical works — with "Talmudic intoning and movement of the body"; because he originally mastered the writings of the synagogue in that way.[1]

If the mechanism of ideas covered the entire field of man's mental development he could never attain to a genuine personality. His mental life might indeed be bound together in this way, as with chains of steel. But it would not be the mental life of a person; and the individual could never achieve personality. Nor could this achievement be secured, if to this principle of mechanism we added a large field for the sprouting of spontaneously generated but uncontrolled ideas of the most exalted character. Let it be granted that sometimes, in a state of

[1] Quoted from the author's "Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory," p. 257; where a detailed treatment of the subject will be found.

so-called inspiration, Philo Judæus had "thoughts fall from heaven like a shower of snow, or like seed from the hand of the sower," into his mind: but science, and wisdom in practical affairs, or even the "plain man's" ordinary knowledge, does not come in that way. The maudlin and incoherent utterances of the dreamer and the drunken man do not give us the key with which to unlock all the storehouses of human thought and mental development. These storehouses are full of the treasure secured only by deliberate and purposeful thinking. Such thinking is an act of will.

When we speak of the ideas of any individual man we do not simply mean — be that man savage or savant, "plain man" or philosopher — a fortuitous assemblage of mental images, or a train of such images that are being hauled along one after another as a locomotive pulls after it, in a fixed order of succession, the loaded freight cars that have been selected by a will not its own, for its appointed task. A man's ideas are indeed characteristic of his individuality. At the same time they partake essentially of the period in which he lives, and of the habits of the surrounding members of his race. But they are not all passively determined in this relatively external and unselflike way. What every man "thinks in his heart," that also, and pre-eminently, is he. It is chiefly such thoughts which distinguish him as a person from all other persons of every time and race. The sphere of such thought is in most

men, indeed, very limited. As it is wont to be said of the multitude: "They have not many ideas of their own; they do very little thinking of their own." But the development of the personal life, to however low a level of genuine personality, requires purposeful observation and purposeful reflection. Such observation and reflection are acts of maturing personal will.

The higher constructive activities which must operate in order to the creation of personality require more detailed treatment than can be given them in the present connection. But at least the mention of them is required in the search for some centre of personality, around which we may group the other more obvious capacities and activities in which consists the personal life. Of these we will now speak a word about memory, especially the recognitive, the memory of a Self. It is plain that without such memory there can be no unity to either thought or action which is worthy of being considered of the personal type. Memory that is capable of being explained by the passive processes of association, however elaborate, can never give to a conscious life the unity characteristic of a Self. For such an achievement recognition and self-appropriation are essential. A certain kind of recognition is manifest in much of the behavior of all the more intelligent of the animals. The dog recognizes his master and the meaning of his master's mood, according to the cast of his master's countenance

at the time, or the gesture of his arm or leg. Whether the animal has the distinctly conscious experiences which man has when deliberating to solve his doubt, and then emerging into a state of feeling sure about facts in a more or less distant past, is a more difficult problem in the psychology of animal life. But the distinctive thing in man's memory, the thing which makes it a powerful factor and an essential activity in unifying the Self, is the fact that man is capable of attributing the present experience to the self-same Self whose was the past experience; and of feeling sure of the truth of such an act of attributing. *I* did this, or suffered that, in the past; it is the selfsame "I" who now achieves the act of remembering. "I *was;* I *am;* I *know* that the I who now *am* is the selfsame *I* that then *was.*" Any act of deliberately remembering, however entangled in elusive and puzzling associations, when it becomes clear, can be resolved into factors that are uniquely personal, and so incapable of being explained by the theory of a will subjected to the dominance of passive associations. The conception of a Self as having some kind of identity; the abstract conception of time as having some sort of continuity and reality; the power to which psychology gives the name *self*-consciousness and about the real nature of which it has often of late debated so clamorously, and so foolishly; and above all, that activity of a self-appropriating will;—all these and other

personal characteristics are involved, however obscurely and weakly, in every act of recognitive memory.

It is the power of self-control, however, in which resides the citadel of personal life and personal development; and it is the doctrine of self-control which furnishes, so far as its possession is possible by finite intellects, the secret of personality. These and similar statements are secondary and dependent on the belief that the veritable *Centre of Personality is the Will.* Ever since Schopenhauer, the current views of human nature, from the different points of view, have been emphasizing the will that is in man and in the Universe, rather to the prejudice or neglect of the more strictly intellectual capacities and activities. "The heart of the heart," said Joannes Müller, speaking from the theologian's point of view, "is the will." "In the will," says Wundt, speaking from the psychological point of view, "the Subject apprehends in an immediate way its peculiar manner of life and action."

But what kind of a will can serve as a centre for the development of personal life in man; and what conception are we entitled to form of The Will on which, if we personify the Universe as our personal nature compels us to do, we must conceive that the constitution and ongoing life of the Universe depend? In the various kinds and grades of animal life — and we might even say without fear of being convicted of absurdity,

in the various species of plants and in the atoms, as judged by their specific peculiarities of behavior — we discover an almost infinite variety of wills. In man's case, too, we seem compelled to recognize in every individual various kinds and degrees of will. In the first edition of his "A Text-Book of Physiology" the English author, Dr. M. Foster, declares: "In simpler and less exact language, such a mass of protoplasm as an amœba, though susceptible in the highest degree to influences from without, has a will of its own." And the reason assigned for this conclusion runs as follows: "It executes movements which cannot be explained by reference to any changes in surrounding circumstances at the time being." Such changes are called "automatic"; and the inner source of their origin is called "automatic will." This property of automatism, the same authority defines as "the power of initiating disturbances or vital impulses, independent of any immediate event or stimulus from without"; and he adds that "it is one of the fundamental properties of protoplasm." If we leave out the words "vital impulses" and limit our conception of automatic will to the initiation of changes which consist in the executing of movements that cannot be *wholly* explained by any influences in the environment at the time being, it would be quite justifiable to say that every species of atom has an automatic will; and that the character of this will is always necessary to be considered in

explaining its behavior under the continuously changing conditions of its environment, that is, the so-called "character" of the doings of the atom.

In man's case we recognize both these kinds of automatic will; both that which executes movements that are purposeful but for the explanation of which there is no need of any consciousness of their purposefulness; and also those changes that may be referred to conscious impulses. But even the latter are by no means always, or even habitually, regulated by conscious choice. For every automatic activity, every deed of will which does not rise above the level of a complicated vital automatism, in order to explain it fully it is necessary to understand the nature of the particular *autos* in which the deed of will originates. Now man's *autos*, or Self, is capable of choice; and choice is the highest expression of the will that is in man, of the Will that is the centre of his personality. But choice is not possible for blind will, or for a merely automatic will, — at least not in the form in which men do actually choose. On the contrary, personal will responds to ideas and motives, whole classes of which range above the utmost stretch of capacity reached by the most notable developments of a merely animal life. The superior imagination and reasoning powers of man allure and enable him to form ideals of various kinds; — that is, ideas of conditions and achievements that

lie beyond anything already presented by experience of what is actual. These ideals of truth, beauty, and goodness inspire the will to choices that have their realization in view. And when such choices become habitual, the "will to live" becomes the will, not simply to live, but to live worthily and well.

It is therefore in *Character*, or that kind of the unification of personal capacities and activities which is firmly settled on its basis in the Will, when self-disciplined in the habitual and regardful choice of rational and moral ideals, that one must discover, to reverence, the highest type of personality. If we can clearly discern the conditions, laws of the evolution, the values, and the probable destiny, of such a character, we may hope the better to understand the secret of personality, whether we can explain it, or not, in terms of the mechanism of the physical, psychophysical, and psychological sciences.

CHAPTER IV

COMING TO ONE'S SELF

IN that parable which, above all others, figures in the most persuasive way the profoundest change possible in the attitude of a human will toward the Will of the Universe, we read: "But when he came to himself he said, . . . I will arise and go to my father." To arrive at such self-knowledge, and to choose such a line of conduct, as is attributed in this parable to the penitent "prodigal son," implies a practical solution of the problem of the secret of personality. As to his origin, the human person finds it in a divine personality; as to his nature, it is that of a wandering and disloyal or a returned and obedient son; as to his development and destiny, these are to be realized in their ideal form by the perfection in knowledge and service of the divine father by his son. According to this view, then, the most nearly complete and final answer to the question, What is it to be a person? must be found in the realm of personal relations. Every human person has within him at least the "potentiality" — to adopt from the Aristotelian metaphysics a convenient word — of recognizing his true relations to

the Divine Person, and by an act of will adapting himself to those relations. Such an act of will may fitly be called a "coming to one's Self" in the highest meaning of the words.

The instances of a human person coming to himself with sudden and sun-clear self-consciousness, and then acting in view of the self-knowledge gained in this way, with full promptitude and firmness of decision, are comparatively rare in the available records of human religious experience. But they are numerous enough to prove its possibility. In his "Confessions" Augustine tells us how he came to himself in no less notable fashion than that narrated of the prodigal son in the parable. In his youth he had made the acquaintance of his baser bodily Self by drinking freely "the cup of sensual pleasure." But even at this stage of the "coming" he had learned enough of another self to awaken the prayer which he tells us arose in his heart: "Lord, give me chastity and temperance, but not now." He had been for some time coming to his intellectual self under Manichean influences, through the attractions of Neo-platonism and the unbounded enthusiasm which this idealistic philosophy awakened in him; and by his induction into Christian doctrine under the preaching of Ambrose of Milan. But he had not yet adjusted his will to the Will of the Universe; he had not yet determined: "I will arise and go to the father." *This* coming to himself took place when,

overcome with conflicting emotions, he had fled to the garden and thrown himself in tears down under a fig tree; had heard the voice of a child from a neighboring house repeating over and over the words *Tolle, lege*, "Take up and read"; and had picked up from the ground a copy of Paul's Epistles and opened upon the sentence: "Let us walk honestly as in the day." To walk honestly as in the day is to follow the road which leads the individual man to the discovery and appropriation of the treasures of his own personality.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the recognition of the truth that man comes to his truest and highest Self only by an intelligent and cordial adjustment of his will to a higher and Divine Will, or — to use more definitively the language of religious experience — by taking the attitude of loyal son toward God as his heavenly Father, has ever been confined to any one type of religious doctrine or religious experience. This voluntary attitude of reverence and fidelity toward "Heaven" as the divine Source of all good and the just Ruler over the affairs of men, individual or social, has long and widely been deemed the prerequisite of all prosperity and righteousness for the personality of man. Only as this secret was discovered and its admonitions acted upon after its prophetic voices had been heard and taken to heart, could individuals or nations flourish or become strong and great.

Dr. Martin is undoubtedly in the right, when he affirms that Confucius ascribed to Heaven, the object of his reverence, more of personality than his followers of today are willing to admit. In a more private way did the greatest of all the monarchs of ancient Egypt, Rameses II, when in sore distress avow the same unshaken belief: "Who, then, art thou, O my father Amon! Doth a father forget his son? Surely a wretched lot awaiteth him who opposes thy will; but blessed is he who knoweth thee, for thy deeds proceed from a heart full of love." And the lame slave Epictetus, the prince of all the ancient Stoics but a true Christian in his reflective thinking and in his mode of life, exhorted himself and others without ceasing: "Dare to look up to God and say, 'Make use of me for the future as thou wilt.' I am of the same mind. I am one with thee."

It is not, however, of this supremely significant and valuable form of the coming to one's Self that it is proposed to treat at the present time. We must begin much lower down in the development of the capacities and activities belonging, as essentials, to all human personal life, if we would lay foundations for the disclosing of its secrets, so far as they may be revealed by appeal to facts of universal experience and to the more primary observations of descriptive psychology. In order to attain any degree or type of the individuality belonging to every normally devel-

oped person, various processes of coming to one's self must be successfully passed through. The coming to itself of a first-rate Self must be preceded by the formation of a selfhood involving, in however great or small degree, the capacities and activities common to all normal members of the human race. The heights of personality can be achieved only by the painful climbing of the base. That is not first, either in time or in logical order, which is spiritual, but that which is psychical and natural. This truth is emphasized by, is indeed embodied in, the very word which religion employs — too often without understanding aright its profound meaning — the word "*super*-natural."

There are three forms of the coming to one's self, different but not distinct, which lay the foundations for the higher developments of the personal life in man. These may be called the Self bodily, the Self sexual, and the Self social.

The first task given to the human infant to do, under the influence of association, habits of ideation, natural instincts, and more clearly conscious impulses accompanied or followed by the reward of pleasure or the punishment of pain, is the formation of his very own bodily Self. We have already seen that to call the individual human being "somebody," or even to deny that he is "anybody" of consequence, and not less, contemptuously to call him a "nobody,"

is to associate the development and inherited qualities of the physical organism in an essential way with the personal life. Every human personality is a Body. Not only this: every human personality is somebody in particular, and must be self-distinguished in space and time from every other body. And, indeed, how could I count for any particular person in my own esteem, or in that of my fellows, unless I distinguish myself, and am distinguished by them, as a separate material existence in time and space. To have been there and then, or to be here and now, is inconceivable without coming to a bodily Self, for a being who is to take his place and play his part, however insignificant and whether for good or for evil, in a world of men.

To get a knowledge and possession of his own particular bodily self is the marvellously intricate and difficult task set from the very first for achievement by the infant's mind and will. Modern psychology, after discountenancing as far as possible the mystery of the process, has occupied itself diligently with attempts to describe and explain the different elements and stages of this achievement. But it has never solved this most abstruse, and therefore most entrancing of its problems. And it never will solve it until some person can combine the power of insight and analysis of the genius in psychology and philosophy with the quite undeveloped consciousness of the babe. Such a combination is,

of course, impossible for a human mind. The truth is that however we may imagine

"Heaven lies about us in our infancy,"

the plain fact is, the rather,

"Shades of the prison-house begin to close
Upon the growing boy."

So far as the unprejudiced study of the signs informs us — and what trustworthy evidence besides such signs have we for interpreting the nature of any thing, or, still more, the conscious experiences of any form of life, or most of all, the kind of Life, personal or otherwise, which is manifested, as we say, in the Universe? — so far as the signs inform us, the dog who runs ahead or follows barking at the heels of his master, has feelings and mental images far more like those of the man than has the infant given to his fatherhood a few hours before. The grown dog is more of a Self than the puppy man. But the human infant has the "potentiality" of knowledge and control of its bodily Self which will shortly carry it far beyond anything possible for a merely animal mind and will. The dog can never become a body, self-distinguished and distinguished by others as a particular and lone example of the human personal type.

We cannot enter into the detailed description of the process by which, so far as its study can solve the mystery, the human infant comes into the possession and control of its bodily self. A brief survey, subject to doubt at many points

and to constant revision, must suffice. It would seem that in this work of "bi-partition," or distinction between body and soul as they are, however, in reality combined to constitute the complete person, "the total *melange* of bodily feelings or sensations that are ill-localized, confused or mixed" — takes an important part. It forms a sort of background or platform of consciousness on which the particular objects of sense-presentation define themselves. Nor is it in the earlier stages alone of the development of self-knowledge that the somewhat vague conception of ourselves as a remembered and familiar complex of bodily feelings is prominent. With the child who has attained any vivid notion of his selfhood, it is the feeling of a moving body that represents the self; and his most abstract conception of his own being does not go far beyond vague generalizations, warm with emotion, upon the basis of *bodily* experiences. If this earliest form of the representation of the Ego could speak, and could use the abstract language of philosophy, it would announce itself thus: "*What is here and now, that am I.*" In this regard the child would agree with the philosopher whenever the latter tries to realize his highest conception of the self. But with the child, what is here and now, — "*that which am I,*" — is chiefly what it can see or put its hand upon, of its own body; or what it feels within its own thoracic or abdominal cavities.

The author once pressed a bright little girl of five years old to tell him what she meant by the "I" that "loved papa"; in the last analysis the solution of the puzzle was announced in the following sentence: "Oh, now I know; it is my arms, because I hug him with them; and my lips, because I kiss him with them." But do we not find the Apostle shrinking back from the vague and shadowy conception of an "unclothed" or disembodied Ego? Indeed, the literature of many peoples, as, for example, of the ancient Hebrews, raises the question whether they had, in general, reached the conception of a soul as separable from a sentient bodily organism." [1]

The conditions of heredity, environment, and of training under the influence of social surroundings, according to varying capacities and aptitudes, make certain an endless variety of individual selves, no one of which is in all particulars precisely like any other. These do not suffice, however, unless they are apprehended and appropriated by the individual, to constitute him a separate bodily Self. Every one must learn by trial of his own particular capacities and aptitudes, and by gaining at least some measure of control over them.

The conscious testing of his bodily powers, and the discovery of the results of automatic and impulsive will, furnishes a growing wealth

[1] Quoted from the author's "Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory," p. 526 f.

of material for every individual to know, more fully and in detail, what particular sort of a body he is, and what things he can do, what things not do, with it. A necessary and highly valuable portion of this experience is gained by matching himself against other bodies, not only those of inanimate things, or of animals, but also, and not least important, of his fellow men. The individual coöperates with others in common tasks, or struggles against them in friendly or deadly rivalry. All the while his temperament, or disposition, whether the subject be aware of it or not, is exercising a determining influence upon the process of coming to one's bodily self. In this way one person may be induced to make for himself "somebody" of a leader or a bully; another may let himself become an unambitious and despondent "nobody." A naturally choleric temperament, and an ardent, grasping, or aspiring disposition, when cherished or cultivated by habitual deeds until habits of will give fixedness of character, makes a very different body from that formed by the opposite of these natural characteristics and acquired habits. Nor can the influence of health and of sanitary surroundings be left out of the complete account.

How true something of all this is of the different species of animals, Epictetus reminds us in an amusing passage which, like all this philosopher says, was intended to bear upon the moral training of the personal life in man. In a Dis-

course which bears the title, "*In What Manner and upon Every Occasion to Preserve our Character*," he emphasizes the importance for upholding his personal dignity, of a philosopher's refusal to cut off his beard. For Domitian had ordered all philosophers to be banished. To avoid this inconvenience, those who wished to disguise their profession had their beards removed. But when Epictetus was asked what he intended to do about complying with this order, he replied: "Whence does the bull, when the lion approaches, alone recognize his own qualifications, and expose himself alone for the whole herd? It is evident that with the qualifications occurs, at the same time, the consciousness of being indued with them. But neither is a bull nor a gallant-spirited man formed all at once. We are to exercise, and qualify ourselves, and not to run rashly upon what doth not concern us."

All such exercise as that recommended by the ancient Stoic, and illustrated by such a process of "coming to itself" as is possible even for an animal, depends upon the formation of habits of will. And it is toward the formation of habits of will that the training of the bodily Self in man is directed. When we speak of *training* we refer to something of much wider import than the special training given to the professional or amateur athlete. Nor do we refer solely to such universally desirable exercise as is demanded for the personal life in order to secure for every

individual human being the requisite *mens sana in corpore sano*. Our reference is much broader than that implied in the attainment of either of these, however desirable, ends. It implies the truth that the "coming to one's self" of every individual Self requires a quite special and highly individualized culture of each one's particular aptitudes, capacities, and opportunities, both of body and of mind as dependently related to the body.

Among the proverbs of "the wise man" it is written: "Train up a child in the way (the trade, handicraft, business, or profession) it is designed that it should follow; and then when it has aged, it will not desert or willingly take itself out of that particular way." And, indeed, so embodied will this way have become in the personal feelings, ideas, and practical activities of the Self, that its disembodiment will be difficult if not quite impossible. Never *quite* impossible; for the will "to break the cake of custom" is essential to the continuous life of a genuine personality.

This conclusion might be enforced at length by a study of the psychology of man's physical organism, and of the manner in which this organism reacts to excite those feelings, ideas, and deeds of will on which the conception of the bodily self so largely depends. The superiority of man over the other animals, and his ability to lay the foundations of civilization, are largely the result of the desire and the capacity

to design and make, improve and employ, an endless variety of weapons of defence and attack, and of use for the supply of his needs; but also for the expression and gratification of his ideals of utility, comfort, beauty, and religion. But the particular character of the bodily self depends to an hitherto not sufficiently analyzed extent on the character of the implement which the individual habitually employs in the accomplishment of his daily tasks. The sensations which have been called "the double feeling of contact" —"a beneficent sensory illusion" — enlarge the bodily self in ways that accord with the implements employed. The man for the time being feels and acts as though his tool were a part of that self. It is not possible for the person who uses constantly the pen to feel as does the man whose daily implement is a plough, a hammer, or a sword. The man who sits at the desk, or tends a swiftly running machine from a bench, cannot feel his legs and back and diaphragm, and the contents of his thoracic and abdominal cavities, as does the man who habitually walks the deck of a ship in all kinds of weather, or handles the huge masses of molten iron in a modern rolling mill. The same boy John will not easily become the same bodily self of a man, quite irrespective of whether he is brought up as John the tailor, John the salesman in a ladies' furnishing store, or John the carpenter, or John of the smithy.

Even the secondary feelings which depend upon the styles of dressing one's self, or still more potently upon going mostly naked or not dressing at all, are of no mean significance in the same direction. The psychology of this subject has been treated at some length in Lotze's "Microcosmus," with his customary mixture of psychological insight and refined humor. Here he calls attention to the universal custom of devising garments and forms of adornment that tend notably to increase the feeling of height. These vary all the way from feathers, and helmets and bearskin hats, to lofty coiffures and high-heeled shoes. The boy feels his bodily self exalted when he mounts a pair of stilts. Other forms of clothing extend the feeling of the bodily self in all directions, and thus increase the feeling of freedom as well. Such is the effect of waving drapery, of wavy clusters of curls, and other appendages that flutter in the air. In the same class are placed the mussel-shells, glass beads, or strings of bits of bone, with which the Indian squaw adorns herself; and the sash-ends, light laces, and waving veils of her more civilized sister. Still another kind of accoutrements helps literally to "bolster up" the sense of firmness, of self-control, and of high resolve. Girdles and corsets and bracelets, and other devices for binding the muscles and soft parts of the body tightly, belong to this class; and to it is referred the "feeling of the boy's pride in the manly

vigor of his existence" as he fastens by braces or belt his first pair of trousers, — the substitute for the suit of armor to which, perhaps, he aspires when he shall have attained the strength of a man.

In leaving this consideration of the lower levels along which every individual man moves toward the acquirement for his soul of a bodily self peculiarly his own, I will quote with something of the same spirit of banter the sentences with which Lotze dismisses this part of his discussion of the laws of "human sentience." "After having by the laying down of these three fundamental laws performed for the exact science of dress the same service as Kepler for astronomy, I make over to others the further scientific profit therefrom accruing, and turn to the examination of several phenomena in which the same tendency here observed to alter with æsthetic wilfulness directly given relations of Nature and enhance their value, is exhibited in a graver form. In all actions, from the simple movement of the body up to complicated social arrangements, is shown the disposition to put in the place of the natural course of events a ceremonious order having its origin solely in the will of the subject and yet claiming to regulate them as they must be."

The coming to one's Self as "somebody" is, however, by no means sufficient for the formation and development of the highest type of

personality; or even for laying the foundation in the bodily functions for such a type. For this conclusion, among other reasons, the following may serve the present purpose. And first: It is not inclusive enough. The person is something more than animated body, no matter how well adapted and trained to its control over its own domain. Man's bodily self is more than mere body. It is more than animated body; it is more than embodied soul. It must be a physical organism, adapted by nature and trained by exercise, to express and set into reality in an environment of human society the functions and relations of a full-orbed personal life. Therefore, such a coming to oneself as has already been described, must be completed by a response on the part of the body to the higher æsthetical, moral, and religious sentiments and ideas. In its completed form, this is what Christianity, chiefly but not alone among the religions, has with a truly audacious metaphor called "making the body a temple for the indwelling of the Spirit of God." Adumbrations of this truly natural demand have been everywhere through all the ages the characteristic source of the requisition of all manner of washings and ceremonial ablutions required of the worshipper before he appears in the more immediate presence of the gods; and, as well, of the offerings which he proposes as likely to propitiate them.

A yet more obvious deficiency of the physical

organism as an embodiment of the complete personal life is its instability. In its normal condition it is sensitive to changes of climate, diet, conditions of atmospheric moisture and electricity, and slight local irritations. More notable is the truth, when temporary changes in the bodily self are produced by alcohol, opium, and other drugs, and by such abnormal states as accompany hypnosis, hysteria, somnambulism, and other similar forms of a dissociated and disturbed personality. In certain kinds of insanity, and in the most severe cases of chronic "double or triple personality," so-called, the bodily self seems profoundly affected or even quite overcome. "Go," said the drunken cobbler of Liège, when he awoke from his sleep to find himself bathed, shaved, afflicted with tonsure, and couched in a cell surrounded by brother monks who presented their compliments and inquired eagerly after his restoration to health, — "Go to the foot of the bridge and see if Gilles the cobbler is in his shop; if he is not, I am he; but if he is, may the devil get me, if I know who I am." Among men of savage tribes, the fear of having the name of the individua tampered with, or his photograph taken, lest some important thing may be lost from the essentials of the self, gives added evidence of the same instability of this lower conception of the nature of personality.

Many other evidences might be brought forward to show that it is only when the *character*

of a thinking and willing being under the influence of moral and social ideas has been, in fact, established, and when the Self knows itself as differenced in this way from all external things and from other selves, has the question, What really is it to be a person? received its answer in the case of any individual human being.

Under closely similar influences, and in not unlike manner, every normal individual member of the human race comes to what we have ventured to call "the sexual Self." In calling attention to this fact, and in emphasizing its importance for the higher developments of personal character which repose upon this fact, it is not necessary to spread out in detail the physical and mental differences that always and everywhere exist between man and woman, when each has reached some good degree of maturity; or to argue that there are absolutely no exceptions to the general rule. Undoubtedly, there are in our modern and supposedly refined civilization, masculine women and men who deserve to be called of marked feminine type, both of body and of mind. Undoubtedly, also, there may always and everywhere be discovered women whose physical and mental characteristics equal or surpass those of many men belonging to the same personal type. But about the general facts, and about their importance for the development of the infinite variations of personal life, there can be no doubt. In general, the centre of

gravity of the physical organism, the development and distribution of the muscular weight, the size and strength of the bones, the mathematical proportion of the nervous system and especially of the brain to the other bodily parts, the rate of respiration and circulation, and perhaps the very constitution of the blood, as well as the organs whose function is in some sort known to all adults, difference the sexes in the human race. Thus, in general it may be said that every adult male comes to himself as some sort of man; while every adult female comes to herself as some sort of a woman. The sort of a man is one; the sort of a woman is another, — when we are talking about the endless variety of personalities.

Nor does this process of differencing the sexes in respect of the type of personality that is forming wait for the age of adolescence. Even at birth a difference of dispositions is provable. This difference is emphasized all through childhood and youth by differences in play and in work, in dress, in personal treatment, and a host of other associative influences. Among the lowest savages, such a process of differentiation is recognized as appropriate, and is, more often than not, over-emphasized rather than underestimated. In more highly cultured circles these sexual differences are largely made to serve as the whole basis of social as well as family life. Even in the Old Japan, and now in country places, where

many of the standards of correct living are notably high and others seem to us lamentably low, in the warm weather little boys may go naked but little girls must not.

Nor does this coming to a *knowledge* of the self sexual, on the part of the individual, wait altogether upon the time when the boy or girl begins, however imperfectly, to understand something of its subtler meaning. The very habits of association and action which enforce attention to the differences arouse a consciousness that begins profoundly to affect the process of coming to oneself. And when the rapid physical changes, and profound disturbance of emotion or finer stirrings of sentiment, and awakening of ideas, which are characteristic of the age of adolescence, are matters of experience, this process is greatly accelerated. It culminates in the pairing of the sexes and in the begetting and bearing of children. It thus contributes the most powerful of influences to the coming to the Self social, and to the shaping of all man's artistic, moral, and religious ideas.

Theoretical psychology and philosophy have long debated the question whether a being that had the native capacity (or "potentiality") of personality could become a *genuine person*, so to say, without the influences of education in a social environment. Could a human infant left alone, and reared apart from all social contact with its fellows, ever initiate and develop any

kind of personality worthy of the name? Wholly by oneself, and unaided by other like selves, can the individual of the human species attain the specific personal traits of the species to which he properly belongs? Romulus and Remus, abandoned in infancy and suckled by a she-wolf, became founders of Rome. But this is myth; and they were sons of Mars. Nor does the myth dare to go so far as to make its heroes become such in the companionship of wolves alone. For the king's herdsman took them home to his wife Laurentia, by whom they were carefully nursed. And "the two youths grew up, employed in the labors, the sports, and the perils of the pastoral occupation of their foster-father." But "their blood could not be quite concealed." And their superior mien, courage, and abilities soon acquired for them a decided superiority over their young compeers, and they became leaders of the youthful herdsmen in their contests with robbers or with rivals." "Blood will tell;" but blood alone, and left to itself in a purely natural environment, will not suffice to enable the sons of a god to come to themselves even as herdsmen. For this there must be practical application of the maxim: "Train up the child in the way he is to go;" and then he will be somebody among other bodies of his own kind, after the human, which is essentially the personal, type.

The problem which has just been raised does

not easily admit of an experimental and strictly scientific solution. There have been wild men, or boys abandoned early and left to grow up apart from civilizing influences, and surrounded by only such incitements as plants and animals could afford, who have been captured and subjected under what science appreciates highly — namely, conditions of control — to observation of the effect upon them of an improved and definitely social environment. In these cases, however we dispute over the kind and degree of development they have reached without the acquirement of language and other means of social intercourse with men, we find in these "wild" ones a mental capacity, and social instincts, which difference them distinctly from anything found in animal life. These unfortunate human beings can be humanized; they may be trained to develop a social self of the human personal type. In those cases of double personality, where one of the secondary selves comes into existence with the traits of an infant, or even of an idiot, the same thing is quite invariably true. The seeming infant or idiot is by no means, in all respects, really infantile or idiotic. There may be aroused in the secondary personality the emotional stirrings, the impulses, and aspirations, and the mental activities, that belong to a human personal life. Or if this cannot be done, the imperfect personality can generally be eliminated by judicious medical and psychical treatment;

and thus the cure of dissociated personality is effected and the patient restored to the unity required for the integrity of the personal life.

But every normal human being, irrespective of its bodily peculiarities and of sex, under all kinds and degrees of its social environment, but solicited, compelled, and guided by this environment, comes to conformity with some type of a Social Self. The general features of that type are, indeed, provided by the kind of society into which the individual is born and in which he is brought up. He must work with others, share in their sports, and take his part in their contests, whether domestic, inter-tribal, or inter-national. To a certain large extent, the forming of his mental associations, the direction of his sense-perceptions, his emotions, superstitions, ideas of moral value and corresponding deeds of will, and all the activities of his æsthetical, moral, and religious consciousness, must conform to the prevailing social type. According to the character and stage of social development, into a certain number and ranking of which the so-called science of sociology, or "societology," in a rather arbitrary way, divides up human history and the various races of men, the individual man comes to his Social Self. But these relatively external influences never quite dominate the process completely. They are prevented from this by the individuality belonging to the bodily self; and they cannot wholly overcome the inherent

differences which characterize the self sexual. Not every boy can be made a mighty hunter or warrior or leader of men, whether by savage or mediæval religious training, or by modern culture or *Kultur*. No girl can be made into a man by compelling her to work in the fields or in a factory, or hiring her to hand baskets of coal up the sides of a ship; or by donning a suit of armor to lead men to battle after the style of Joan of Arc. Nor is it the social environment which accounts for poets, artists, reformers of morals, inspired prophets, or great teachers of religion or discoverers in science, in a wholly exclusive way. The individual personal will, with its mystery of personal choice, and a special endowment of imagination, sentiment and ability to form and to appreciate ideas of value, must be admitted into the account of the formation of such selves as these. And, indeed, differences, whether inherited or acquired, which culminate in different habits of will must be recognized in the coming of every individual to his social self.

It is often claimed that savages have a much inferior development of individuality in the social self; and it is assumed that the reason for this is to be found in the low grade of their social development. Both the claim and the assumption are doubtful, however. But anthropology is not acquainted with any savage tribe that is not already gifted with all the essential requisites for developing a high type of the social self, in

every one of the most characteristic features of human personality. If religion of the pure and redemptive sort *can once get hold* of them, — and here is the difficulty, a difficulty often chiefly due to the conspicuous inconsistencies of the teachers of such a professed religion, — and then education come to its aid, the way is opened to the actual production of a percentage of the higher type which shall compare favorably with that produced by the most favored nations.[1]

The Coming to Oneself in all these three closely dependent ways — the self bodily, the self sexual, and the self social — is absolutely essential for being anybody among others, a Self of some sort in relation with other selves of

[1] Some years ago a pupil of mine who had roamed among the most unfrequented and savage of the South Sea Islands, translated a book of the Odyssey into the language of one of them, and read it before an assembly of its chiefs and their followers. They greeted the poem with more intelligence and enthusiastic appreciation than that displayed by the average Freshman or Sophomore in College, even when he reads the translation of his "pony," or listens to the translation of his teacher.

An acquaintance of mine, who had been brought up from infancy in the closest intimacy with the so-called "primitive men" of Australia, and who was himself a member of the anthropological branch of the British Association of Sciences, once said to me: "About every matter for the knowledge of which their environment affords them the means of gaining knowledge, I take off my hat to them every time." A professor of anthropology in the University of Cambridge, England, who was well acquainted with the primitive men of the East Indies, did not hesitate to declare that he considered their powers of accurate observation and acuteness of intelligence distinctly superior to that of the lower classes in Great Britain.

the human kind. But this achievement, if it can be called such, for it is largely passive and enforced, although it has its centre in a personal will, lays only foundations for a genuine personal development. The conditions, nature, and stages of personal development must, therefore, be further studied before we can even see clearly an approach to a recognition — not to say a solution — of the secret of personality.

CHAPTER V

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY

A DESCRIPTION of the different types of coming to oneself, or rather different aspects of the one process, does not by any means furnish an answer to our question: What is it to be a person as every normal human being is a person? Indeed, it only forms a point of starting in a search for the more complete answer. The self bodily, the self sexual, and the self social, all combined, afford only the raw material of genuine personality. Anybody who has reached only this stage in the attainment of a truly personal life is a case of arrested growth. It is necessary, then, to inquire: What are the capacities which must be further developed? What are the activities which accomplish the development? and, What is the result reached as the goal of development?

At the beginning of any study of the development of personal life, however, it is supremely desirable, as a guide to truth and a guard against error, to keep three principles in mind. These may be called in a provisional way: The principle of continuity; the principle of coöperation

or mutual dependence; and the principle of individuality.

The life of every person is, at least theoretically considered, subject to sharp crises, sudden and seemingly profound changes in the currents along which it is running and even in its underlying purposes; and, at times, to the pretty complete upsetting of cherished plans and supposedly fixed ideas and confirmed habits of action: and in most cases, not merely theoretically so. For they be few, and these by no means always the best few, with whom the course of the personal life runs altogether smoothly. On the contrary, there is reason to believe that such complete smoothness is not favorable to the development of personality. Such facts do not, however, disprove the principle of continuity or diminish the extent and intensity of its importance in application to the individual man. The way the crises are met and improved or suffered; the voluntary reception and repulse or adoption of the changes; and the return to, or abandonment for something better, of the disordered plans; — all these, and all other experiences of the personal life, can never in thought or in fact be separated from that same life's history in the past. For the development of personality is not as the appearance of "shadow shapes that come and go"; it is all in the direction of forming a character; and by the word "character" we mean that kind of a will to live the life of a person which has been formed by

a continuous process of "stamping in" and "stamping out" habits of choice that have expressed themselves in action. Even those cases of moral or religious conversion, to which reference was made as examples of the most notable forms of the coming to oneself cannot be exempted from the principle of continuity. A disenthralled Buddha is no other than Sakya-muni disenthralled. Ambrose's convert to Christianity, and become the greatest of the Church Fathers, cannot be understood as a person other than the dissolute Augustine converted. Confucius the practical philosopher can be appreciated only as the Chinese youth of the same name whose mind and will had been determined by the study of his country's classics and his country's disregard, in its actual economic and political life, of their sacred injunctions.

With particular care, however, must we avoid the psychological fallacy with which so-called mental science was so long afflicted, and which is still a sort of obsession, the deliverance from which it is almost impossible to effect. There is good reason for speaking of different faculties of the human soul or mind. The old-fashioned tripartite division of these faculties into those of intellect, feeling, and will, is not without its solid ground in all the facts of experience. But psychology is not the only science which is constantly tempted to make separate entities out of the different elements and operations into

which, for laudable purposes of more detailed study and complete explanation, it has analyzed the objects of its researches. Witness the use constantly made by the chemical and physical sciences of such terms as "energy" and "law"; and, as well, the way that the economic and social sciences employ terminology borrowed from biology to describe phenomena which have little or no real likeness to those observed in the genesis and growth of plants and animals. It should be clearly understood, then, that no so-called faculty ever acts in independence of all the other faculties; and that the growth of mental life and the development of personality invariably implies the activity and coöperation, the unceasing action and reaction, of all the faculties. The life of the mind, like the life of the body, proceeds only with a constant readjustment of every one of its capacities, and every one of its forms of activity, to every other; and all to every form of its environment. Circulation and respiration, digestion and assimilation, muscular activity and nervous impulses and cerebral processes, are never for a moment independent of one another's condition and functioning. But, since all these functions are assignable more particularly to certain parts of the physical organism, — the whole organism being physical, and its parts being physically separate — the unity of the whole organism and the principle of action and reaction need not always be kept before the mind.

The case of the mind, however, is very different. The account of personal development must always respect the essential but peculiar unity of the personal life. Never, even for the moment, must we speak of intellect, feeling, and will as though they were independent forms of personal life, or could by any possibility be developed in independence of one another. Never, when speaking of self-consciousness, or memory, or reasoning or choice, or of any form of conscious emotion or sentiment, must we forget, or diminish our implied recognition of, the unity of the subject of all these faculties and their corresponding states.

The individuality of the developed personal life — its course in development and the character attained — follows from the individuality, inherited and either passively acquired or adopted by choice, of every human being. That nobody is precisely like anybody else, and that everybody possesses some sufficient claim to this individuality, are thoughts which for the present have been sufficiently enforced. We consider now how the development of personal individuality is dependent on personal will.

The development of personal life depends upon growth in the knowledge of things; growth in the knowledge of Self; growth in the knowledge of the relations between things, and between things and selves, and between selves; but especially upon growth in the knowledge and appre-

ciation of the ideas and sentiments of what has value, — truth, happiness, beauty, and goodness; and all given reality by being expressed in conduct, and by the formation of a character corresponding to these ideas and sentiments of value. All this growth, however, is dependent upon the continuous coöperation of those faculties which, in their unity, belong to the nature of man. Or, to turn the statement about, we may say that man's personality by nature consists in the possession of these forms of capacity; and that development of these native capacities, in unison, toward the goal of personal life which his nature suggests as truly his own, *is* the development of personality, stated in different terms.

The scientific description and explanation of the act of knowledge, and of the growth of knowledge, is the most difficult task of psychology. The philosophy of knowledge lays the foundations, and furnishes the introduction, of the philosophy of life. Only as we assure ourselves that our judgments represent in truth the realities of things, and the actual relations and changes between things, have we any claims to a science, or even to the bare existence, of a Universe. Only as the interpretation of our own individual experiences guarantees similar experiences in other selves, can we have any points of starting, or places of standing, for the social sciences. The metaphysics of man's faculty for knowledge, whether we find the guaranty for its certainty in

feeling or in reasoning, or in both, gives the only key that can unlock the door, the only hand that can raise the veil, between the otherwise completely isolated subject of so-called mental states and a real world of things and men.

We have just used the phrase, "the faculty of knowledge." But, in truth, knowledge involves the use of all the faculties. The knowledge of which *persons* become possessed requires the coöperation of all those faculties which distinguish a truly *personal* from a merely animal life. Up to a certain extent, however, it is difficult or impossible to distinguish the qualities and activities of the "intelligence" of some of the animals from the intelligence of man. If we remove, or greatly impair, certain centres in the cerebrum of a highly trained dog, the animal becomes "soul-blind" or "soul-deaf." He may retain the power to see or to hear, — that is, sensations of light or of sound may still be aroused in organized form corresponding to some outside object; but they have lost the meaning which the animal's natural or artificial training had given to them. The same thing happens to men when nature or the ill fate of warfare deals with them more ruthlessly than the knife or caustic of the experimenting physiologist dares to do. Within certain limits, as yet not quite rigidly fixed, partial or complete recovery may take place, whether the sufferer be animal or man. The difference in recovery implies that difference

in learning to which reference has already been made (p. 45 f.). It would seem, then, that there are important differences between persons and animals even in the most fundamental of the processes by which they acquire the knowledge peculiar to their so-called faculties. For example, the condition of what I have elsewhere called "primary intellection" is the conscious recognition of resemblances and differences.[1] His instincts, impulses, and above all his social surroundings with their more intricate and multiplied training, compel the human infant to *mind* many things which are indifferent to the animal. This difference, in its higher forms, is recognized by the humorous Japanese proverb: "Puppies do not have the Buddha-spirit."

The similarities and differences that at first are very vague and taken "in the lump," as it were, by mental activities to which such names are given as "comparison," with its two sides of "analysis" and "synthesis," and the psychical processes as well, which are sometimes called "assimilation" and "differentiation," are combined into perceptions and ideas of different Things. Things are thus known as, at least in some respects, like and in others unlike one another, but never identically the *same*, otherwise, they could not be *different real things*. In order to *be* different to the mind, however, they must be judged to be different. This act of

[1] See "Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory," p. 288 f.

judgment has been well said by one philosopher, to be "a second and higher consciousness," "a new manifestation of psychic energy." In more precise terms: The conscious affirmation of relations of resemblance or difference between the contents of consciousness is the primitive form of judgment. But in order to make this judgment amount to even the most crude and imperfect knowledge of a "Thing," it must be accompanied by the metaphysical assumption or belief in objective reality of the thing, independent of the judgment which affirms its existence. Such a metaphysical assumption or belief, enfolding, as it does, the slumbering conceptions of Self, Space, Time, and Reality, is of the distinctly personal type. Dogs are, however intelligent they are, not metaphysical as all men are. To them, *reality*, as we understand it, has no meaning.

The knowledge of things, as human beings know them, is stimulated and enlarged by the social environment. The child is constantly having his cognitive powers developed after the type of his kind, by being compelled to pay constant and serious attention to things, to the right use of them, to their relations to himself and to others; and, then, finally, to their less obvious and less immediately practical qualities and relations. Home-life, play and work with his associates, and more definitively life at school, if this particular kind of life's schooling is given to him, all afford instruction in the knowledge of things.

The personal quality of man's development of the knowledge of things is further expressed and cultivated far beyond anything possible for the mind of the animal, by man's power to construct and develop articulate speech, or language, such as all men, and only men, invent and employ as a distinctly personal means of communication. When the infant of eighteen months, of whom M. Taine tells, who had learned to call "*coucou*" while playing hide-and-seek, and had been taught to say "*Ça brûle*" as a warning that his cup of milk was too hot, or the candle too near, cried out "*Ça-brûle coucou,*" as he saw the burning sun disappear suddenly behind a hill, he showed powers in the growth of knowledge far transcending those possible to be displayed by any animal. For he had united, of himself and not by any trainer's whip or lump of sugar impressed, two entirely distinct conceptions in an act of judgment that assumed the objective reality of them both.

The further increase, refinement, and certifying of knowledge requires a higher and more elaborate exercise of the faculty of intellect. To the exercise of this faculty the names of inference, reasoning, proving, and other terms have been given. Whether puppies or grown dogs of the more intelligent breeds possess, or not, this activity of the "Buddha-spirit," depends, of course, on how we use our terms. If animals reason at all, it certainly is not in the manner to

correspond with the conception of "reasoning" as the process is fully described in treatises on logic, whether formal or psychological. We have no evidence in their conduct that they consciously place their conclusions on grounds of previously established general judgments; or that they chain together a series of judgments by the conscious thought, "this is *by cause of* that," or, that being true, *therefore*, or for that reason, this other follows as a matter of course. Indeed, in man's case it is rarely, if ever, that the process of reasoning as a conscious fact involves a consciousness of the separate steps of reasoning as the latter are described in detail by formal logic.

There is enough, however, in every genuine act of reasoning, as men reason in the development of knowledge, to warrant our calling it "a second and higher consciousness," "a new manifestation of psychic energy." "Thinking," says Professor Ward, "may be broadly described as solving a problem — finding an AX that is B." In its two principal forms, Deduction, or reasoning from accepted truths to new particular applications of them, and Induction, or inferring general truths from the observation of particular instances to the explanation of which the truths, as at first assumed or conjectured, seem to apply, the science of reasoning in man must recognize the personal activities that achieve his growth in knowledge. But these two forms of reasoning are never separated in any achievement of new

knowledge, — important or trivial, knowledge of particular things or knowledge of general laws. For example: particular disturbances in the movements of a particular planet, supposedly united under the principle of gravitation with other known planets, favor the deduction that another and as yet unknown planet is in existence, whose behavior must conform with the same general principle; at the inferred correct time the telescope is directed to the right inferred spot, and another particular planet is discovered to be in fact obeying the same law, that had been derived from an infinite number of previous inductions. Again: It is extremely desirable for the science of physics that a practically achromatic lens should be discovered. A great French authority on lenses, basing his deduction on the laws of optics as far as accepted at the time, confidently declares that this can never be done. An American physicist, after months of tedious calculation with the use of the higher mathematics, infers that, given two pieces of glass of the right refracting indices, as calculated but as yet never manufactured, and bring their surfaces together, each having the calculated curvature; and then the required achromatic lens will, in fact, result. By prolonged experiment the two imagined kinds of glass are actually made; the physicist himself grinds and polishes them to the required curvature; and the lens, that had been proved impossible by a previous deduction,

takes its place among existing realities, and thus serves the purposes of a new induction. Such processes as these infinitely transcend the workings of an animal intellect. They are achievements of a personal reason braced by personal will.

It would be impossible thoroughly to analyze these two instances of notable scientific discoveries, without disclosing all those forms of activity, thought, feeling, and will, which enter into the constitution of the rational life, and of the development of knowledge, in man. But none of these forms is peculiar in any essential way to the individual trained in the methods of scientific research, with its demands for controlled observation, suspended judgment, doubt, inductive and deductive reasoning; and further demand for proof of the conclusion by the continuance of the test of "putting it to work." The plain man, the man who is rated by his fellows as almost a fool, solves his particular problems every hour of his waking life in essentially the same ways.

In this connection it is well to refer again to the three principles of continuity, coöperation, and individuality. Formal logic divides the entire intellectual process called reasoning into the three stages of conception, judgment, and inference under some form of the syllogism. But as I have said elsewhere ("Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory," p. 437): "Conception, judg-

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ment, and reasoning must all be regarded *as actual forms of psychoses in the flowing stream of consciousness;* the rather do we designate by these words *certain successions of psychoses which derive their characteristics from the nature of their sequence, — and of the laws, or fixed forms, which are shown by the states of consciousness in this sequence.*" No mental act, or attitude toward any reality, such as logic calls a "conception," can take place without previous reasoning, or without embodying numbers of judgments. No judgment is ever formed, that may not be regarded as a union of conceptions, or ideas, — a union that must be accounted for by processes of reasoning. No inference is ever drawn, under any one of the simplest or most mixed figures of the so-called syllogism, that is not dependent on previously formed conceptions and judgments. Do you ask: How can such a thing be true, and, If it were true, how can the mind ever make any advance in its knowledge? I reply: The thing is, in fact, true; and the reason is that the mind is not a conglomerate, or even an ordered collection, of faculties, to each of which a localized and semi-independent function can be assigned, as may be done to different organs of the physical organism. The mind has the unity of a life spiritual, developing as such a unity, with all its so-called faculties coöperating in every state and stage of this life. Indeed, our list of faculties, and of the functions which we

say they perform, and of the products which we assign to them, are only abstract terms representing "moments" or "aspects" of the one life. In reality, they have no separate, or separated activity.

The account which has been given of the development of a knowledge of things, after the personal type, does not serve to explain the development of self-knowledge. It could not serve this purpose, even if it were made by the combined efforts of all the most *suggestive* geniuses in psychology, and stretched out to indefinite lengths. In fact, it does not give the barest elements for a satisfactory description of the growth which every individual man, of normal development, makes in the knowledge of things. For the development of the knowledge of things is dependent upon the development, with something like an equal pace, of the knowledge of Self.

The infantile personality must discover itself as a will capable of producing effects, in order that it may know other things and other persons as having wills that are not its own, and that cross and thwart, and refuse to yield to, its will. The discovery depends upon the child's applying reflective thinking to the results of its own deeds of will, as involved in all its own thinking, feeling, and conduct. From this same source — the will to live, the will to know, the will to achieve the satisfaction of natural impulses and desires — as

subjected to reflection, and regulated by the successes it attains and the failures which it encounters, spring the beliefs and ideas of reality for the Self and for things, and the actuality of causal relations between them. From the same source, — the will to enjoy the social life and to reach the ideals of art, morality, and religion, — as aroused, refined, and disciplined by reflection, springs the development of the knowledge of that which has value.

A charming description of the earlier activities in which the child-life knows and realizes itself as a will, and grows in the self-consciousness of a personal being, is given by Preyer in his "The Mind of the Child" (II, p. 191f.). It is worth for our purpose quoting at length.

"Another important factor is *the perception of a change produced by one's own activity* in all sorts of familiar objects that can be taken hold of in the neighborhood; and the most remarkable day, from a psycho-genetic point of view, in any case an extremely significant day in the life of the infant, is the one in which he first experiences *the connection of a movement executed by himself with a sense-impression following upon it.* The noise that comes from the tearing and crumpling of paper is as yet unknown to the child. He discovers (in the fifth month) the fact that he himself in tearing paper into smaller and smaller pieces has again and again the new sound-sensation, and he repeats the experiment day by day

and with a strain of exertion until this occupation has lost the charm of novelty. At present there is not, indeed, any clear insight into the *nexus* of cause; but the child has now had the experience that he can himself be the cause of a combined perception of sound and sight regularly, to the extent that when he tears the paper there appears, on the one hand, the lessening in size; on the other hand, the noise. The patience with which this occupation — from the forty-fifth to the fifty-fifth week especially — is continued with pleasure is explained by the gratification at being a cause, at the perception that so striking a transformation as that of the newspaper into fragments has been effected by means of his own activity. Other occupations of this sort which are taken up again and again with a persistency incomprehensible to an adult, are the shaking of a bunch of keys, the opening and closing of a box or purse (thirteenth month); the pulling out and emptying, and then the filling and pushing in of a table drawer; the heaping up and strewing about of garden mould or gravel; the tearing of leaves of a book (thirteenth to nineteenth month); digging and scraping in the sand; the carrying of footstools hither and thither; the placing of shells, stones, or buttons in rows (twenty-first month); pouring water into and out of bottles, cups, watering-pots (thirty-first to thirty-third) months; and, in the case of my boy, the throwing of stones into the

water. The little girl in the eleventh month found her chief pleasure in rummaging with trifles in drawers and little boxes. Her sister played with all sorts of things, taking an interest in dolls and pictures in the tenth month. Here, too, the eagerness and seriousness with which such apparently aimless movements are performed is remarkable. The satisfaction they afford must be very great, and it probably has its basis in the feeling of his own power generated by the movements of the child himself (changes of place, of position, of form) and in the proud feeling of being a cause."

The necessity of admitting a division in the means and the results belonging to the development of personality on the side of knowledge is too obvious to admit of doubt or sceptical criticism. Every person must have some Knowledge of Self as well as some Knowledge of Things. And this bi-partition, or di-remption — if this is not too strong a word — of activities in the acquiring of knowledge, and of the objects of knowledge, must result from development. For what Tennyson has expressed in the sentimental way of poetic simplicity is profoundly true when converted into terms of the science of psychology or of the theory of cognition.

"The baby, new to earth and sky,
What time his tender palm is pressed
Against the circle of the breast,
Has never thought that this is I.

But as he grows, he gathers much,
And learns the use of I and me,
And finds I am not what I see,
And other than the things I touch.

So rounds he to a separate mind,
From whence clear memory may begin,
As thro' the frame that binds him in,
His isolation grows defined."

This special form of activity — sometimes treated as a "faculty" or better, a particular direction of a group of so-called faculties — has received the title "Self-consciousness." Accepting this rather naïve, offhand division, every person may then be said to have faculties of sense-perception by which he acquires the knowledge *of* things, and a faculty of self-consciousness by which he acquires a knowledge *of* himself. But for the development of both these kinds of knowledge he makes use of his faculty of inference or of learning from others.

The statement of the function of self-consciousness, as it has just been made, is much too easy-going; and indeed, any professional student of the actual conditions and stages in the development of knowledge in the individual man would resent it as a caricature of his own views. There has been much discussion between the advocates of two extreme theories as to the nature and authority of personal self-consciousness; and there have been, and still are, many theories lying all the way between the two ex-

tremes. According to some psychologists, there can be no such thing as an immediate and authoritative act of self-knowledge. With them the very word suggests an absurdity. Before I, as Subject, could catch myself, as object, in any state of consciousness, any condition of feeling, or ideation, or image-making, that particular state or condition has already passed away. At best I can only have some fading memory-image of what that last state was. But the memory-image is doomed to the same impossibility of its being the subject's immediately and intuitively known object, as has been already affirmed of every mental condition or activity. And as to having an intuitive conception of what it is really to be a Self, or even of the bare fact that I am a Self;—much more, as to what kind of a Self I really am, and what kind of reality I have, and whether I have any reality at all, as a self; why! all such assumptions are doubly absurd when clothed with the authority of so-called self-consciousness. For all that self-consciousness can tell us, we are really to ourselves only what others are to us, and what we are to them, "a moving row of shadow shapes that come and go." This, then, must be the answer to our question: What is it to be a person?

In the supposed interests of all that is most valuable and best worth living for with an unswerving and devoted purpose, another theory of the nature and authority of self-consciousness

has, with equal or even greater confidence, been put forth. Self-consciousness gives an immediate and indubitable knowledge, an envisagement, of the substantial reality of the Self. As Professor James has said ("Principles of Psychology," II, p. 297) — in this statement contradicting other statements of his own, in his customary charming way: "Our own reality, that sense of our own life which we at every moment possess, is the ultimate of ultimates for our belief." Some of this school would have it that every mental state is essentially and fully self-conscious, though not in the form of philosophical reflection; and that our confidence in the evidence of self-consciousness justifies us in founding upon it, not only a belief in the reality of the Self, but also an indisputable knowledge of the essential qualities of selfhood. In this case the necessity, if not the benefit, of writing books in the hope of making the secret of personality a little clearer to one's self and to others, would, fortunately, be greatly impaired if not wholly abolished.

As happens with most extreme views on any subject of large general experience, whether having to do with the knowledge of things or with the knowledge of selves, neither of these theories of the nature and authority of self-consciousness is wholly true or wholly false. Each of the two is partly true and each is either unfortunately stated or partly mistaken and false. But one

cannot reach satisfaction for his own mind by borrowing something from both, or by taking an unthinking attitude somewhere between the two. To make a start in the assurance as to a working theory of self-consciousness, its nature and authority, every mind may be safely left to its own reflections. And when we utter the word "reflections" we assume something with regard to the activities, and something with regard to the object toward which the activities are directed. Every sane man incontestably believes in some sort of reality for his own here-and-now existence; but most men would be puzzled enough if called upon to define in what, completely, that reality consists. All the philosophical wisdom in the history of reflective thinking has not sufficed to answer the question of meaning; but all the philosophical nihilism or sceptical criticism of the past has not in any degree diminished confidence in the fact. Even the insane have the same confidence. The muddled self-consciousness of the Real A may change him into the Apostle Paul at one hour and into the Apostle Peter at the next hour; but the existence of the Self about whose name and perquisites he doubts, or to which he has for the time being pinned his faith, is still believed to have its own reality *of a sort.* So it is in cases of double personality.

It is not our purpose to expound at length what we consider to be the true doctrine of self-con-

sciousness — its nature and authority; or, in this connection, even to state the elements of personality concerned in the development of self-knowledge for which such a form of conscious activity may be held indirectly responsible. So far as is necessary for the former of these two purposes, what has been said about the natural distinction between body and soul, the centre of the soul's reality as to what we call will, and the coming to oneself as a consciousness of body, sex, and of being socially related to other selves, has included the more important particulars. The latter of the two inquiries will occupy us in all the remainder of our search for some solution of the mystery of man's personal life. *Somehow or other* every adult human being arrives at a certain kind and amount of self-knowledge. Every person is certain that he, as a living reality, does actually correspond in certain respects to the conception he has formed of himself. A few words of explanation at this point, however, will make our present position clearer and our future task easier and more plausible.

Of course, the act called self-consciousness cannot be said to give an intuition, or "immediate knowledge of the Self," not even as being for the moment in any particular condition or state, if by affirming its "immediacy" we mean to deny its duration in time. There are no states of the mind that are statical: there are no forms

of consciousness that do not — as the appropriate figure of speech puts the truth — "consume" some time. Indeed, the very science of psychophysics is based upon the determination within limits of σ, or one-thousandth of a second, just how much time it takes to form the different kinds and complications of the so-called mental states. It always takes more or less time to come to consciousness, whether this process of coming terminates in the perception of a thing, or of a change of relation between things, of a mental state, or of a change in mental states. When we talk about the lightning-like speed of thought, we are likely to deceive ourselves. To see a flash of lightning takes longer than the electrical change which causes the flash. Those then who deny the authority of self-consciousness on the ground that a timeless envisagement of the Self is impossible, set up a man of straw which they must take but sorry satisfaction in knocking down.

But those who claim that every act of consciousness is always also an act of self-consciousness are almost equally in the wrong, when we come to bring the alleged facts to the test of experience. When I am watching a fireman take a child out of the window and down the ladder from a burning building, or a horse running away with a buggy containing friends of mine, I do not in the least degree reflect the fact that it is *I* who am doing the seeing. When I am narrating what

I saw, I affirm the authority of self-consciousness in the reflective act of memory. But not all memory is reflective. It is, indeed, impossible to think of others, no matter how much they may force a correction of my reflective memory, as remembering anything for me. It is I who do my own remembering, whether its object be the look of any particular thing, or how I felt at the time of seeing it.

The conception of what it is to be a Self, and equally the conception of my own particular Self, is not a matter for immediate knowledge, or for mental envisagement, in a single mental act. It is formed by intellectual processes essentially the same as those by which we arrive at the conception of things, or of some particular thing. But the contents, "the stuff" moulded into conceptual form, is different in the two cases. What we may call "the feeling-tone" is also different in the two cases. As I have said elsewhere ("Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory," p. 521): "The knowledge which is of self differs from the knowledge which sense-perception brings, both as respects content of consciousness and general tone of consciousness. *This knowledge has its content not chiefly in sensations at all, but in mental images, thoughts, feelings, or volitions.* The sensuous elements of consciousness, especially those of the most definitely localized and clearly projected sort, are relatively suppressed. In predominating states of self-

consciousness, the sensations are of the vague, unlocalized order, which are attributable to myself as a sentient organism, rather than to any objective thing. But especially is the attention directed to feelings which are interesting to me, as *my* feelings, because of their tone of pleasure or pain. In this way, by the influence of feeling over attention, one often passes back and forth between the objective and the subjective aspects of the same experience. For example, when one is in the bath one feels the temperature of the water as the quality of an external thing; but if it is greatly too cold or too hot one becomes aware of oneself as suffering with the pain of heat or cold. It is largely because of their ordinarily toneless character as feeling that our visual sensation-complexes are customarily known as qualities of external things." If all goes well, I know the qualities of the food by teeth and tongue and roof of the mouth. But when the eyes become inflamed, one does not question the authority as to whose eyes ache; nor does one need to go to the dentist to find out whose is the pain, although the dentist himself may have difficulty in discovering which particular tooth is the external cause. It will not do, however, to say with Lotze, that "the crushed worm writhing in pain undoubtedly distinguishes its own suffering from the rest of the world, though it can understand neither its own Ego nor the nature of the external world." There is little

reason to suppose that for the worm there is any distinction between ego and world, or any capacity for referring the pain to an Ego, and so for appreciating it as "its own suffering" in any intelligible meaning of the words.

The development of personality, then, as involving growth in the knowledge of Self is the achievement of intellect as a capacity and activity of the personal type. And this is the same type of intellect on the achievements of which we rely for the development of the knowledge of things. The two kinds of personal development are interdependent; they go hand in hand within certain limits, and up to a certain distance along the same path. But the sanest activities of this same intellect compel it to conceive of the Self as having qualities that cannot be ascribed to any Thing; although everything is known by the Self, only as having some of the qualities in lower degree which every Self knows itself to have. The development of this higher degree of self-knowledge requires the appearance in consciousness of thoughts, sentiments, aspirations, and ideas and ideals, such as incite and regulate the personal life along the lines of science, morals, art, and religion.

CHAPTER VI

THE PERSON AS RATIONAL

IT would seem that in order to be Anybody, — in other words, any sort of a Person, — so much development of the knowledge of things and of the knowledge of oneself, as has been described in the preceding chapters, is a minimum requirement. The human being who would lay reasonable claim to personality, even of the meanest grade, must know, with an indubitable conviction of its certainty, something of himself, something of other selves, and much that concerns his own physical constitution and its physical environment. He must know himself as an intelligent will, capable of producing changes, but only within certain limits, and compelled to suffer changes in his states of feeling and thought by external influences that are not subject to his will. He must also have powers of reasoning which go somewhat beyond the knowledge that is given to him in the seemingly more intuitive ways of so-called sense-perception and self-consciousness. But he is a poorly endowed and insufficiently educated person who has not a much larger credit to his

claim on personal life than is scantily summed up in all this.

Any further development — and its explanation and justifying — are sometimes ascribed to secondary reflective activity and habit under the name of "the philosophical consciousness." All men have "natural self-consciousness"; but only a good few, distinguished by special gifts of inquisitiveness and ambition to sound the depths of truth and reality, and perhaps also having within their reach particularly favorable opportunities for self-culture, acquire any skill in philosophical self-consciousness. We have already seen how certain individuals have experienced a coming to the better Self that, for suddenness, and for depth and loftiness of attainment, has greatly surpassed that of most of the race. It is by no means all men who ever have the clear vision of the Ego, the intuition and the conviction that can only express themselves in the sentence "I am I," after the fashion of Jean Paul Richter. This poet philosopher records of his experiences: "Never shall I forget the phenomenon in myself, never till now recited, when I stood by the birth of my own self-consciousness, the place and time of which are distinct in my memory. On a certain forenoon I stood, a very young child, within the house-door, and was looking out toward the wood-piles. In an instant, the inner revelation, 'I am I,' like lightning from heaven, flashed and stood brightly

before me; in that moment I had seen myself as I, for the first time and forever."

But there is no hard and fixed line to be drawn between the natural and the philosophic consciousness. The data of the natural consciousness are the only sources of information for the philosopher whenever he essays the answer to any problem concerning what are the essential truths contained in them. And, Woe to his findings and to his lasting reputation as a reflective thinker, if he despises or misinterprets greatly these, his only available data. On the contrary, if he counsels with the "plain man's" opinions and convictions as to his own personal characteristics, and the inferences which shape his naïver, and for that very reason often less prejudiced convictions and conclusions, the philosopher is the less likely to go far astray in his approaches to the secrets of the personal life. No popular absurdities can possibly rival those which, in all ages, have been rife in books on philosophy and theology.

It is true beyond question, however, that a great extension of the knowledge of what it is to be a person, beyond that which has been brought to the attention of the average man, is necessary for the satisfaction even in a lamentably feeble way, of every earnest inquirer. For there are as many and serious moral as mental obstacles in the path of him who would attain this satisfaction. Self-indulgence and the degra-

dation of the sentiments of truth, beauty, and righteousness, are chief among the former class; indifference and mental laziness among the latter. Indeed, it is difficult for the teacher to whom is committed, or who has voluntarily assumed, the task of expounding the doctrine of the personal life, to tell which of these two classes of obstacles is the more difficult to overcome. At any rate, it must be recognized that much further study of the problem of personality demands in both proposer and critic a more severe and thoroughly disciplined exercise of the powers of reflection. Only the sharpened spear-point with the thrust of a determined will behind it, can reach to the heart of the mystery of man's personal nature and the laws of, and means available for, its realest and highest development.

Those who studied the hand-books on formal logic in use a half-century ago will recall, as the creaking of a rusty saw, the major premise of an argument, as follows: "Man is a rational animal, etc." This premise might be used in either its backward-looking or its forward-looking form. As an induction it might be claimed proven by observation of all, or at the worst, of the vast majority of men. This in spite of the fact that every man's observation makes him doubt its application to a large minority, if not to a positive majority, of the men with whom he is acquainted. And of *all* men: What could he know, or anybody know, by observation, about

all men; or about any relatively large number of men. Its use as a deduction — if applied to oneself, a demonstration — runs as follows: If all men are rational animals, then I, John Smith, am rational, no matter how much of an animal I may be. The text-books of the same period which undertook to demonstrate the evidences of natural theology assumed, as a matter of course, that all men are free. But what is it to be rational? as man is rational; and, What is it to be free? as man is free? These are questions the answer to which cannot be given without calling out all the reserves of reflective or philosophical consciousness. This is true in spite of the obvious fact that the times have changed, and with them the attitude of the public toward the metaphysics of morals and religion: and that over the troubled heart of a generation which had resolved in vain no longer to bother itself with metaphysical problems, the masque of Comus and his merry rout had been taken on.

> "Strict age, and sour severity,
> With their grave saws, in slumber lie."

The demand still remains, however, for some sort of rationality, and for some sort of freedom, which exceed anything possessed by any animal, if man, as man, is going to understand and vindicate his claim to a genuinely personal life. Has man, the average man, these personal qualifications; and precisely what do we mean when we attribute them to him?

It belongs to the biological sciences to answer the question: What is it to be an animal as every man is an animal? In the partial but progressively correct and full answer to this question, all these sciences have their resources of observation and inference taxed to the utmost. The end of their efforts is not yet in sight. By all their discoveries the mystery of life is rendered more complicated and profound. The biological explanation of all animal life culminates in the life of man. By universal consent, the problem which the physical life of man offers is at once the goal and, as yet, almost the despair of these sciences.

But the question, What is it to be rational? while in a way dependently connected with an animal body, transcends the limits of the biological sciences. It is a question for reflective thinking, in its higher or so-called philosophical form. The moment we raise it, however, we enter the domain of metaphysics. For we raise a question which concerns the reality of the subject of knowledge and, as well, the reality of the objects of knowledge. At the basis of all rationality, then, lies the belief in, and respect for, reality. Repulsive as the word is to many who claim to be the foremost champions of scientific truth, the simple fact is that the foundation of man's rationality, and so the last impregnable stronghold for the defence of all human science, is man's *metaphysical* nature. How the mental attitude of

belief in reality, and the respect for truth as the mental representative of reality, comes to be the objective "correlate" or "extra-mental" aspect of all knowledge has been the subject of much dispute. And no wonder; because the attitude is itself assumed as already there, in every dispute about itself. Nor can we very well attribute it to inference, and the accumulation of knowledge by use of the intellect on the part of the individual or of the race; for all inference implies the belief, and all accumulation of the results of observation and inference only illustrates and confirms the same assumption. The scientist who decries metaphysics and claims for science only a linking together of phenomena, without any reference to the truth of reality to which the linking aims to correspond, and which in his own thought the method of linking faithfully represents, does not mean what he says. He could not say anything unless he had an invincible conviction of the reality of other beings, of a rationality similar to his own. Indeed, the language he uses, and the thought he is unhappily trying to express, could not have for him even phenomenal existence, independent of the reality and the invincible belief in reality, which provide the soul of their significance. The very word "phenomenon" has no meaning except as the correlate of some reality, thing or self, whose phenomenon it is. There is no appearance (phenomenon) which is not the appearance of

some real thing to some real self. Thus much is true, though in a sort of indirect and implied fashion, of such phenomena as ghosts and centaurs and heathen gods. When I reject, as well as when I affirm, my belief in the ghost which is now a phenomenon, or in the ghost whose *appearance* was present to your sight last night, I affirm the reality of my own existence, and of your existence, and of the producer of the ghost-like phenomenon as some real somebody's imagination or some real external thing.

The attempt has been persistently made by rival schools of philosophy to limit this belief in the reality of the object of knowledge to only *one* of the two classes of knowledge, either the knowledge of things or the knowledge of self. In this attempt the denials of both schools cancel each other; and the concessions of each sufficiently supplement the claims of the other. A materialistic realism would deny the reality of the rational self; such a self, and all its ideas and feelings and voluntary activities are, in its opinion, only phenomena of the true reality, — the bodily organism, and especially the nervous system with its regal creative crown, the cerebral hemispheres. The retort is obvious and perfectly crushing. All you know of this physical marvel of a creator of human rationality, including the sentiments, ideals, and achievements of science, morals, art, and religion; what is it, — your boasted knowledge of the *real thing*, —

but the creation of the same rational being, the phenomenon of the same thinking mind, whose reality you deny?

But the fall of subjective idealism before the onsets of its rival is no less conspicuous and severe. And now it is things which are denied the priceless title to reality. All the substance, the "bone" of existence, as the Hebrew and Shemitic languages generally call that which has the qualities, and is entitled to at least a relative permanence and a higher style of identity, belongs to the thinking, feeling, willing Self. And since I know other selves only as thing-like existences, after I have advanced so far along the path in the development of knowledge as to make the grand distinction in objects; does not the conclusion follow of M. Flournoy, in his remarks on "Phenomenism" — a doctrine he unqualifiedly avows in the interests of positive science: "My state of consciousness, that is all the reality." "The very bread one eats might well have its reality spared, if *only* the phenomenon of eating were followed by the phenomena of *no longer being hungry and being invigorated.*" But when this metaphysician conceives of the same attitude being taken toward his own wife and children, and all humanity, past, present, and future, "the bare idea of this solitude gives him a chill in the spine." If this chill is no better answer to this form of phenomenism than the celebrated kick of Dr. Johnson, there is enough of

truth in the assertions of the other and opposite form of phenomenism. Knowledge of myself cannot be gained except as I act and react in surroundings of real things; and knowledge of other selves can be gained at all, only as we know them (it makes no difference how near and dear they are to us, or how intimate our daily communion with them) through the phenomena of their bodily organism.

It is worth repeating, then: The very foundation of man's rationality is his metaphysical nature. Embodied in all his knowledge, and in all his use of knowledge, and even in the elementary processes involved in every act of knowing, is the ever invincible belief in reality. The terms of knowledge are ever changing; and the realities are ever changing. But the essential nature of knowledge of the rational type as it belongs to man remains unchanged. As respects things, in the primary knowledge of them, the truth has been well expressed by Riehl: "The compulsion to apprehend every sense-experience as the sense-experience of Something, as the property of some subject, XY," is beyond all doubt. Reflective self-consciousness, even in its lower stages, proclaims essentially the same truth of fact with regard to the Self.

Respect for Reality, in other words, regard for truth, characterizes all the endeavors and work of genuine science. Nor is the same quality wanting altogether in the rational nature of the

average man. Another universal judgment, based on an equally wide induction, has indeed declared: "All men are liars;" more especially: "The Cretans are all liars." Although the one judgment was pronounced "in haste," and the other applies to men now long since dead, the boasted advances of civilization have not greatly discredited either of the two. At any rate, abundant experience confirms the fact that men in general are prone to prejudice, and given to self-deceit in their habitual attitudes of intellect, feeling, and conduct toward the facts and truths of reality. How, then, can we say that respect for reality is a universal and essential characteristic of the rationality that is inherent in human nature?

Modern science protests its love of "the truth for the truth's own sake," and whether it is palatable to all men or to any one man, or not. Science is the avowed and determined foe of obscurantism in any of its many subtle and attractive forms. It is thus squarely, or by quite legitimate inference, opposed to those philosophers who hold the doctrine that the evidence and meaning and value of truth are to be determined by the "way the truth works." Thus in their different ways, science makes a profound obeisance to that characteristic of man's rational nature for which we are contending; while philosophy only gives it a passing nod of seeming assent. Neither of the two, however,

can be interpreted to the satisfaction of reason without coming to a virtual agreement over the fact for which we are contending: A certain attitude of the whole man — mind, heart, and will — that indicates "respect for reality," is an essential characteristic of his rationality and of the development of the rational life as becoming to man. In the current form in which the devoted student of any one of the sciences, physico-chemical, psychological, or social, commends the spirit most appropriate to his work, there is, without interpretation, no meaning at all. The words "for its own sake" cannot properly apply to an abstraction. Only realities have any "sake of their own." The only realities concerned in science are selves and things. And unless things are assumed to take a conscious and active interest in being known by selves, and in being truly known, it is man whose sake is served by the knowledge of what is true about things. But to limit this concern to the regions of physical acquisition and the interests therewith connected, would not express, but would degrade, the very spirit of science which it acclaims. It is the fuller satisfaction of man's rational nature which science seeks. It is the *truth* which affords this satisfaction. But truth implies a correspondence between reason and reality; and the spirit which seeks this truth "for its own sake" — *i.e.*, for the satisfaction it affords to the rational nature of man, — is a certain respect for reality.

When we assert that the evidence for the truth, and the meaning and value of truth, are to be found in the way that any judgment deemed true is found to work, we misinterpret and degrade the nature of reason itself, unless we include in the *working*, and as its most essential and noble effort, end, and achievement, to be the satisfaction, and growth and elevation of the rational life that is in man. And respect for reality as the embodiment and revealer of truth to man is the spirit which characterizes and crowns man's rationality.

"Falsehood," said Aristotle, "is in itself base and censurable: truth is noble and laudable." But is not this the rule or motto only for the man of science or the gentleman? "The man who rings the bell cannot march in the procession:" and as the Ojis have a saying, "When a poor man makes a proverb it does not spread." And just now is the atmosphere so loaded with the poison of lying — diplomatic, economic, political, strategic, and in the regions of ethics and theology — that one cannot get even a whiff of it without danger of asphyxiation.

> "O monstrous world! Take note, take note, O World,
> To be direct and honest, is not safe."

But which one of the liars in any form would venture to affirm: "I have lost all regard for truth in any form; a lie is as honorable and worthy of my rational nature as is the truth?" Further as to this characteristic which I have

called a "natural respect for Reality," as contributing to the answer to the question, What is it to be a person? must be left for consideration in another place.

No reality is ever known as *bare* reality. Only particular realities are known; and from their qualities, changes, and varying relations are inferred, by processes of reasoning already sufficiently described, the general laws and principles which are said to regulate their behavior. But all these concrete objects of knowledge, whether things or selves, and whether known by self-consciousness, sense-perception, or by inference, or even when asserted in the wildest flights of speculation, the dreams of natural sleep, or the ravings of the madhouse, agree in having certain common characteristics, and in standing in certain relations which are shared by them all. This looser kind of unity is the minimum requirement for their being known as belonging to the world of reality. The real world, with its actual or imaginary transactions, differs enormously in its size, and in the details of its constitution, as known by different individual minds. It may be a world which does not exist, except in untrained imagination, beyond the not far distant mountain range or sea-coast; it may be the world of the traveller who has visited many foreign countries and gone many times around the globe; it may be the world of the astronomer who has probed the heavens' depths with the

most skilful use of the most approved modern methods: but in all these essential respects, every man's world is like every other man's world. All the things in this world have qualities and modes of behavior;—some like and some unlike the other neighboring things. All are subject to certain changes, both in space and time. In effecting these changes, many of them seem to have great and special influence over each other. Many of them plainly are adapted to certain ends, perhaps to several different ends. Some of them are good for man; some are bad; many of them seem quite indifferent to his interests in any way. Many of them exhibit signs of that progressive and regulated change which is called growth; and these seem to be especially dependent on certain features of their ancestral origin. In many cases they serve the uses of one another; in many other cases, they are plainly prejudicial to one another. In not a few cases one kind of thing continues to exist only as it destroys some other kind of thing. It is a strange jumble of facts, this world, be it large or small, into which the individual man is thrown by birth, and in which he can survive and thrive only if he masters, by the use of his rational powers, at least some primary truths as to the real nature of other beings than himself and the methods of their behavior.

Every concrete thing in the world must conform to the general terms of man's rationality,

whether it belong within the fields of the specialist in science, or to the humblest domains of daily experience; and in this respect there is no difference between the two, — in order even to be conceived of as real. Everything in the real world has some qualities, or modes of behavior, that are its very own. It has a "nature"; and its nature reveals itself to reason through these qualities, by these modes of behavior. Every real thing has a certain more or less clearly distinguishable limit of size and duration. It may be relatively large or small, long enduring, or quickly passing; it may be now here and the next instant or century in some other place; it may disappear by instantaneous explosion, or it may slowly, and even quite imperceptibly, fade away. But it must exist *in* space and *in* time; it must *occupy* some time and some space. Still more obvious, if this were possible, is it that every real thing must *stand in* one or more discoverable relations to other things, both near and distant, in both time and space, in order that it may be known at all. For the intellect is essentially a relating activity, and the unrelated is the unknown and unknowable, the non-existent for the reason of man. No act of imagination or conjecture can bring the unrelated within the compass of the human intellect.

The meaning for reality of all these terms is the problem for metaphysical analysis and speculation. What it *really* is, to "have qualities

and quantity," "to *exist* in time and space," "to *stand in* relations" of any sort, "to *change* oneself and to *change* others" in the character of these relations, are the profoundest problems for reflective thinking to undertake. And that the human mind can undertake such problems and make some shift at partially answering them; yes, even that the human mind can raise such problems, is the most convincing evidence, and the severest test, of the rationality that is the crowning glory of man's intellectual life.

A treatise in metaphysics is not, for its own sake, our present particular concern. This is, the rather, to point out the notable fact that the *respect for reality* which is shown by the human reason extends to the ways in which reason conceives of the general terms under which reality reveals itself. The phenomena imply reality in an inevitable way, and as an essentially incontestable belief. But they do more than that. The varied phenomena imply with the same inevitableness, and in the form of the same incontestable belief, various kinds of realities actually existing in various relations, and frequently or constantly changing these relations. Out of the phenomena, every man's observations and reflective consciousness construct a loose conception of a unity of a world of things and other selves which stands over against the unity of his own Self; and to this world he attaches the verity that arises, as of necessity, from reason's

respect for reality. All the sciences do the same thing in more extended, profoundly critical, and carefully guarded ways. The world which the sciences present to our intellects and to our imaginations is a far grander and more complicated and mysterious world. But it receives from the men of science the same faith in man's rational powers; and it is presented to us, who are not men of science, or at least have no claim to be men knowing the whole universe in terms of the particular sciences, as a claimant for the belief which gives evidence of reason's respect for reality.

We have said that the crowning glory of the rational nature which gives one phase of the complete answer to the question: What is it to be a person? in so far as the more purely intellectual processes are concerned, is reason's power of self-criticism. It is what Immanuel Kant made it his life-work to develop in his so-called "Critique of Pure Reason." Stated in another way: It is the problem of the so-called "Categories." By the term, "the Categories," metaphysical philosophy understands those forms of knowledge under which man knows everything which he knows, even also, what he thinks he knows. The exact number of the categories has been a matter of dispute from the treatment given to the subject in Aristotle's "First Principles" down to the present time. In the Oriental reflective thinking, the whole doctrine of these

first principles takes a different turn from that given to it by the Western, and especially the modern scientific mind. To the practical mind of the West, the conclusion that the whole World of things and selves is Illusion (Māyā) is not congenial. To a large part of the modern scientific world, the doctrine of the categories is not worth disputing about. But surely, the truth of the assumption that science in some manner, and to some degree, *is* a collection of truths, rather than a bunch of delusions, and that the picture of the Universe which it is constantly tending more and more completely and accurately to present, bears some resemblance to the real Universe, is something worth defending; if by any means which themselves have respect to the facts of experience, such a truth is defensible.

In the disputes which are perennial between two schools in Epistemology, or the Theory of Knowledge, and which logically lead to fundamental differences in Metaphysics, or the Theory of Reality, the same extreme and one-sided views are noticeable that distinguish the psychology of the cognitive powers. With one school, the categories, or necessary forms of the knowledge of things, their nature, relations, and ways of behavior, and so the entire constitution of the Universe, originate in the nature of reason itself. Our knowledge of everything in the World, and of the constitution of the World, is due solely

to a compulsion, or a weakness of reason. What is real; and what sort of a World the World really is, — Why, about this we can never know anything, or hope to know anything. The bird cannot fly above the air that sustains it. The greyhound cannot, by running the faster, outstrip his own shadow. These forms of knowledge, which dictate for us the forms of reality, are only the inborn nature of a way of construing phenomena, which does not depend upon the nature of reality, and can never lead us to the knowledge, or even to the defensible conjecture as to what reality, so to say, really is.

The other school of theorists, if it can be called a "School," explains the origin and character of the categories by the passive reaction of human reason to the impressions made upon it by the things themselves. Reason itself is, to use a technical but rather meaningless word, an "epiphenomenon." The real World would be and would behave in the way in which it now exists and behaves, if there were no reason anywhere in the World. The phenomenon of rationality is *epi*, — or something in the way of phenomena that is over and beyond, in the meaning of being entirely superfluous to all reality.

Now both these views are unsatisfactory; not only because they lay no foundations for our confidence in any form of truth, but also because when we pursue them in their consequences to the last result, they end in absurdity.

For if, on the one hand, human reason has no ground in the reality of things and of thing-like selves, that are not my individual Self, then all the faith which underlies knowledge is undermined. My assumption of rationality for myself is inseparably connected with the faith in a common reason possessed by others than myself, that cannot possibly be manifested to me through self-consciousness alone. But if I and all others who have faith in the convictions and knowledges of the common reason are simply compelled, in total impotency, to be the records of irrational things; and if our reason has no power superior to the impressions themselves, to criticise them and from them derive a knowledge of what the World really is; then science itself, and all claims to every form and degree of knowledge, become doubly epi-phenomenal. The physical and natural sciences have become the epi-phenomena of an epi-phenomenon.

Now either of these conclusions is a sorry affair. To proclaim it as the result of rational procedure is a performance more absurd than the contortions of any clown in a circus. The laughter which it excites is scornful and bitter; it is not the laughter of merriment, or of that delightful sort to which the triumphs of the intellect lead the healthy mind.

To point out the fallibility of man's reason is easy, in the detailed beliefs of science as well as of religion. To say that the procedure of reason

in the development of knowledge is "anthropomorphic" is to state a self-evident proposition. As a matter of course, man has no other way of knowing things than the way common to all men. The way of every individual man is, in respect of the categories, the way of all men. But there is one assumption which, like a sleeping but universal and necessary hypothesis, underlies all human knowledge, whether the so-called scientific, or otherwise. It is not an hypothesis derived from our individual experiences, though it may be confirmed and cleared of linguistic obscurities by reflection upon the significance of these experiences. The hypothesis is this. *Man's Self, the person, and all the things which are the objects of his knowledge, have the same rationality in them.* This is the secret which justifies our respect for reality, — not only that it is, but also what it is. Things could not be shaped into realities by our minds, if they were not in their very nature shaped by mind other than ourselves. To share in Universal Reason is to be a person, a *rational* animal. It is such sharing which guarantees all human knowledge.

We are not concerned now about the importance of this truth, with its invincible convictions, for theology and for laying the intellectual foundations of the religious life. We are concerned for the salvation of man's claims to rationality, and to valid knowledge, and to foundations in reality for his science and his social life.

Just how these universal forms of rationality work in practice, and from what special activities of the Self they, each one, take their rise, must, with one exception, be left to the theory of reality, as the result of psychological study and metaphysical criticism. The one exception to which brief reference will be made is the conception of Causation.

Things are known only as related to each other; and closer observation — but only so close as every one is compelled to make to some good degree — shows that the changes in some of these relations have a special bond connecting the things that change. To the observer the changes are phenomena; but the observer, being rational, and having reason's respect for reality, must assign them to real things. Any observed peculiar relation of one thing to another in respect of their changes, whether simultaneous or sequent, is also phenomenal. But reason's respect for reality bids in this case, too, that we assign the phenomenon to something working in the things themselves. They influence each other; but the influence is not mere persuasion; it is not merely of the social kind. The quality which no eye has ever seen, no ear has ever heard, and no modification of the senses can ever hope to reach, as existent in things, we call Force. It is this quality, not discoverable as an outside phenomenon, which, however, accounts for the compulsion that some things exercise over other

things, to the generalized conception of which we give the name of Causation. The more or less regular ways in which things manifest this kind of influence, when generalized to the fullest extent, we call the Law or Principle of Causality. And then, if we venture upon the unwarrantable procedure of applying the same conception to all changes and events in the whole world, of both men and things, we boast our knowledge of the universal Reign of Law; — too often, unfortunately, for our claim to a cultivated and well-rounded development of rationality, with its tender regard, as shown in cherishing the "truth for its own sake" — in the sense proper alone to the physical and chemical sciences.

But whence comes this conception of *force*, if it cannot possibly be discerned by the senses in the phenomena of things? The answer given by some has been to deny that any phenomenon even of the mental life answers to the conception. Such an answer would reduce it to mere observed sequences in the past, and to expectation of similar sequences in the future. But in truth, no observation of similar regular sequences in the past is necessary to evoke the most convincing experiences with this conception, the most tremendous instances of its application to the changes between and among things. I do not need to have witnessed several explosions of the can from which kerosene is being poured upon the live coals of the fire, in order to recognize

the causal linking of the forces which the carelessness or ignorance of the servant has evoked to her own ruin. The soldier does not need to have his arm torn off more than once for a demonstration of the force that was in the piece of shrapnel that wounded him. But suppose that he preserves the offending metal as a trophy and, on returning home, submits it to experts for examination. Will their microscope or chemical analysis ever come upon any of that so-called "force"? Moreover, to declare that regularity of sequence and expectation are all there is, to account in terms of consciousness for the conception of causation and of force inherent in things as at the root of causation, is only to declare what is not true when tested by the facts of man's consciousness.

It is not from any quality inherent in things as known from the point of view of their time-relations, that this group of the assumptions which underlie the picture of the Universe as presented by the physical sciences takes its origin or derives its claim to universal application. To solve this metaphysical problem, which is not a problem so much as a naïve uncritical assumption, we must look within the Self. The beginning of its solution, so far as it has a solution, is to be found in the fact that every Self knows itself as a self-active will. As self-active will, the rational personality has experience, in reality, out of which his intellect evolves all the concep-

tions of Force, Cause and Effect, Causation, and the so-called Law or Principle of Universal Causality.

Reference has already been made to the pleasure with which the developing infant recognizes its own forceful and effective will. Its exercises are almost if not quite invariably, however, accompanied by feelings of effort and of more or less definitely localized strain. It is not necessary to enter into the psycho-physics of these feelings. Apparently they are a mixture which has its physiological correlates partly in brain-states that accompany or follow immediately the initial volition, partly in the sensory impulses that come up from the tense areas of skin, the swelling muscles and stiffening tendons, and the changed condition of the internal organs, and that serve to modify or reinforce these initial brain-states. Be this as it may, the result in our conceptions of the significance of the experience, as respects ourselves and the things about which our knowledge grows, remains the same. In knowing ourselves as self-active wills, we know ourselves as having force within ourselves, as being veritable causes of changes in our world of environing things.

But the other side of resisted effort, the explanation that our wills cannot have their way without effort, and often cannot have their way in spite of all our efforts, is the knowledge, vital with a conviction which is founded in reality,

that there are many wills besides our own. These other wills oppose and often thwart our wills. They persistently will what we do not will. They have force residing in them; they, too, are causes which produce effects in us and in one another.

In all these conscious experiences, with the legitimate inferences from them, fortified and applied to the World of things and selves under the conviction that reason is dealing in a legitimate and rational way with realities, there is nothing that contradicts the claim of the person to "moral freedom." Without moral freedom, no being, however mightily self-active, or profoundly and acutely intelligent, can make good the title to personality. The nature of moral freedom, as we conceive of it, will be briefly discussed in the following chapter.

There is, however, a form of the principle of causality, which is thoughtlessly adopted by the physical sciences, and more thoughtlessly but quite fallaciously carried over to the personal life and to all its development, that quite under-mines the claim to moral freedom. This theory in its extreme form holds that all individual beings are, throughout all time, bound together by a chain of causal influences, such that everything and every self that comes into existence, and every change in everything and every deed (even including the choices) of every self, is to be explained, sufficiently and solely, by its position in this chain of causal and therefore compulsory

influences. This metaphysical theory of the world's development, and of the origin and behavior of every individual being that takes its little part in the whole development, is usually claimed by its advocates to be either indubitably proved by experience, or self-evident and in need of no proof.

To reflective thinking, this lofty and almost or quite *a priori* form of determinism is not simply inadequate; it is absurd. For let us consider how science is compelled to explain every event; and not least of all, those which most evidently fall under the terms of its deterministic theory. It enumerates the conditions under which the elements of the complex event come together, and the so-called laws, or regular sequences of such a combination; and it then presents the whole to our minds as a satisfactory account of the event in terms of its causation. But it is no such account; for it is the so-called "*nature*" of each one of the combining elements which has also a determing voice in what the result shall be. But what do we mean by the "nature" of anything, — personal Self, or only just mere thing? We can answer this question only by observing what the particular thing has done in the past, and what we can discern, or legitimately infer, it to be capable of doing at the present time. Its nature may be statical or developing. It may be conscious, in any one of many degrees and in several different kinds; or it may be, so

far as we can discover, although plainly purposeful in some of its modes of behavior, quite unconscious, or only dimly conscious, throughout them all. But as soon as we begin to explain the doings of things in definite relations with other things, and leave out of account the native or acquired natures of the things related, our explanation lacks its better half. And as soon as we go on with our explanation by appealing to the "nature of things," we argue in a circle for the concealment of our ignorance at the terminal points of our explanation. Analyze, as we may, the nature of any composite thing into the things which compose it, and we can never reach the limits of the analysis. We illustrate the impotence of intellect in its attempts to get rid of all mystery by its linking under compulsion all things together in the endless chain of causation. All explanation leads back to the mysterious, the inexplainable, and therefore the to-be-taken-for-granted without being explained. Oxygen and hydrogen, under certain conditions of pressure and temperature, have in them the kind of nature, or self-activity—which probably operates without consciousness, though in a plainly purposeful and most benevolent way, to form the compound water. But how explain that nature of oxygen and hydrogen, and the mysterious nature, ultimately considered, of temperature and pressure? It is the nature of dogs to bark and bite, —not of all dogs, and at all times. It is the

nature of the Russell's viper to hiss and strike; but not necessarily, and usually not, without being provoked. Even the lower animals, under the influence of inner motive forces, sometimes do what it is not according to their nature to do. This proves that their deeds of will are seemingly influenced by motives. And influence by motives is not the same thing as physical causation, especially of the strictly deterministic type.

It is the nature of the person to choose; and, equally so, to have for his motives certain ideas, sentiments, and a certain development of self-activity, of which the animals do not seem to be capable. And if there are ultimate and insoluble mysteries connected with the "nature" of personality, the evidence for the actuality of this nature is not impaired by such a fact. For the nature of a person is to be rational; and the very centre and source of personal reason is in the mysterious fact of a self-determining will.

CHAPTER VII

THE PERSON AS MORAL

WITHIN certain limits the words "reasonable" and "rational" may be correctly used as interchangeable terms. And yet we do not mean precisely the same thing when we say, one to another: "You are not reasonable;" and "You are not rational." The former charge might imply simply a fault in one's logic, or logical understanding, the discursive reason, which makes man capable of learning and of scientific achievements as the lower animals are not. The latter word would involve a much graver charge. To be unreasonable may be only a symptom of mental but momentary disarrangement, a failure to examine one's premises or to observe those laws of the syllogism which provide for a way of linking them in together that is satisfactory to the critical use of the intellect. But if you are fairly by a good judge pronounced irrational, you are afflicted with a chronic disease, from which you must recover, or be denied the claim to be fit for conduct touching the interests of other persons; or — for that matter — unfit to care for your own personal interests. This disease,

if not cured, may consign one to the asylum for the insane, or even to social perdition.

The explanation of this partial agreement and partial difference in the two words is to be found in the fact that, although the meanings do not quite overlap, they both have acquired two somewhat distinct spheres of their application. To be reasonable — constitutionally and habitually so — is to have the capacity, native or acquired, for framing certain moral, æsthetical, and religious ideals, of which the lower animals show few, if any, traces. But the word "rationality" is an "abstract collective term" which is intended to include all these ideals, and the sentiments and activities of thought and imagination in which the ideals originate, as well as the manner of life which realizes them.

In English philosophy, it was Coleridge who fought for this use of the word *reason* as involving capacities and activities much beyond those which could be attributed to the intellect considered as the faculty of man's superior power of discursive reasoning. To quote a passage from the *Friend* (Works, Vol. II, p. 144): "I should have no objection to define reason with Jacobi . . . as an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the universal, the eternal, and the necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phenomena." This conception of the rationality of the person, man, is too vague and figurative to be of much scientific or practical

use. But it suggests the important truth that no rational life is possible, no personal development can take place, without moral consciousness and moral freedom. It follows, then, that our search after an answer to the question, What is it to be a person? and even much more our quest after the secret of personality, can meet with no success unless some account is taken of the springs and principles of man's moral life.

To anticipate the finding by a preliminary word: The "respect for reality" which supports and guarantees the value of truth, and so the integrity of the foundations of science and of all manner of social intercourse, is itself really a moral affair. He who has it not, or fails habitually to observe it in the conduct of his affairs, is not a good person. But he who trains himself to an habitual fidelity to this feeling, inherent in the very constitution of rationality, is, in this respect, a good man. And fidelity to the truth is a virtue which draws after it a group of other virtues.

The sources of the personal life in its ethical aspect are described by Lord Shaftesbury in quaint language as follows: "In a Creature capable of forming General Notions of things, not only the outward Beings which offer themselves to the Sense, are the Objects of Affection; but the very *Actions* themselves, and the *Affections* of Pity, Kindness, Gratitude, and their Contrarys, being brought into the Mind by Reflec-

tion, become Objects. So that, by means of this reflected Sense, there arises another kind of Affection toward those very Affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the Subject of a new Liking or Dislike."

Of the "Affections" to which the passage just quoted refers, the most primary and, in its developed form the most comprehensive, is called the consciousness of obligation. As *feeling*, and considered apart from the judgment to which it becomes attached, I have ventured elsewhere to give it the uncouth term, "The Feeling of the Ought." [1] For, whatever we may decide as to the relative priority of feeling and judgment in the moral consciousness, and as to the relative value of the two in the determination of duty and the doctrine of the virtues, and as to the philosophy of ethics, the distinction must be recognized as of great importance, between one's feeling *that* I ought, and one's judgment as to *what* I ought. We hold that the former is inherent in the rational nature of the normal individual person, as a spontaneous expression of his rationality; but that the latter, like all other general judgments, depends upon the exercise of the reasoning powers, as subject however to the influences of heredity, environment, — especially, the social, — education, and the habits of will formed under all these influences. Only

[1] For a full discussion of this subject, see the author's "Philosophy of Conduct," Chapter VI; and "What Ought I to do?" Chapter II.

by holding fast to this important distinction can we reconcile the conflict between those who assert for every man an infallible intuition of what is right, what wrong, in any of the several forms given to the conception of an infallible intuition, and those who point to the notable differences and even oppositions of moral judgment which have characterized all generations and stages in the course of human moral development. In a word: "*The feeling of the ought*" *is primary, essential, unique; the judgments as to what one ought are the result of environment, education, and reflection.*

It must be confessed that the proof of the statement just made cannot be got from an appeal to the reflective self-consciousness of the morally developed person. He has long ago come to himself in such a way that feeling and judgment are indistinguishably blended in his attitude toward certain states of mind, called motives, in himself and others; and to certain kinds of conduct. He does not need to make up his mind, either by argument or by asking other persons, as to the right or wrong in these matters. The blend of mental components has the quality of immediacy which is one of the tests of a so-called intuition. He can truthfully say, with about equal evidence and emphasis of conviction, either " I *feel* that I ought" (or ought not) and "I *know* that I ought" (or ought not). With certain Kamchatkans and Mongolians,

however, the same feelings of approval spontaneously arise toward deeds of theft, adultery, and murder; but they also think that he who scrapes snow from his shoes with a knife, or lays iron in the fire, or strikes his horse with the rein, *verily ought* to be punished with death.

In most cases, long before the reflective consciousness has developed far enough to make the experience fit for storing in the permanent memories of childhood, an emotional disturbance has taken place which, although it is nearly always accompanied or followed by feelings of either pleasure or pain, is not itself a mere feeling of either pleasure or pain. It is a feeling of repulsion or attraction based upon another kind of distinctions in conduct, its quality and its consequences, rather than its connection with the individual's pleasures or pains. It soon shows its power to bind the will to ideas and acts of a different and higher kind of value. In most cases, it is probably first awakened as a feeling of repulsion toward some form of gratification opposed to the social customs that lie closest to the daily life. The child can learn his "better-not" by lonely experiment with the tail of a snappish dog, or the flame of a burning candle. He learns his "ought-not" by trying to appropriate his brother's toy; or by disobeying his mother's command as to the contents of the sugar-bowl. He may even learn it through failure to turn over to his "pals" the due proportion of his "pickings and steal-

ings." In the latter case, too, the feeling of the value of honesty and fairness, though only in a sadly limited way, attaches itself to the social effects of following without discrimination one's impulses toward what it is pleasant to have under selfish control. Soon after, if not simultaneously, the feeling of the ought in its positive and agreeable form is born within the personal life. Respecting some rights, doing some fair things, obeying some one's commands, and even courage and skill as virtuous ways of committing all manner of crimes, are rewarded with social approval which may be expressed in any one of many different ways. A word, a smile, a pat upon the back, or a stick of candy, may in the earlier stages of moral development serve the purpose of exhortation and of careful instruction in the principles of right and wrong conduct.

But why have we ventured to characterize this emotion which answers to the developed feeling of obligation, the doctrine of the virtues, and the theory as to the ultimate nature of the morally right, as something unique in man, — an emotion which in its simplest form cannot be aroused in a merely animal consciousness. The Japanese have a proverb which may be liberally interpreted somewhat as follows: "The bamboo shows its noble character from the first shoot as it springs from the ground." The bamboo is therefore the type of what the son of a true samurai ought to be. Not a few species of ani-

mals have exceedingly elaborate specific and tribal customs which are quite rigidly enforced upon their own members, and against all attacks from their enemies. But they show no sufficient signs of that reflective consciousness, or those powers of intellect and imagination, or of that organized and rationalized social structure, with its infinite capacity for development, that bear witness to the unique moral personality of man. In the development of the social life of the most intelligent of the animals, therefore, we miss all the rational elements of man's moral life. We are only judging the tree by its fruits, when we declare that in its roots and sprouts, and in the grafts, it has the qualities which its fruits display in their maturer form.

As we have already said, education and reflection develop in different individuals startlingly different judgments as to what deeds of will are right, what wrong, and therefore valid claimants for respect as principles of the moral life. And yet all persons have its essentials in common, and as necessary to their being *persons* in any true and full meaning of the word. I have known the Jain politely to excuse himself that he might take his evening meal before the darkness would compel him to breathe in or drink some invisible form of vermin life; and the English milord boast of how many score of highly organized lives he had done to death in a single day's sport. I have heard a learned and honored

chief-justice of one of the Provinces of India boast that he considered it his duty daily to drink the water in which his mother had washed her feet; and the poor drunken thief of a woman sob out her heart-felt confession of guilt, when the judge of a police-court in the City of Edinburgh asked her: "How could you be so mean as to steal that poor old woman's only petticoat?" Yet all were of kindred moral nature with the saints and the Apostles.

There are other emotions than the feeling of obligation which play an important or essential part in the make-up of man as a moral person. For the most part, if not exclusively, these are such emotions as are aroused by things and ideas that have value. Some of them are more distinctively ethical in their character; but some resemble rather the feelings with which human reason greets the beautiful in nature and in art; and some there are which closely counterfeit the most profound of the religious emotions. For the good man has a Godlike character; and in saying this we draw near to the secret of personality and the explanation of the ultimate goal and supreme value of the personal life.

The most distinctive of the other more definitely ethical feelings that constitute the person as moral, and so equipped to become a member of a society of persons, is the so-called "feeling of merit." Of this feeling the description given by the late Professor Bowne is excellent. "Merit is

the desert of moral approval and the right to be rewarded accordingly." This emotion looks in two directions. It is a feeling of a right to assert a claim; it is also a feeling of a right to perform a duty. Its syllogism runs in somewhat the following way: If *A* is a good man, he has a right to be universally approved; and it is the duty of other men from *B* to *X* to approve him. It, indeed, lies at the foundations of social order as a moral affair; but it does not contradict the moral wisdom of the typically good man, who is good "not for the sake of gaining heaven or of escaping hell."

> "Thanks to men
> Of noble minds is honorable meed."

The whole social order, as an affair of morals, depends upon this feeling of merit due to the man who lives up to the feeling of obligation. He is the "good man" in war or in peace, in some one of the many relations which he must sustain to his fellow men, or in a general all-round way. "He ought to have" what he does not generally get, the reward of appreciation by all rational persons; it is not right that he should be deprived of it by any one of them. And when he exhibits some of the virtues in a way so marked as to partake of heroism, the feeling of approbation takes on all the characteristics of an æsthetical emotion. Others are impressed with feelings of admiration similar to those with which one looks off from Observation Hill upon Kinchinjinga and the surrounding Himalayas. This emotion

is *purifying* to those who feel it; or, to use the phrase of the Hindu religious philosophy, it "washes away one's sins." Again, the emotions aroused by heroic virtues, or by a life, however humble otherwise, that is able to overcome with patience and endurance the obstacles to right living have distinctly the characteristics of religious awe. "I take off my hat" to such a man, is the common fellow's way of expressing this emotion. The great philosopher who has generalized the objects to which the feeling of obligation is naturally due, affirms that the "moral law within" and the "starry heavens without" awaken in him the same feeling of boundless admiration.

Feelings like those just described do, in fact, make an appeal to the will of every person who has a normal moral consciousness. They are essential endowments of his ethical personality; essential moving powers and guides to his moral development. He who has them not is either a sort of monstrosity, or a radically defective person.

But all this appeal to the will, even when reinforced by the utmost wisdom to be gained from experience, would not succeed in effecting the creation or the development of a truly personal life, if the will — regarded as the summary of man's native and acquired self-activity — were not possessed of moral freedom. Reference has already been made to the fallacy of an *a priori* and metaphysical theory of determinism as applied to man, — his conduct and his character.

Not even things are compelled by other things to act in "regular" ways, irrespective of their own nature. But it is man's nature, as a person and so far different from any known or conceivable thing, to act with respect to motives, and to choose between and among these motives. This nature of his is known, and can only be known, as the so-called nature of every being is known, by its fruits. Thus known, it ends indeed in ultimate mystery; but it leads to the acceptance of indubitable facts. We cannot, therefore, agree with the German philosopher Riehl: "Morality is the cognitive ground of Determinism, while Determinism is the real ground of Morality;" or with the Dutch psychologist Höffding: "Psychology . . . must start from the assumption that the causal law holds good even in the life of the will, just as this law is assumed to be valid for the remaining conscious life and for material nature." On the contrary, both philosophy and psychology must start from, and stick to, the evidence of the facts of life; and in this case, the facts are especially those that appertain to the self-conscious self-activity of the person as moral. These and other assumptions of Determinism cannot fitly be met with the calmly measured declaration of Mr. Sidgwick "as to the practical unimportance of the Free Will controversy." But neither can they be satisfactorily met by setting up the plea that *we* (and here the "we" can be only equiva-

lent to an "I," for my part; since no individual can intuitively avow the consciousness of another), know that we are free by an immediate, self-conscious, and therefore — all argument to the contrary, notwithstanding — invincible proof, which no form of science can overthrow or weaken. On the contrary, every one who will reflect upon his own conduct and the motives which influence it, may easily know that there are numerous limits to one's so-called freedom of will, and many degrees of the attainment of this freedom. For in this respect, as in all other forms of the development of personal life, different individuals come to themselves in differing ways and to different extents; and there are still not a few who give no evidence of having come to their better selves in any way or to any extent. It is only the moral heroes who can truthfully declare with Browning's "Paracelsus":

> "I have subdued my life to the one purpose
> Whereto I ordained it;"

or, again:

> "I have made my life consist of one idea."

But this degree of exalted self-control is by no means necessary for *some* moral freedom and for a corresponding moral responsibility.

The very contrary of the declaration that the law of causation applies to man's conscious life as it applies to material nature is strictly true. Causation, as the physical sciences interpret its application for material nature, never once ap-

plies to man's conscious life. Things do not reach the centre of man's personality, the self-conscious will, — not even his own thing-like body, — until they have awakened states in the self-conscious life itself. Gold and fame are nothing to the will, either as attractive or repulsive, or even so as to be regarded with indifference, until feelings of greed, or ambition, or ennui, or their opposites, are aroused. The rack is nothing to the culprit or the martyr, until its torturing pain is felt, and so the will is appealed to hold on to, or to let go, its formative or already formed decision. It is the *pain* and not the rack, that influences the will. Either culprit or martyr, under the influence of that torturing pain, may be brought to feeling: "I can endure no longer." The thief or murderer may be brought to the conclusion: "It is not worth while to refuse beyond this limit of endurance." Then we say, using an impressive figure of speech, that his confession was "wrung" from him (*i.e.* his will), as water is wrung from cloth with loose meshes, or as blood is literally wrung from his suffering body. But the idea of the moral value of steadfastness in faith may make the martyr scorn to weaken his will that is set in the determination to keep that faith until the end. The thought that it is mean to betray his partner in crime may do the same thing for the thief or the murderer. The soldier who has fought a rear-guard action for two days, without food or relief, may

fall as one dead upon the ground with all the will to live and desire to do his manful duty taken out of him. He cannot will to march and fight any more. The feeling of exhaustion has mastered his will. But the voice of his officer, or the call of the bugle, may arouse the ideas and feelings to which the will freely responds; the soldier staggers to his feet, and fights on for another night and day. It is not the vibrations of the air caused by the officer's voice or the call of the bugle, or even the imaginary vibrations of the nervous system provoked at the end of the physical series, that causes the conscious and deliberate or only dimly conscious alteration in the direction of the person's self-activity. It is the meaning, the significance as expressed in states of ideation and emotion, which stands in apparent relation of cause and effect to the reactions of the personal Self. To understand even the phenomenal aspect of all such experiences, — the experiences which make up the daily record of every personal life, — the nature of the relation between mental states must be stated in terms to correspond with experienced facts. Thus stated, — we repeat, — the relation differs in most essential ways from that of the conception of causation between things as applied by the physical sciences to material nature.

In order, then, to connect the will of man with natural forces in the manner, and under the laws that control the changing relations of things,

three assumptions have to be made, two of which are highly conjectural, the other demonstrably false. The states of the nervous system must be unconditionally caused by external influences, in the form of sensory impulses. The successive mental states — thoughts, emotions, desires — must be unconditionally caused by the states of the nervous system, especially by the brain states. All the decisions and deeds of will so-called must have themselves linked together under the laws of causation, so that they follow each other with an intensity and in an order strictly determined by the mental states. But physiology has by no means been able to explain the *nature* of man's nervous system, and especially of the cerebral hemispheres of the brain, so as to make its behavior such a one-sided affair. There is about as good evidence that its behavior is determined by the states of consciousness as there is to connect it in a strictly deterministic way with natural forces outside the bodily organism. Again, to make brain-states the causes of states of consciousness in a manner corresponding to that in which changing states of things are causes of each other, is not only — as I have just said — a highly conjectural assumption, but to many thinkers it seems so inconceivable as to be palpably absurd. When we step over the threshold of physical phenomena into the domain of consciousness, of however low an order, we seem to be in a quite different world.

To arrange the states of consciousness under the conception of a causal sequence, in which each preceding state determines its next following state, is to misconceive and pervert all that we know, as truth of fact, about the constitution and the development of personality. For, in the first place, there are no stages or single performances of this life that do not give evidence or a certain *self*-activity. We cannot account fully for anything that a person does without making appeal to the mystery of a nature that manifests itself in this way. For Will is not a special faculty, or ability, that can be in thought or in fact separated off from its vital union with all the other so-called factors that invariably and momently coöperate in the currents of the onflowing stream of personal life. We speak, indeed, of will being influenced, or even compelled, by motives; but we can just as truly, and often more illuminingly, speak of motives as influenced or determined by the will. The will of any personal Self *is* the person regarded as self-active. This distinction is not for the distinguished only; though different persons are distinguished by its possession in different degrees. It is the centre of all that distinguishes the personal nature of man from the nature of the lower animals.

The culminating activity of personal, moral freedom is Choice. "When we say," declares Aristotle, "this is chosen or proposed, we mean that it has been selected after deliberation."

Now there is good psychological ground for agreeing with M. Paulhan when he says: "Every idea . . . every sentiment, in brief every psychic system, tends to complete itself by volitions and motor phenomena; every system has its own will." But the moral person, whether he be a good or a bad person from the moral point of view, if he is a person in any true meaning of the word, and to any appreciable degree, can deliberate, on due occasion. The infant does it when he pauses before he stretches out his hand toward the forbidden piece of cake, or to grasp the piece of candy which looks the more attractive of the two, one of which has been offered him. Deliberation is itself the conscious interposition of a check until two or more contending "psychic systems" can have their *value* estimated. Dogs appear to do something of the same sort. But the impassable gulf between the canine and the human animal appears when we consider that the former does not seem to develop any ideas or sentiments appreciative of distinctly *moral* values; but it belongs to the essential nature of the person to have sentiments appreciative of moral values and of their binding obligation. Moreover, as a result of development, these sentiments of obligation and of approval and disapproval have been attached to certain forms of behavior by the social environment, — the culture this nature has received from other beings morally constituted; and then sub-

jected to a self-reflection that rises far above anything possible for the most intelligent of animals. We may say then: "*Rational will is the Self regarded as determining its own conduct with a view to realize the ends that are morally good.*" ("Philosophy of Conduct," p. 153.) It follows that the morally ideal person is a Self voluntarily using its own intelligence to secure the ends of that conduct which is judged to be morally right.

It is in the phenomenon of Choice, when thoroughly analyzed, that the immediate consciousness of what is called "being free" (less fortunately and often in a way to deceive oneself, "having an immediate knowledge of the freedom of the will") comes to its highest and most intelligent expression. Briefly described, the stages are as follows: I am aware of different or conflicting tendencies in the form of impulses, needs, desires, or other forms of so-called "motives," urging me to select one of two or more acts or courses of conduct. But I pause in my volition; I call a halt to decision until I can more carefully estimate the values of these courses, whether by way of happiness, relief from pain or other form of evil, reputation, success, approbation of conscience, or other form of good that is likely to follow for myself or others. I weigh the different courses of conduct in a scale of the values of the ends they are adapted to secure. In this process of "deliberating" (*scaling*, or subjecting them to the test of the *libra*) I must pay

attention to them; but I cannot attend to them all at the same time, or to any two of them in strictly the same moment of time. In fact I follow out the advantages of one; and then turn my attention to another. Slowly, or perhaps suddenly and in a highly emotional way, I drift, or pass, or leap, to a decision. *I will*, in the narrower meaning of the words; I issue a volition. For, in spite of all denials to the contrary, in deliberate choice, something between action and idea or emotion does intervene which we can only express by the words, "I will."

These elements or stages in deliberate choice which it is possible for psychological analysis in the most favorable cases to detect, are customarily more or less huddled together or quite fused. The decision in which they end at any one moment may be taken up and exchanged for another before the entire process of deliberation is complete. It may be too weak to withstand subsequent "temptations" to alter it. But the immense significance of altering one's decision, as a proof of personal life, and as a test of moral freedom, is thus increased rather than wholly destroyed. And let these two truths about every such phenomenon of deliberate choice not be forgotten: Human nature as a self-active, self-determining personality enters into and shapes the process of choice at every stage of its on-going; and this nature is not fixed once for all by any causal influences external to itself.

Such change is indicative of a nature capable of a personal development.

But is there nothing further to be known, of a more definite character, as to those qualities that with some sort of necessity determine the moral development of the personal life? This question bears some resemblance to the one already raised as to the real nature of things, whether known by science or experienced in practical ways. All things *must be*, as we are wont to say "in themselves," determined in certain forms which philosophy has called "the categories." They *must have* qualities, magnitude, stand in relation, occupy time and space, etc., etc. What qualities must the moral person possess and exercise, in order to conform to the true type? The very form in which we are obliged to ask this question about the real nature of the person as moral shows that its answer cannot fail to differ from that given to the similar question about the real nature and natural relations of things. For, — and if there were no other reason, this would be sufficient, — things have no choice as to their own qualities and relations; but it is, in fact, an essential quality of the person as moral, that he should have a choice.

It is, however, in the doctrine of the virtues that the truth about the question just raised finds its answer. This doctrine as founded in the facts of man's moral development notices, first of all, the incontestable truth that, in all ages

and everywhere, conduct has been esteemed capable of division into two opposite kinds. Some is esteemed "good" and some is esteemed "bad." This distinction is not in the least blurred by the fact that certain acts and courses of conduct are often seen by all to be partly good and partly bad, from the moral point of view; and that much conduct which is esteemed good by some judges is esteemed bad by other judges. Nor is the distinction abolished but the rather emphasized by the saying, now-a-days so popular and so often misapplied, that "no man is wholly good or wholly bad."

Valuable light is thrown upon the conception of moral goodness, and so upon the doctrine of the virtues, by the use in different languages of the words employed to express this fundamental distinction. By the ancient Greeks the "good" man was the one who had the manly characteristics of bravery in battle for the state and nobility of bearing. The word virtue (*Virtus*) among the Latins emphasized the same characteristics. The connection of the English and German words for "good" with the German *Gatte* indicates the emphasis which these languages placed upon personal fitness in the virtuous life. In Greek, again, virtue was that which, for a man, is best. But the man is bad, or vicious, who is deficient in these fundamental characteristics. Where the influence of allied religious conceptions becomes more obvious, the idea of

stain and defilement becomes more emphatic. The bad man has a darkened and soiled character. In Greek and in Sanscrit and in Latin the idea of something black and dirty is incorporated in the term for moral badness.

But what are the qualities, the possession of which entitles a man to be called good from the moral point of view, and the lack of which, or the opposite of which, bring upon him the unwelcome and perhaps opprobrious title of badness, of unworthiness to be called a real and virtuous man? The first appeal to history and to the present witness of legal enactments, of social customs, and even of professional treatises on ethics, seems to land the answer to this question in darkness, if not hopeless confusion. But a closer examination of the testimony of the general, if not the universal, workings of the moral consciousness of the race, so far as this testimony is accessible to us, shows that our search may have a better result.

Even in the case of the categories, or universal and necessary forms of the reality of things, different thoroughly elaborated metaphysical systems furnished at their conclusion somewhat different lists, and were prone to give widely different accounts of their origin and of the method of their application. Any appeal to the popular off-hand estimate inevitably results in a great increase in the number of these categories, and in endless repetition and confusion.

The same thing is true of the ethical categories, the virtues and vices which divide among themselves the field of the ethically good and the ethically bad. But the doctrine of the virtues, and therefore the description of man's personality as moral, and the laws and practical maxims which should control his moral development, require some attempt at the solution of this problem. Fortunately, any attempt, if it is not too pretentious, is sure to meet with a pretty general agreement as to its truthfulness in fact, whatever may be thought about the theoretical explanations advanced for the facts, or for their ultimate significance. In a word, the type of the really moral person is not much more uncertain than the type of the really existent thing.

Every piece of conduct, and more obviously every deliberately chosen course of conduct, involves in the inseparable unity of the personal life all the so-called faculties of human nature. But certain species of conduct seem to emphasize some aspects or activities of this living unity, to the relative exclusion of others. Some of the virtues are appropriately ascribed to a moral superiority, chiefly of the judgment; others, to an excellent refinement or intensity of the moral sentiments, the feeling for the morally good; still others, to the more heroic and enduring, and therefore morally more excellent will of the individual whose virtues they are.

For purposes of convenience, therefore, and

not without psychological warrant, though with the hope of not being too much misunderstood, we shall divide the virtues, or forms of conduct which mankind agrees to call "good," into three fundamental kinds or classes. These are Virtues of the Will; Virtues of Judgment; Virtues of Feeling. Under each of these heads, three fundamental virtues may be ranged: under virtues of the will, Courage, Temperance (in the widest meaning of the word), and Constancy; under virtues of judgment, Wisdom, Justness, and Trueness; under virtues of feeling, Kindness, Sympathy (in the widest meaning of the word), and Love as an ethical Affection. The good person, then, is brave, controls in the interests of reason his appetites and passions, and is dependable or constant. He is also wise, or uses his intellectual powers for ends that have value; he is just to his fellows and to himself as one of the same kind; and he is true in word and deed; he has that respect for reality which is an essential of his rational nature. But his social sentiments are of the more noble and ethically preferable sort. If he must be just, and must speak the truth, he strives also to be kind. He feels *with*, as well as in pity *for* others; because they are, as persons, of his own kin, — the virtue appropriate to the doctrine of the brotherhood of man. He has also the more active virtue of the social life of personal beings; he has toward all, in propriety as determined by their differ-

ing relations to him and to one another, the desire to promote the real welfare, and somehow to bless, his fellow men. He who has these virtuous forms of the inner life controlling conduct, — he is a "real good man." But the cowardly, intemperate, fickle and untrustworthy, unwise, unjust, deceiver and liar, who has no pity or sympathy, or loving-kindness toward others, — that fellow is a bad man. He is really not the kind of a person that he ought to be. And when we consider that he has at least some dim apprehension of what he ought to be; and at least some measure of moral freedom to become that better Self; then we disapprove of him and say he merits ill for his bad character.[1]

Manifold, indeed, are the ways in which the different peoples and ages express in word or deed their feeling of obligation to the different virtues. The brave man in the Homeric poems "puts might into his rage"; "breathes fierce wrath through his nostril"; and "his blood boils." But Wordsworth's "*Happy Warrior*" is the man

> "Who, if he be called upon to face
> Some awful moment to which Heaven has joined
> Great issues, good or bad for human kind,
> . . . . . keeps the law
> In calmness made. . .
> . . . . . .
> More brave for this, that he hath much to love."

[1] For a detailed discussion of this doctrine of the Virtues, the reader may consult Chapters X–XIII, of the author's "Philosophy of Conduct."

And Aristotle knew, as well as you or I, that "the fool-hardy man is generally a coward at bottom; he blusters so long as he can do so safely, but turns tail when real danger comes." That the virtue of humility is rational, because it is wise and just, even the savage Ojis recognize in the proverb: "If you can pull out, pull out your own gray hairs." Or, as says the Dharma: "That man truly pronounces the name of the Loving Lord, who is in fortitude like the trunk of a tree, and in humility like a blade of grass."

Substantially the same observations might be made to summarize the different forms of conduct in which consists the excellence for the life worthy of a person that characterizes the equally difficult and seemingly variable virtues of justness and trueness. The gap between the demands of moral consciousness and actual practice is probably no greater with the "chiefs and people" of the Tongan Islanders than it is with the "Chiefs and people" of the United States and Great Britain, if we select them as the most apparently *moral* of the so-called Christian nations.

From time immemorial those who have taken the lead in reflection over the phenomena of man's ethical life and development have made the endeavor to bring about a closer unity in the different virtues to which his moral nature acknowledges the duty of obedience. As said Socrates to Meno: "When I ask you for one

virtue, you present me with a swarm of them." And, indeed: Is there no one virtue, or form of virtuous living, which includes all the others? If such a virtue could be discovered, how incomparably more easy would it be to be really virtuous, and thoroughly so! In one place in his most celebrated work on Ethics, the greatest of all the psychologists of the ancient world answers this question by the proposal to elevate the virtue of "General Justice" to the throne of undisputed authority. "Justice, as so defined," says Aristotle, "is complete virtue." It is "not a part of virtue but the whole of virtue." On this account, it is often spoken of as the chief of virtues, and such that "neither evening nor morning star is so lovely." But at once the process of "hedging" begins; and on trying to follow this trail, we are at its end quite disappointed in our expectations. "For general justice is not complete in an absolute sense, but only in relation to one's neighbor." How, then, about the virtuous treatment of one's enemy or one's slave? In the estimate of this ancient writer, a slave was not a person in the fullest sense of the word; still less was a slave to be put in the same class as one's neighbor. And should the good man not be brave and constant and wise and sympathetic in the exercise of this virtue of general justice? The answer to the question inevitably leads us around again to the point where we must recognize the obligation for the

moral completeness of the personal life, due to all those qualities of self-activity with reference to ends of value, that constitute the very nature of a *person.*

Not more satisfactory from either the psychological or the practical point of view is the effort of a school of modern theologians and of the German philosopher Lotze to unify all the virtues by reducing them to the principle of Love or Benevolence. An American theologian proposed to universalize the virtues in this way, "The Law of Love and Love as a Law." Mosaism defined "what is good" as "to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly." Jesus summarized all right conduct for the finite person in the endeavor to keep the exhortation to mould himself after the pattern of the Divine Person: "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in Heaven is perfect." Lotze, after having defined "benevolence" as the "effort for the production of another's felicity," declares that the idea of benevolence must give us the sole supreme principle of moral conduct. Literally interpreted, we find all these and similar statements, either not intended as scientific generalizations, or else not in accordance with the facts of moral consciousness or social development, and too vague to be useful for the conduct of either the individual or of society.

In brief, the virtues, whether we make the list longer or shorter than that which we have pro-

posed to include the more fundamental of them, cannot be reduced to any one virtue. They cannot be unified in any such way. They must be unified, if at all, by showing how their exercise and harmonious development progressively tends toward the perfection of the individual person as moral, and toward the perfection of human society regarded as consisting in the conduct of relations between persons. To accept this truth, and appreciate its more profound meaning, is to make some advance, at the least, toward the discovery of the *secret of personality*.

The motive in large part for the persistent effort to unify the virtues by reducing them to one virtue has been to do away with, or to soften, the conflict of the virtues. For if the person is a self-activity, with freedom of choice, but only obligated to the binding formula of one dictate, or intuition, of what he ought to do; then the problem of settling in a practical way the conflict of the claims of two or more specific forms of virtuous conduct is solved at once. And, indeed, not a few moralists have denied the possibility of a conflict of the virtues. Such a denial, however, makes a hollow mockery of some of the most vitally real and truly tragic experiences of human life. And — "Note well" — such experiences are most frequent and severe with the best of men. It is not those with sleepy or dead consciences who are most often subject to this awe-inspiring condition of mind, heart, and will. It is not

they who have to search with moot, passionate eagerness the resolution of the intensely strained moral personality: "I want, Oh! how devotedly, to do my duty; but how sadly ignorant I am as to what I ought to do. In such conflicts, courage is often pitted against wisdom; constancy against justness; trueness against kindness, temperance against sympathy; and it is hard to decide which of these virtues — all entitled to rank as motives to virtuous conduct — shall be yielded in fact the right to move the will. *But the choice between the virtues, so to say, is the highest form of rational choice.* It is the supreme and supremely valuable exercise of moral freedom. Of him who draws back "in Hector's fashion" it may be said:

> "Whoso is seen to skulk and shirk the fight
> Shall nowise save his carcass from the dogs."

But of those who stand up like men in this fight it is written:

> "Languor is not in your heart,
> Weakness is not in your word,
> Weariness not on your brow."

The underlying problem of the metaphysics of ethics concerns the source and final justification of the authority which the moral consciousness exercises over the nature and development of the personal life. We cannot enter into this metaphysical problem in a way to divert from our pursuit in a straighter line of the inquiries: What is it to be a Person? and, What may we

at the best make probable in the form of a reasoned opinion as to the secret of Personality? What we have already found that seems true as we have followed this straighter line does not favor the theory that the values sought and demanded by the moral consciousness of the person lie outside of the person as moral. The seeming is, the rather, that no abstraction of a so-called moral law, and no theories which regard moral conduct as simply useful for reaching values that lie outside of the moral personality as such, afford the solution of these problems. To us it seems true that the source of the authority of moral consciousness lies in *the response of the actual Self to its own Ideal of self-hood;* and that the value of moral conduct must be estimated by the value of this Ideal. Thus far, then, every normal person is capable and responsible for his own attempt at the practical solution of his own particular problem.

But where in reality shall we find the grounds for the formation, by processes of thought and imagination, of the framework of this Ideal? In this Reality, if at all, must we discover the secret of Personality.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PERSON AS A LOVER OF BEAUTY

THE value of the emotional appreciation of the beautiful, and of the activities and achievements to which it gives rise, for the life of the individual and for the development of civilization, is beyond all dispute. If we attempt to conceive of what the world of nature and of men would be without objects that irresistibly call forth the admiration and love now universally attached to this kind of value, we find our imagination baffled at the very beginning of the attempt. Man's food and drink and clothing, and his housing, would be almost completely changed. Similar changes would be made in the implements of his fishing, hunting, and agriculture; and even in the weapons with which he makes war. Not an act or a habit of his daily business and social intercourse that would not be altered, — one finds it difficult to conjecture how. Sky and earth, grasses and trees and flowers, would lose much of their significance; and indeed, innumerable forms of all these growths would never have come into existence. It was the prophetic call of the superior excellence of their beauty that

urged the mind and hand of man to compel nature to improve her natural ways of employing her creative energy. As to the arts, and the works under each one of them that were achieved by those whom the world acclaims as its "masters," no dawning of a conception of them could have lighted the darkness of human existence. Of architecture as distinguished from mere building; of landscape-gardening as distinguished from areas of mud or sand grubbed with a shapeless hoe; of sculpture and painting as distinguished from the crude scratchings on wood or stone that might serve the purpose of usefulness in securing the lower necessaries or avoiding the dangers of savage life; and of music as distinguished from animal-like howlings and screamings; — of all forms of art, there would be none to bless and lighten the external surroundings which contribute to the moulding of the personal life.

But it is not of the externals of the personal life that we design chiefly to speak at the present time. It is not the utility of art by way of making the atmosphere more comfortable or promotive of human well-being in the form of its enjoyment of varied pleasures, that we now chiefly desire to commemorate and praise. We are, the rather, bent on showing that the love of beauty, and the aspiration and achievement which spring from this emotion, are essentials of personality. Without these inner qualifica-

tions man would not be, and could never become, the person that he really is. And besides, this movement of the self-activity of man in a conscious, purposeful, and free way, is so closely connected with the nature and development of the moral and religious life, that the æsthetical, the ethical, and the worshipful attitudes toward reality, although not to be identified, cannot be wholly separated.

What we call the "decencies" of social intercourse are as well named the "petty" but by no means insignificant moralities of personal life. He violates in some measure the obligation to act rationally who makes no intelligent and voluntary effort to acquire and observe them. There is no writer on morals less likely to be accused of finicalism than the Stoic philosopher, the lame slave Epictetus. In one of his Discourses, however, he complains that some persons assume the rôle of philosophy, while "failing to fulfil what the character of a man implies." "In what," says he, "do we act like cattle?"

"When we act gluttonously, lewdly, rashly, sordidly, inconsiderately, into what are we sunk? Into cattle. What have we destroyed? The rational being." Again, when discoursing of Purity, both of body and soul, as though the two had some principle of union, this practical philosopher, so indifferent to mere conventionalities and so scornful of pettiness, indulges in speech where wisdom is blended with sarcasm and humor.

"I declare, for my own part, I would rather that a young man, on his first inclination to philosophy, should come to me finically dressed, than with his hair soiled and dirty. For there appears in him some idea of beauty and desire of decency; and where he imagines it to be, there he applies his endeavors. One has nothing more to do than to point it out to him and say, 'You seek beauty, young man, and you do well. Be assured, then, that it springs from the rational part of you. Seek it there, where the pursuits and avoidances, the desires and aversions, are concerned. Herein consists your excellence. . . . But if he should come to me soiled and dirty, with moustaches drooping to his knees, what can I say to him; by what similitude allure him! For what has he studied that has any resemblance to beauty, so that I may transfer his attention, and say that beauty is not there, but here? Would you have me tell him that beauty consists not in filth, but in reason? For has he any desire of beauty? Has he any appearance of it? Go, and argue with a hog not to roll in the mire." How much more obviously applicable is all this to those, who in the name of beauty and claiming the authority of the love of beauty, and its freedom of spirit, make use of art to pander to the "cattle-like," rather than the rational nature of their fellow men.

In vindicating the love of beauty as an essential element in the rationality of the person, we

begin where we have begun in our treatment of the other corresponding elements; we begin with æsthetical consciousness. This has its emotions and sentiments, its thoughts and imaginings, its impulses and deeds of will, peculiar to itself. But they all arise in the unity of the same rational Self. Man's Self is "just naturally" a lover of the beautiful.

On analyzing the æsthetical consciousness, the first thing to be noticed is its marked pleasure-pain quality. Some things in nature and of human production, quite apart from their usefulness or their more immediate relation to ourselves, produce in the soul a peculiar feeling of pleased admiration; some produce a disagreeable feeling of mild or severe repulsion. But these emotions are seldom a perfect blend of wholly agreeable or wholly disagreeable feelings.

This pleasure is not, however, quite like that which one gets from eating the oranges of Egypt or Syria; nor is the pain of the same quality as that which follows biting into a bitter persimmon. The complex sentiments with which men respond to æsthetical impressions have two classes of characters that distinguish them from all emotional disturbances of a merely sensuously agreeable or sensuously disagreeable form. They have a certain universality and a certain rationality. These differences suggest that while sensuous tastes, appetencies, and preferences of an emotional character, relate to what "in-fact-is;"

genuinely æsthetical tastes, appetencies, and preferences, belong, the rather, in some sort to the sphere of "that-which-ought-to-be." True the silly motto, *De gustibus non disputandum*, may be applied to the preference of a rag-time jig for a sonata of Beethoven, or of the vulgar song of a dance-hall to Schubert's Erl-King. But it is impossible to convince the cultivated æsthetical consciousness that such a preference is rational. That we have little or no ground, except that of their physiological effects — and these lie quite outside of the sphere of the beautiful — for an argument over the fact that some men like olives or caviar, and some do not, is almost equally evident. For *these* are the tastes about the reasonableness of which it is not seemly to dispute; unless, indeed, the dispute can be raised into the realm of the really æsthetical or the moral. But he who has no respect for the beauty of a symmetrical or a noble and heroic personality seems monstrously lacking in a rational love of what is worthy of respect, in the highest form of its impressiveness.

A second distinguishing characteristic of the æsthetical sentiments is their objectivity. Of course, every feeling of the beautiful is somebody's feeling; it is an emotional disturbance occurring in the conscious life of some subject. But the qualities which call forth the feeling are invariably regarded as somehow inhering in the object. The fading colors of a gloriously beau-

tiful sunset remain in reality scarcely long enough for me to admire them. And yet I am sure that it is the *sunset* and something belonging to the beauty of the quality and arrangement of these colors, and not my admiration of them, which deserves to be called the *object* of my subjective state. The object and the subjective state are, in this case, equally fleeting; in a few moments both have forever flown from the world of the really existent. But the essential character of the relation between subject and object is as evident as it is when I learn how throughout countless centuries millions of living rational beings have looked upon the snows of the Himalayas with hearts subdued in reverence or almost bursting with admiration and wonder at the awful beauty of their grandeur. It is, we repeat, the *Object* which is beautiful, whether its beauty be that of nature or that imparted by the moulding process of some form of art. The beauty is *over there;* the love of beauty is *in me.* This love is an essential part of the constitution of personality; it is also an essential factor in the development of personal life.

Judgments as to what is beautiful differ with different ages and with different individuals in every age, even more than do the judgments as to what is morally good. The reasons for this are obvious enough. The fact is a matter of daily experience. Ask the average man, who is not an adept in the art of self-reflection, Why

he considers courage, fidelity, justice, kindness, to be right, and the opposite forms of conduct and of character to be wrong; and he will probably make shift to give you some kind of an answer. But ask the same man, Why he considers the sunset or the mountain, or some particular work of art — some painting, poem, or piece of music — to be beautiful; and he will either be unable to answer, or he will be forced to confess that it is because some one has told him it is so. This is the answer of ignorance or prevarication. For no one can effectually command or advise another to the genuine love of any particular beautiful object. Social influences, some breadth of personal experience as to the results of conduct, and reflection over the varying phases of his own moral consciousness, have laid a somewhat firm foundation for every man's opinions on moral issues, the values of the motives that influence them, and the deeds that embody them. But not the same culture has been given to his judgments on matters of art. The dread of the effects that follow many of the grandest displays of the tragic beauty of nature has made it impossible to look at these displays from the more purely æsthetical points of view. There are few that can appreciate the awful beauty of the sea and the sky, when the ship is sinking. It need occasion no surprise, then, to find that feeling leads judgment in matters of art much oftener than in matters of

conduct; and that judgment awakens and leads feeling so much oftener in matters of conduct than in matters of art.

For similar reasons the canons of art have never been developed, and are not likely ever to be developed, to the same extent of definiteness and universal acceptance, as the canons of morality. "I have heard many say," remarked my musical friend, who was a member of the country's most celebrated quartet; "I have even heard some musicians say, that they do not like the latest compositions of Beethoven; but when I hear them say that, I feel greatly superior." And superior he certainly was; but how shall one prove a judgment like that? Doubtless, in the final analysis it must be chiefly committed to the musical feeling of the majority of those who have the most refined musical feeling. But here, again, the selection of those possessed of such refinements would be largely left to the judgments which are themselves inspired and shaped by experiences of the same kind of feeling. In some large degree, what is so conspicuously true of the art of music is true of all the other arts.

But, as in every other of the several greater domains of the personal life, so in the "respect for reality" to which man's æsthetical consciousness renders obedience, the character of the intellect and the influence of education, play an important, even an essential part. The arts

have their canons, — in some worthy sense "established," if not incontrovertibly so, or by an absolutely universal agreement. For there are probably more so-called artists in every form of art, who are persons of perverted feeling, weak judgment, vacillating wills, and unworthy motives, than there are among the professional teachers of the truths of science, or of the laws and maxims that should govern righteous living.

Some of the more fundamental qualities which should be possessed by every object that has a natural right to awaken the love and admiration of beauty may be suggested, if not in a way demonstrated, by the classification of the arts which has been adopted by general, if not really forced, consent.

No other of the qualities which seem to entitle any art object to be called beautiful is more generally agreed upon than that group which is somewhat vaguely expressed by the term "life-likeness." The pictorial or poetical presentation of things that are themselves alive must partake, as a presentation, of the life of the real objects, in order to arouse legitimately the love of the beautiful. It is the *life* caught from nature which imparts its beauty to the landscape painting, the picture of sea, or sky, or tree, or flower. It is the same quality which tests the beauty of the figure moulded of the less plastic material which sculpture employs. Even the beautiful

structure of the art of architecture must stand firm on its footing, or soar aloft as though moved by the spirit of aspiration; its lines must suggest strength or graceful movement. But above all must music express, and arouse by expressing, all the more vital forms of human emotion. To this, with the rhythmic movement, the rise and fall, the quickening and slowing of pulse, which characterizes the life of all that has life, poetry adds the description in language, man's supreme form of rational expression, the spiritual content of his life as a person.

But this admirable and moving quality of life-likeness is not to be attained by mere imitation. Even the camera with the highest magnifying power of the most perfect lens cannot produce a beautiful picture, unless artistic feeling selects the object, the point of view, and the right moment for releasing the shutter. No kind of artistic work consists in copying nature or the external frame of human beings, whether posed as individuals or grouped according to any of the innumerable social relations. It is the *spirit* in the object which the *spirit* in the artist must apprehend by imagination, appreciate at its true value, and reveal in forms that are conditioned upon the skillful use of such plasticity of material as his particular kind of art permits.

All the more important phases of external nature, which are suggestive of an indwelling spirit that resembles the human spirit, — only grander,

more subtle, mysterious, and alluring, — can be represented to some extent in all of the arts. But it is music and poetry which have in this respect the superiority over all the other arts. For these arts are of all the freest from the limitations which the stubbornness of the material imposes on all human work. Only to a limited extent can we have our way with natural objects; they have a will which is not our will, which is, indeed, often opposed to our will. They have ways of their own; and only within narrow ranges do their ways correspond actually with our preferred ways. But the Will that is in them, and the ways of their behavior, excite in us admiration, affection, and respect, of the distinctly æsthetical sort. Some of them we find sublime; some graceful. The beauty of the orderly and harmonious seems to prevail at one time and place; at another time and place, the beauty of the luxurious and the wild. The magnifying glass applied to the meanest insect or the most loathsome worm reveals a beauty of form and color in details, the exquisiteness of which the art of cloisonné or jewelry can do no better than to reproduce.

All these spiritual qualities the human mind, out of the depths of its rational love of beauty, obstinately refuses to credit to itself as though they were of merely subjective origin and significance; — obstinately persists in assigning to the object as an existing form of reality. The

attribution of beauty to the external world is every whit as rational and as well-founded as are the attributions of law and causality, and the actual relations in space and time, as made by the physical sciences. Indeed, the very conceptions of law, and order, and the infinity of space and time, have half their value when they are considered from the point of view of the æsthetical consciousness. What, then, stands in the way of announcing the truth: In every beautiful object, Nature as a Reality of spiritual character and spiritual worth, reveals itself to man's spirit, and lays a sort of mandate for admiration and affection upon the human will. Or, in other words: Any object, in order to be considered beautiful, must appear to the human mind as revealing some traits kindred with itself, of an ideally worthy spiritual life.

The transcendent objectivity and value for the development of the personal life, of the admiring and worshipful love of beauty is, however, made apparent only when we consider the intimate relations of art and religion as they unite to define for the human imagination the spiritual character of the Universe in the midst of which man's personal life is set, and on which his personal development is conditioned. Of what kind of Spirit shall we conceive of this Universe as the revealer? When forced to take the "scientific" point of view, or the point of view of so-called "common sense," the primitive man knows

as truly as does the modern agnostic, what the fetish, the totem, the tree or the stone he worships, actually is, — that is, as a Thing and not as a Spirit. He will tell you, he does not worship the thing but the spirit in the thing. If imagination depicts this natural object as benevolent or malevolent, the crude work of the savage will delineate it by exaggerating the features that express the spirit in the life of nature or of man. It is as true of the savage, as Plotinus declared it to be of Phidias: "He did not create his Zeus after any perceived pattern, but made him such as he would be, if Zeus deigned to appear to mortal eyes." It was in accordance with this half-moral respect for the character, so to say, of a World that can excite and rationally support the love of the beautiful, that Apollonius contended for the superiority of the Greek to the Egyptian representations of the gods; since the former gave to them their ideals of the human spirit, while the latter made use of grotesque and exaggerated imitations of bestial life.

The undeveloped thought and unrefined imagination of the savage or so-called primitive man can conceive of a world of many objects in a discontinuous, fragmentary, and disintegrated, or as yet not fully "integrated" way. To the distracted and unorganized personal life of the human individual at this stage of development, his religious emotions and imagination respond by creating a horde of divinities, of invisible

spiritual agencies, that are incapable of forming any spiritual unity among themselves; and still less so, of imparting any spiritual unity to the world over which they have limited, and often mutually hostile, spheres of temporary control. The Ideal of Divine Being in the form which Pantheism gives to it, or the belief that the Universe *is* God, cannot belong to the religion of savages; if for no other reason, because savages have not sufficient culture of the creative imagination. In India, where alone in ancient times a philosophical Monism is found, the preceding and the still co-existing religion among the multitudes is *panpsychism* rather than *pantheism.* But even in the Vedic hymns, the more "enthusiastic phrasifiers" show a more or less strong tendency to religious syncretism. In the later part of the Rig Veda there appears a nearer approach to a real pantheism. The "great, one spirituality of all the gods" was beginning to be realized. But it is not the mere conception of a vast collection of things thrown together in some matter-of-fact way, that is calculated to satisfy either the æsthetical or the religious demands of the personal life. Such a conception is neither stable nor adequate to serve for man's artistic or religious development. Nature must be conceived of as a spiritual Unity in order to satisfy the scientific, the æsthetical, and the religious consciousness, — that is, all the demands of the rational nature of man. It was the

conception of Brāhma = All-Energy that completed the beginnings of philosophic pantheism.

It is Theism, however, — as we shall see more clearly when we come to consider the fuller content of the religious consciousness, — which fills out and satisfies most completely all the demands of both the æsthetical and the religious consciousness in its endeavors to conceive of the world as a spiritual Unity. Longinus had already caught this truth in its application to one form of the æsthetical respect for reality, when he says: "When a writer uses any other resource, he shows himself to be a man; but the Sublime lifts him near to the great spirit of the Deity." In another aspect, as Bosanquet truly says of Plotinus: "In the directness with which it is perceived, beauty has an analogy to mystical intuition which often makes it find favor with those who think methodic science too circuitous for an available avenue to truth."

We have seen that the application of our æsthetical consciousness to natural objects inevitably implies a sort of personifying process similar, in a way, to that employed by all our claims to have given to our minds in terms of science a knowledge of reality, to which Reality corresponds because our knowledge faithfully responds to it. On the larger scale of the Universe considered as a whole the same thing is true. Every judgment of taste, in the higher and non-sensuous meaning of the word, bears a silent

witness to the kinship of the human spirit with a boundless Spiritual Life, whose Reality is felt with a sympathetic joy but is not capable of mathematical demonstration or of scientific discovery and testing. In one of his "Philosophical Letters" Schiller affirms: "The Divinity is already very near to that man who has succeeded in collecting all beauty, all greatness, all excellence, in both the small and great of Nature, and in evolving from this manifoldness the great Unity." This is true only because the meaning of such a conception of Nature makes it the equivalent of the Ideal of a transcendently perfect Personal Life.

There is one phase of the nature and development of the Person as a lover of beauty which requires a very special mention in this connection. This concerns the theory which explains why Tragedy is the highest form of art. The theory is so important to the approach to any inquiry into the secret of personality that a somewhat extended quotation from a work of the author in which the whole subject is treated at a greater length seems permissible.

"The tragic idea, and its appeal to the appropriate sentiments, whether set forth in sculpture, painting, music, poetry, or prose dramatic literature, is found in almost all the greater and more highly appreciated products of art. The verdict of the world's best artistic judgment runs this way. Struggle against difficulties, scorning

of pain, self-sacrificing affection, the often baffled but final triumph of justice, human penitence and pity, and Divine pity and grace, find their expression through the tragic in art. But these are all ideas and sentiments that fall under the most heroic spiritual activities and which correspond to the supreme and profoundly satisfying ideals of spiritual Life."

"The persistent and rational determination of mankind not to regard its æsthetical sentiments and judgments as purely subjective, but to ground them in Reality, cannot be disregarded. This determination is both cause and result of the belief that all the forms and kinds of beauty have their ground and ultimate explanation in a Universal Personal Life. The world when regarded from the æsthetical, as from every other point of view, is seen to be undergoing a process of development. It is, at least in many respects, and so far as its processes are open to human research, coming to be more and more beautiful; and therefore more satisfactory to man's æsthetical ideals. This evolution itself is, of all conceivable natural things and processes, the most awfully and mysteriously sublime. It is a development characterized by order and harmony and grace, and by exquisite workmanship in details; but it is also characterized by rigor, severity, and luxuriant wildness in parts. It has the marks of a spiritual process, of a vast march onward that is compelled, and shaped or more

gently urged, by the Power of an indwelling Spiritual Life."

These elements of struggle and pain, of loss and self-sacrifice, of dark mystery and almost hopeless agony, are forced upon the personal life of man as indispensable elements in his personal development, and even in his personal existence. Their inexpressible value is impressed and enforced by everything that we know about man's personality as self-active under the control of moral and æsthetical ideals. But they have their objective realities. That Spiritual Unity, which science personifies as Nature, and religion personifies as God, must be conceived as somehow unifying and harmonizing them all in his own Divine Being, if only we can Know Him as He really is.

It is, however, in man's religious nature that all the qualities and activities of the personal life find their most perfect expression and their supreme development. *What man most essentially is as a Person can be understood only by understanding him as a religious being. In the depths of this nature, if anywhere, we may hope to discover some answer to the Secret of Personality,* especially on the side of his Titanic struggle to overcome physical evil, unreason, ugliness, and moral weakness, error, sin, and shame.

CHAPTER IX

THE PERSON AS RELIGIOUS

FROM fifty to twenty-five years ago an essentially materialistic metaphysics was much more dominant in the spheres of the physical and chemical sciences than it is at the present time. Its method was, under the general but abstract conceptions of Law and Evolution, to arrange the classified facts, fill in their gaps and so-called "missing links" with venturesome conjectures, and announce the results, when thus "systematized," as affording a satisfactory, if not altogether demonstrable and *a priori* explanation of the Universe of natural objects and of human history. For this theory did not stop or hesitate at any barrier that proposed a radical or even a very important distinction between the forces which seem to reveal the nature and control the evolution of things, and the nature and development of the self-determining, morally free, and rational being of man, — the individual person, or his social institutions and relations. Its metaphysics not only assumed to explain in a mechanical way its own foundations in human reason; but it also undertook to dominate the hitherto accepted principles and canons of morality, art, and religion.

It is not strange, then, that the extreme advocates of this all-embracing metaphysical materialism rejoiced in the discovery of individuals and races, which bore all the other characteristic features of being human, but were almost or quite deficient on the one side or element of personality to which we give the name religion. They eagerly, but almost uniformly without any attempt at criticism, ransacked books of travel to find evidences of savage or "primitive" men who had no traces of a belief in a god or in the existence of the soul after death. It did not matter to their minds that these announcements of such a fortunate finding were quite customarily made by travellers who had little knowledge of the language of the tribes they were reporting; who did not sufficiently appreciate that the secrets of religious belief and cult are among the things first of all to be guarded with great care and last of all to be given away to strangers; who were oftenest themselves extremely unfitted to approach the subject with the requisite intelligence and sympathy derived from comparative studies; and who were by no means always free from the justifiable impression of being antecedently pretty sure to find just what they set out to find, and not much other or more.

But there was another class of reporters concerning the non-religious nature of savage and primitive man whose influence was even more misleading. This class consisted for the most

part of missionaries and orthodox Catholic and Protestant theologians. Such explorers or residents, or readers of books by explorers or residents, did not allow the important distinction between religion and religions, or between religion that is just simply *religion* and *true* religion. And, since "true religion" is with such, or ought to be, *my* religion, it follows as a matter of course that there are many individuals and not a few tribes, — not all of them savage or primitive, — that are irreligious persons. But to be irreligious in another's estimate is by no means to be wholly non-religious, — that is, wholly lacking in the fundamental and germinal forms of a religious nature, and quite devoid of the capacity for a fine and noble religious development.

The days of this ignorance are now winked at. Indeed, among students of comparative religion they have almost become matter of merely historical interest rather than theoretical concernment. We do not think that any other aspect, side, rational activity, — however one pleases to designate from selected points of view, the nature and development of personality, — is any more surely fundamental and universal than is that which we call religious. Man as a person is, in fact, religious. Being in fact religious is essential to his complete personality. All men, irrespective of divergencies of race, period, of ignorance or culture, of forms of expression in

creeds or ceremonies or secret cults, — men in general, whether or not, we can say this of each and every individual man, — are "just naturally" religious. To have one's nature totally devoid of religious impulses, emotions, aspirations, ideas and ideals, is to be so far forth abnormal. It is to be sadly handicapped in the effort at personal development and personal influence of the highest sort among one's fellow men.

The questions as to the nature and the universality of religion are essentially inter-related. When we seek for a thing, we must know for what sort of thing we are seeking. If we do not find that particular thing, we may possibly find something not quite like it, which, however, is the better worth the finding. But when we claim to have found everywhere essentially the same thing, we must be able to describe the thing so as essentially to agree with what in fact we have been seeking and finding. Fortunately we are not at present beginning any such search. Otherwise there would be little hope of finishing the task in which the search is comprehended.

The nature of religion may be defined from either of two quite distant points of view. It may be defined from the point of view attained by human reason when it has reached its highest stages of self-understanding and self-appreciation; and when the contents and achievements of the religious consciousness have been sympathetically appreciated and criticised as they

appear in the clearer lights of the "all-around" development of the personal life. But religion may also be defined as it manifests itself among the children of nature; in its "darksome beginnings" and by tracing its "tedious upward-climbings." Is it not in this way, however, that we must come to an understanding of the nature and development of every side of the rational, personal life of man? We shall briefly regard the subject from both these points of view. And we begin with the latter.

The word "religion" as signifying some sort of a "binding" between the human and the Divine has been referred to as giving the essence of the earliest and most persistent of its forms. In accordance with this idea, Lactantius defined religion as "the bond which units man to God." But philologists do not agree as to the meaning of the term. Among the Hindus, Hebrews, Greeks, Celts, or Germans, there is no corresponding word; and these include some of the most obviously religious of all the world's peoples. In spite of all divergencies, however, we find certain conceptions prevalent in all the lowest forms of religion; and some of these forms are prevalent everywhere. These elements of universal religion may be grouped as follows: (1) The belief in invisible, superhuman power; (2) this power conceived of after the analogy of the human spirit, — that is, anthropomorphized; (3) man's feeling of dependence for his well-being

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on this power; (4) and his feeling, to some extent at least, of responsibility for his conduct to this power; (5) add to these, certain emotions and practices which follow naturally from such a belief.

To vindicate, therefore, the essential truth of this grouping of the elements of the personal life involved, these conclusions must be justified. First: The rational powers of the person, Man, must be trusted to arrive at the truths of religion just as completely, faithfully, and complacently as they must be trusted to arrive at any form of truth. But the arriving at any form of truth is for man, in the broader meaning of the word, a species of *anthropomorphizing*. All manner of the facts of experience are, as a matter of course, given, organized and limited, in terms of human cognitive faculties. But these faculties are not simply those assumed to be intellectual; there are in reality no such *simply* intellectual operations, or truths that reveal the nature of things or of minds, to be derived from such operations. Pure logic, if there were any such self-activity as *pure* logic, could give us no presentation or conclusion corresponding to any reality. The assumption that every individual real existence is akin to personality, and that the key to the true conception of its nature and development is in the hands of man's personality, so far as there is any key for the race of men, is the only and fundamental guaranty of every form of knowledge, practical or scien-

tific, so-called. Deny this assumption, and you have no foundation for any kind of truth. Indeed, its denial is intrinsically self-destructive and hopelessly absurd. When, then, we begin worthily, whether from consideration for the values of truth and the practical life, or of moral and artistic and other even more exalted and subtile and mysterious emotional values, to conceive of the Universe in terms of personality, we are not to be dissuaded or turned aside by an unthinking outcry against "anthropomorphism." Of course, we are anthropomorphists, — here as elsewhere, but on the most lofty and well-assured grounds.

Second, in estimating the nature and development of the person as religious, we are fully warranted, if we make large use of the values of religion for stimulating the self-activity of will, the sense of moral freedom and of responsibility; for cultivating and supporting the higher flights of imagination and the achievements of art in architecture, painting, music and poetry; for explaining and provoking the endurance of the tragic side of personal life, its disappointments, its losses, its struggles, its agonies, its defeats of one sort exacted as the price to pay for its successes of another sort; and for its supply of satisfactions craved by the consciousness of wrong doing and sin, and supplied by the hopes of forgiveness and redemption.

It is only by keeping in mind these two truths

that one can properly estimate the incomparable extent and value which religion may claim and hold by a firm grasp, as the supreme thing in the nature and development of the personal life.

The different names by which students of comparative religion have called those particular forms which they have aimed to establish as the most primitive of all, when examined, confirm our analysis of the fundamental elements as already made. Call them Shamanism, Fetishism, Totemism, Theriolatry, or any of the other titles that may be given to the lower forms of nature worship, and their essential character remains the same. It is a vague and unreflecting spiritism. In fact, they all run into each other, and through and through each other, with cross-currents confused and innumerable. "The human soul," says De Groot, "is in China the original form of all being of a higher order" (that is, esteemed divine). "It is difficult for any believer in Hinduism," says Sir Monier Williams, "to draw a line of demarcation between gods, man, and animals." "Who is a manito?" asks the mystic chant of the Algonkins. "He who walketh with a serpent, walking on the ground, he is a manito," is the reply. The Buddhist traveller of centuries ago found in India a tribe who worshipped "a white-eared dragon, that caused fertilizing and seasonable showers of rain to fall within their country, and preserved it from plagues and calamity." In the Travan-

core District today, the people, when they see a cobra approaching, say: "The god is coming; make way for the divinity." This they say with reverence rather than with fear. But even stones, especially if they have an incomprehensible and strange appearance, or are known as meteors to have fallen from heaven, may have in them a spirit to be worshipped or to be feared. When a half-century ago the simple-hearted peasant women of the back-country in India first saw a locomotive and heard its signs of complete "exhaustion," — in other than the physical sense, — they devoutly added to the water which the tank was furnishing, a glass of milk and a bunch of flowers, with prayers and invocations to *Injin-Mae* ("mother-engine"). It was the mysterious spirit which the imagination located there, and which in some way above them, and so in some hidden way, might control their interests, and convict and punish them for wrong behavior toward it, which stirred their minds and hearts to the attitude of spiritual fear or affection. How crude the superstition! Undoubtedly. And yet how natural! This is the very fact for which at present we are contending. For the crude superstition can be raised by the development of the personal life to the place of a rational conception, having for the self-determining will a supreme practical value.

But do all men have by nature at least thus much of religion in the form of what the culti-

vated, agnostics and believers, consider a superstition? Reference has already been made to some of the reasons which led to a negative answer from so many writers on the subject a half-century ago. Among these writers, perhaps no other had more popular influence than Sir John Lubbock. But long since, every one of the witnesses on which he relied for his attempt at voluminous evidence has been shown to have been misled either by haste, incompetence, or prejudice. And what shall we say as to the claim for authority of a writer who, for example, after proving by a chance traveller that the Brazilian Indians are without religion, himself reveals the facts that they reverence the moon and certain stars, believe in a principle of evil which is invisible, and try to propitiate it, and that they honor animals which they believe to be messengers from the dead? We may even at this date recall with a touch of amusement that it required a bull of Pope Paul III (June 2d, 1537) to determine whether certain of our Redskins were possessed of a capacity for receiving the Spanish type of Catholicity; were, in fact, really human. But in some of the Redskins, besides the motley mixture of popular spiritism of the vague and unreflecting sort, we find clear traces of the elements of an exalted type of monotheism.

On this formerly contested point of the universality, and so the inevitable naturalness of some

form of religious belief, feeling, and cult, it is enough to quote only a few of those writers who are justly entitled, after careful and prolonged examination of the facts, to speak with authority. "Obliged in my course of instruction to review all human races," says the anthropologist Quatrefages, "I have sought atheism in the lowest, as well as the highest. I have nowhere met with it except in individuals or in more or less limited schools." "Religion as we define it," says Reville, the student of the subject from the comparative point of view, "is inherent in the human mind and *natural*." "A people destitute of any religious notions has never been discovered," says the same author. And with him agrees Roskoff: "Hitherto no primitive people has been discovered devoid of all trace of religion." "The statement that there are nations or tribes which possess no religion, rests either on inaccurate observation or on a confusion of ideas." And looking, not so much over the earth, searching out and misunderstanding savage and primitive man through our lack of sympathy and ill-founded pride of race and superiority of modern intelligence, but looking, the rather, back as far as we can get any clear light of history, we are cheered by having to say with Professor Jastrow: "The essence of true religion is to be met with in the earliest manifestations of the spiritual side of man's nature."

That religion should differentiate itself into

various kinds of religions follows as a matter of course. Such differentiation is not an argument against the rational nature of religion, but just the opposite. All the most important and essential manifestations of personal life are subject to similar changes. In and through the changes they manifest the nature of its unity and the laws of its development. To the vision which can descry the direction and interpret the final purpose of the changes, and only to this vision, can the goal of personal life be revealed. In these respects, the differentiation of religions is no more discreditable to religion, than are the different social customs and institutions, the different styles of architecture and painting, the different schools of science, ethics, and philosophy, to the different ideas, emotions, and practical activities that evince and confirm the values and verities of science, morality, and art. The breaking up and bursting forth in various directions does not destroy, but rather manifests the spirit's unity.

Many attempts have been made by the learned to classify the religions of the world, in all times of its history, according to some one or two principles of classification. But the attempt has only resulted in failure. The muddle of so-called religions of the lowest order from the point of intelligence and moral value, as summed up together under the title of a "vague and unreflecting spiritism," has already been remarked.

Philosophical Hinduism, even as existing side by side with Christianity and including some of its borrowed truths, continues to find room for the worship of the *lingam*. The same thing was true until recently of the Buddhism of Japan. Of the three religions in one that prevail in China, Dr. Martin has said: "They are not, as the natives thoughtlessly assume, identical in significance and differing only in the mode of expression; . . . to a certain extent they are supplementary." In Thibet, too, Buddhism and Roman Catholicism have to a certain extent amalgamated; the beliefs of the former adopting the rites and ceremonies of the latter. Modern Babism is a mixture of Muhammadanism, Christianity, and Buddhism. And who can avoid the impression that the form of religion largely influential in the most cultivated modern nations is rather a worship of Wodin and Thor, or of an abstraction of physical Force, or of an impersonal Law, or of a metaphysical code, than of a Holy Spirit in whose everywhere immanent presence the spirit of Jesus found the exhaustless source, and abiding resting-place, of his own personal life?

But if we abandon all attempt at strict classification of religions, and agree with Sabatier's declaration that "the systems of classification which have been proposed have been rejected one after another as either arbitrary or too narrow," we do not surrender the right or shirk the

obligation to weigh all religions over against each other, and to make a sincere effort for their relative estimation as tested by their "respect for reality," their ministry to thought, imagination, and the higher emotions; but, above all, by their power to stimulate and support the will in its struggle toward the goal of personal life.

The causes which actually bring about the differentiation of religions afford an interesting and by no means insolvable problem. In the case of the less highly developed forms, physical influences and tribal differences are among the more prominent of these causes. Nature is always there; ancestors and heroes are always in evidence. The early Romans personified the clear sky as Jupiter and Juno, the nourishing earth as Tellus, the germination and growth of grain as Ceres; and Pales was a presiding deity over their flocks. Everywhere the sun is lord of the day, and the moon rides, seductive or poisonous in her influences, overhead at night. Fire is a wonderful and mysterious force, both terrifying and purifying. In its totality, Heaven is the Supreme Lord in China; and Heaven is so far personified and glorified in its spiritual essence by the best of China's thinkers as almost to lay the foundations for an ethical Theism.

But the differentiation of religions from the one spirit of religion is not necessarily its true development. Something more than mere change is necessary for this. Whatever we may see fit

to imagine as to some original and relatively lofty and pure form of religion, from which man has, whether through his own fault or through a series of inevitable misfortunes, fallen in his religious estate, the testimony of history, so far as available, reads the other way. The highest form of Christian Theism had its origins, however, by Divine inspiration and revealings, in the vague and unreflecting spiritism of Semitic tribes. Surely no whiter lotus ever had its roots in deeper or blacker mud! It was a marvellous succession of great prophets, or men who spoke fearlessly for righteousness, as they understood it, in the name of a divinity whom they conceived of as a spiritual Power interested in, and making for, righteousness, who advanced along this line the religious development of mankind.

It is not possible, however, for any particular one of the many religions to attain the best possible for it in its own line of development, without admitting influences from other religions that are developing along other and different lines. The righteousness of the tribal god Yahweh, even after the conception of his nature and relations to men had been greatly elevated by the work of the Hebrew prophets, could never in its isolation from other Oriental and Greek thinking have served for a God to meet the demands of the expanding personal life of mankind. But it was Greek Platonism and Stoicism which added very important elements to the Hebrew concep-

tion. These elements were not of merely speculative value. They consisted in most stimulating and profound thoughts concerning the immanence of reason in the Universe of concrete individual existences, and concerning the relations of Divine Reason to the life of man whom it had made partaker of its own rationality. These philosophies of religion supplemented and enlarged the more naïve and childlike views of the Hebrew Scriptures, and thus made possible systems of theology which through Mediævalism, and even down to the present time, served to attract and hold the intellectual and speculative resources of the personal life of religion committed to the problems which the very nature and destiny of personality propound.

But it was the life, teachings, and death of Jesus, which set forth in reality, as never before or since, the Fatherhood of God, the nature and conditions of divine sonship, and the conception of a Divine Kingdom, or religious community, composed of all who, by faith and the practice of righteous living in obedience, become true sons. Here again, in the light of modern historical research, it can scarcely be denied that the more elaborate doctrine of an eternal Son of God, kept in Heaven to be revealed in the fullness of time, had its origins to a considerable extent in sources lying outside of the Hebrew Scriptures and the earliest Christian writings.

All the phenomena that are shown by the his-

torical differentiation of religions illustrate, however, these two universally active unifying forces: The psychological unity in function of the individual soul; and the spiritual unity of the race in its development under varied physical and social conditions.

Although suggestions and relatively feeble efforts at reaching some one higher ideal of the Divine Being than that found in the so-called nature religions, or in ancestor worship, or in any exclusive tribal religion, are to be found widely scattered abroad in all ages of man's religious development, there are relatively few that have carried this attempt at an ideal to any satisfactory extent. Religions are many; religion has an essential unity; but religions adapted to become universal are few. Indeed, of the religions that have this quality of universality in the highest degree, there are scarcely more than two. These are Buddhism and Christianity. In their past history, both of these religions have frequently practised the effort to make themselves universal in thoroughly ignoble ways. Sometimes this has been done — oftener perhaps by Buddhism — by absorbing the practices and beliefs of the lower and the lowest forms of religion that happened to be popular, in the places and at the times of their strife quickly to universalize themselves. Sometimes this has been done — oftener perhaps by Christianity — through an effort to bind the minds of men to formulas

without convincing their spirits of the vital truths; or to control the emotional and practical expressions of the religious life, by methods of some kind of force rather than of persuasion and example. Both these methods of what is called "making converts" are alike unsuited to the spread of religion, however much they may seem to diminish the number of religions. To slush the truth with falsehood, or to weld truth and falsehood together under the heat of persecution, do not effect a spiritual unity in the life of the person as religious. In religion more than anywhere else, respect for reality, the moral issues, the satisfaction of the deeper wants, the more aspiring sentiments, and choicest practical values, must influence and guide the self-determining personal will.

The intimate and important influences which the religions of the world have constantly exercised upon every branch and phase of human civilization, could be illustrated without end. The industries and politics of all ages have been largely moulded by religious ideas and customs. Agriculture, business, and the crafts have from the most ancient times been given a religious significance and have been largely regulated by customs emanating from the temples and the priestly class. Among all ancient peoples the prevalent religion has been intimately interwoven with the mental picture of nature; and thus scientific and philosophical ideas have been

very largely compelled to pay attention to each other, and to religious truths, at every stage of their advance. It has already been noticed how interwoven are some of the æsthetical with some of the religious sentiments and ideals, — as it were, at their very roots. In even more important and profound ways is the same thing true of morality and religion. But to illustrate and enforce this truth it is necessary to dig somewhat deeper after the pure gold of religion's conception of the real Being of the world and of the relations of this Being to the personal life of man.

We turn, then, from the further survey of the phenomena of differentiation and development as offered by the variety of religions to a brief but more careful analysis of the nature of the place held, and the part played, by religion as comprehending and dominating the whole spiritual life of man. We turn our eyes inward for a renewed survey of the nature of the personal life and of the conditions of its highest development.

The central thing in religion as an experience is a certain belief which guarantees to the believer the reality of invisible and superhuman agencies, to whom he stands in relations of advantage or disadvantage and of at least quasi-moral obligation. The belief necessarily calls forth and associates inseparably with itself feelings of dependence, of fear or affection, of reverence and of

the sense of mystery. Through these feelings it stimulates the will to acts of self-defence, of propitiation; to ceremonials, to penances, to self-inflicted retribution or vengeance upon others who have by disregard of the gods endangered their fellows, or to heroic self-sacrifice. The feelings excited depend, of course, on the nature of the relations between gods and men, which follow from the nature of the belief. The various attempts which have been made to reduce the emotional origin of religion to any one of the feelings referred to above only serve to obscure the quite evident and altogether natural explanation of the facts by a shallow attempt at parsimony. The feeling of dependence is, as Schleiermacher held, one of the most fundamental of the religious emotions. But to derive from fear of the invisible and the unknown the emotional origin of all religion is to overlook the powerful influence which must account for the cheerful social intercourse of the believers in many of the lower forms of religion with these divine beings, such as leads to cordial invitations to share with men in their feasting and their games. Gods and men do not get drunk together under influences of fear alone. As the quaint old Chinese ballad from the seventh century B.C. sings:

> "And see! they place the goblet full,
> In figure fashioned as a bull;
> The dishes of bamboo and wood,
> Sliced meat, roast pig, and potage good;
> And the large stand."

"When," says one authority, "the Spanish missionaries questioned the Indians as to the origin of their gods, the usual reply was that they had come from heaven or the air to dwell among them and do them good."

But this diverse and even divisive form of belief is subjected to three classes of unifying tendencies which are at work in all forms and lines of human development. These are the social, the more distinctively intellectual or scientific, and the philosophical, — meaning by this the efforts and achievements of the profoundest reflective thinkers upon the ultimate problems of Reality and of the origin, nature, developments, and destiny of man's personal life.

The invisible spirits conceived of as belonging to the same larger family or genetic group of men very naturally order themselves after the analogy of the prevailing family life. Thus one family of greater gods may be enough for a whole nation; while leaving to its own house-door its own Janus, to each bit of ground its own Lares, to every hearth its own Vesta. Rome repeats essentially this family list as received from the Greeks, though with a change of names which has only a partial influence on the conceptions answering to the deified ones. And in modern Japan, a mystical pantheism of the philosophical Buddhist type, or a virtual deification of such scientific conceptions as Force and

Law, tolerates for the common people and for the women and children the home-worship of deified ancestors or of national heroes. The chief of the more virile or more intellectually advanced tribe or clan overcomes or absorbs the divine chiefs of other tribes and clans, and thus makes a most convenient reduction in the number of the claimants for worship.

Still more powerful in its socially unifying influence is the development of vast monarchies, where all that has value for the everlasting life of the multitudes of the peoples culminates in a single individual, or in a small group of individuals. The monarch is God, or at least the only real and powerful son of God; and his God is the people's God, though with certain understood licences to have some little gods of their own. In the case of a great world-empire like ancient Rome, the different religions may be left, under the guise of a scornful policy of indifference, to devour or absorb or otherwise eliminate each other through the application of the law of the survival of the fittest; or, finding itself annoyed or endangered in political matters by some of them rather than others, the state may take in hand the task of diminishing their number, or reducing them to an enforced unity. In the history of mediæval and modern Christian nations, there is not one of them which has not for long, or repeatedly, made the attempt to unify belief by using the seductive or restrictive influence of

social considerations. Under the voluntary system, and where there is no semblance of a state church, as with us today, social influences are powerful, and by no means always fortunately or righteously so, for the unification or the division of the essentials of religious belief.

Of all the social influences, at once most powerful, honorable, and benevolent, as bearing on the unification of religious belief, is the growing conviction, and the many practical forms which the conviction is taking, of the brotherhood of man. Ancient and time-honored social ideas and customs are rapidly being modified, or are altogether breaking down, under the rapidly growing and wide-spreading conviction that all men are, essentially considered, of one race. The belief in the brotherhood of man is largely a product of the religious belief in the Fatherhood of God. This belief is central and distinctive in the two universal religions of Buddhism and Christianity, — but especially the latter of the two. Its roots, however, have long since been nourished in other soil than that of religious belief.

All social evolution, though with many backsettings and twistings, has contributed proofs for the essential brotherhood of man. Would it misrepresent the facts to say that the political and social belief has done as much to advance the religious belief as the religious belief has done to advance it? If there is one God, and

God is my Father; then all men are my brethren, and are, like me, potential sons of God. But if all men are, in any real meaning of the words, my brethren, then who is our common ancestor? In forming our religious belief, for purposes of the suggestions it may afford in solving practical problems of social relations, it is not a common progenitor after the flesh, — a mythical Adam or an equally mythical ape-like creature, — about the reality of which we are inquiring. It is, the rather, a spiritual and present-day progenitor, an immanent regardful source of life in right social relations, which we are now eagerly seeking. Hence the incomparable practical and social value of the religious belief in the Fatherhood of God, as involving the brotherhood of man.

The comforting belief in the Fatherhood of God, with its practically beneficent corollary of an obligation to show good-will, as to brothers in one divine family, toward all men, does not, however, avail to satisfy the reason of man in its demand to understand the Universe and the divine relations to it at large. The problem of Universal Being is given to the human intellect to work upon, and as far as possible progressively to solve. As its work of research develops in comprehensiveness and depth, it discovers more and more the falsity of the pictures and theories of creation and development proposed by religious myth and theological dogma, whatever

of essential truth may be conserved as to dependence of the World on God, amid the confusion and chaos of imaginings as to the particular origins, sequences, and relations of dependence, of its concrete existences. What are the actual facts? What are the real causes which explain the phenomena? What are the laws which the order of the observed occurrences illustrates and enforces? What are the ends toward which the movements, the ceaseless successions of changes, are looking forward and themselves effecting? And, rising to the height of its audacity, the intellect may propound for itself as its ultimate problems, the Whence, the Whither, the Meaning, the Substance, the Productive Principle, and the Final Purpose of it all. But these are questions which cannot be answered by rehearsing the simplicities of religious belief, strictly so-called.

In the places and times where the religions of a vague and unreflecting spiritism have sufficed to satisfy the reflective consciousness, no conceptions corresponding to those of the modern sciences are to be found. Even in the lands where the greater religions have had their origin and earliest developments, the scientific spirit has not prevailed; the methods of science have had little influence upon, and little part in, the determination of the nature of Reality; the scientific conception of the world has not as yet struggled to its feet. And for centuries this con-

ception had to contend with the most enlightened of these religions, in order to get upon its feet. The unfortunate effect of the struggle was, not only to difference the scientific and the religious view of the world, but to throw the two views into the sharpest contrast, or even to enlist them in the bitterest antagonisms. The cry has gone forth: "Choose ye this day whom ye will serve," the God of Science or the God of Religion. But the imperative demand of the moral personality is: "Be sincere in your choice." You cannot righteously be the devotee of both Baal and Yahveh.

CHAPTER X

THE PERSON AS RELIGIOUS (Continued)

IT is the nature of the person man to be both scientific, a seeker for the truth of fact and reality, *and* religious, a believer in the invisible and the ideal; and neither of the two self-directed activities of his rational life can be safely or honorably sacrificed to the other. Neither of the two forms of his rational development can be eliminated or wholly suppressed by the other. The path of the fuller realization of the rational and personal life is a steady up-hill clinging to a vision of the essential oneness of the two.

All the achievements of those positive sciences which deal with the physical constitution of the Universe have resulted in giving to It a sort of unity to be described, if not as yet strictly defined, in terms of Substance, Force, and Law. Of the first of these three terms, so far as a metaphysical analysis of its meaning when applied to any concrete reality or to Reality in general is concerned, the physical sciences prefer to fight shy. It is much more convenient for them to let theology flounder about in that muddy pool than to dabble in it themselves. They are loth to recognize the metaphysical truth that it is

just as difficult to tell what it is for one thing to be of the same substance as another thing, as it is to tell what it is for one person to be of the same substance as another person. But unless we talk, for scientific as well as for practical purposes, about the sameness and difference of substances, we cannot talk about things as though they were realities, at all. It is *a fortiori* the substantial qualities of things upon which the Universe must rely for its Reality and its Unity.

If, however, the physical sciences are averse to the metaphysical conception of substance in general, they are fain ever and anon to put forward some favorite claimant to the title of actually being *the* Universal Substance. Of course, this is no longer such simple stuff as mud or water or air or fire; or such a chaotic mixture as that out of which Yahveh made in six days the present scheme of things and animals and man. The universal, the all-substance, is Ether, or Electricity, or mere undifferentiated expanse of atoms, or ions, or what not.

Let us take Ether as the most promising, if not the least incomprehensible and mysterious of the alleged universal substances. In order to do some of the simplest things required of it, such as to be the bearer of light with its enormous rapidity, and also the inherent cause of gravitation, it must combine within itself in the most inconceivable degree those very qualities which we find most opposite, most incompatible,

in the concrete things which Ether has made. Moreover, it must be infinitely cunning and versatile in its ideas and means for self-differentiation. These ideas must limit its self-activity and furnish the means for carrying out into a far-off perpetuity its innumerable subtle plans. It must have the sources of self-differentiation in itself; since there are nowhere, until it has produced them, any substances from which any successful scheme of differentiation can be devised. Surely then, the mystery of Ether is not less than the mystery of a Creator Person called God. Indeed, is it not thus far substantially the same mystery, — namely the mystery of a universally dominating Will, putting itself forth in an endless variety of ways, that, after all, when more closely examined, and seen more nearly in their totality, seem to combine into some sort of Unity as, so to say, their net result.

The attempt to set up an impersonal Force as the substitute of Personal Will, and derive from it a satisfactory account of the real unity which belongs in whatever measure to the scheme of physical things, is not more successful. Indeed, it is not so successful from the controversial point of view. For the very idea of force goes straight, for its derivation and for the justification of any attempt at its application to things, to our experiences as personal wills. But Force as *mere* force, all forces considered as impersonal emanations of an essential unity of im-

personal Force, cannot really do anything, or really account for anything which is actually done. The very principle of the conservation and correlation of energy implies that the World, as a whole, has in itself some immanent reason controlling the various ways and amounts of distributing the Force of which it is the boundless source. There is one energy of gravitation, and there is another energy of light. There is one energy of electricity and another energy of heat. There is an energy called magnetism; and there are as yet not definitely enumerated energies assigned to the different classes of so-called atoms. Indeed, the recognition of the very existence of the atoms and their classification depends upon the accurate differentiation of their energies. But the last generation of workmen in physical science — more eager, more sagacious, and better equipped, if not more serious and more profound than any preceding generation — has discovered and partially revealed the nature of forms of energy that, for subtle cunning and tremendous output, surpass all the wildest imaginings of the earlier scientific mind.

It is only in a very partial way that we know the exact terms on which these various kinds of energies either engage to do a common work, or pass each other by without the compliment of a recognition, or rush into each other's arms in the deadliest strife, from which, however, they are

supposed to reappear, either unharmed and undiminished, or reduced forever to some form of energy of another and characteristically different type.

It is when they are all employed in framing the constitution, encouraging, supplying, and limiting the growth of living things, and presiding over its earthly and heavenly environment, as both the lords and the subjects of the evolution of Life, that these different so-called energies become of most close-fitting practical interest to the personality of man. And this is just where their nature grows nearest to his own nature as essentially that of a self-differentiating will, — skilfully adapting itself to certain ends which bear plain marks of final purpose. For, indeed, if we were to rule out of the Universe, in our conception of it, all Life, what value would the Universe have? What idea of value, or relation, or differentiation of energies with unity of a force, or of *a Universe* in any conceivable meaning of the word, could possibly be retained? But does not all the scientific conception of the world of things, working along the line of this attempt at an explanation of their actual relations and real transactions, end either in shadowy dreams or ineffective and even intrinsically absurd abstractions, unless the one Force of the Universe from which its manifestations of energy proceed has Mind immanent in itself to serve as a principle of differentiation? Undoubtedly Yes; al-

though it may not be the province or the duty of science to give this affirmative answer.

That the conception of Law cannot possibly be of either impersonal origin, meaning, or application is even much more obvious. And yet this word law is often written with a capital *L* and used as though capacity to perform something as well as authority to set forth the way, could be imparted by a marked departure from the ordinary usages of English spelling. It was this which more than a generation ago gave to the witty Catholic writer, Father Dalgairn, the opportunity to suggest that Mr. Spencer invariably used the capital *U* for beginning his favorite abstraction (in this case, "The Unknown"), for the same reason that the old-fashioned English grenadiers used to wear such tall hats: "To excite awe in the beholders." Laws cannot do anything; they have no being, no force, *in themselves*, so to say. Their announcement, whether in simple descriptive form or in the more elaborate and imposingly scientific form of the higher mathematics, cannot furnish the satisfactory full account of any of nature's most ordinary transactions. This is true, for two quite sufficient reasons. They are at best only approximately accurate formulas for the way in which things would behave, if we could catch them simply under one set of conditions or relations. But, then, in reality, facts never occur in simply one set of conditions or relations.

The single events, the actual transactions of the real world, are always complicated by a great variety of conditions and relations. Therefore, a number of so-called laws invariably combine or conflict, in order to afford their, for us, fullest possible explanation.

Still further: The very conception of law is an elaboration of a developed personal life along lines of reflection. It is a formula that has been *thought out* and stamped either with the hall-mark of a certain factitious logical necessity, or with the authority of moral consciousness in approval of that which ought to be. To speak of things as "under law" is to personify things; to speak of Nature as "obeying Law," is to personify Nature. It is to regard the Universe as subject to a sort of inner compulsion to behave itself in an orderly and rational way. That it always does so, is an assumption which we are, as yet, far enough from having placed on a firm basis of experience with external facts.

It would seem, then, that up to this point there need be no quarrel between science and religion over their conceptions of the Universe as involving the realities of Being, Force, and Law. Both have to the same extent transcended the inscription on the shrine of Athene-Isis: "I am all that was, and all that is, and all that shall be; and my veil hath yet no mortal raised."

At this point the more advanced form of re-

flective thinking called philosophy, in its metaphysical or ontological branch, intervenes, and either confirms or confuses the conception of a personal World-Ground, which the religious belief in God requires if it is to meet the demands of a rational development of personality.

The pitiful recoil of the human reason into avowed agnosticism or atheism, when the conception of an Absolute Person or a Personal World-Ground is offered to religious belief, is usually due to two sets of considerations. One of these involves a return to the negative argument that the conception is the result of an illegitimate, if not absurd, process of anthropomorphizing; the other consists in juggling with such abstractions as "The Absolute," "The Infinite," and similar terms, with the effect of giving to them the active substance and terrifying force which they might acquire if only they could be made to correspond to any existent or imaginary Reality. As to general objections to so-called anthropomorphizing, enough has already been said. The scientific conception of the Universe, when stripped of the barest possible reference to the tender interests of religious faith, is the result of no other than the same kind and degree of anthropomorphizing. But not even the most abstract of the physical sciences, not even the abstractions of the higher mathematics, is guilty of such folly as is Agnosticism in its use of the words infinite and absolute. Mathematics deals

securely and with no small profit, with infinite lines, and infinite space, and infinite and infinitesimal quantities of a great variety of kinds. But an infinite line is as much a *line* as is a line an inch long. Infinite space, as long as it is measurable or conceivable, retains all of the qualities of finite space. Infinites and infinitesimals retain all the essentials of being *some quantity*. The positive and characteristic core of the thing meant, the *what-it-is* of the matter in discussion, is always retained; the negative prefix "in" does not alter this; it signifies only the attempt of the imagination to remove the limit of quantity. Just as soon as this attempt takes the turn of essentially destroying the nature of what we are talking about, it is time to stop; lest we begin talking nonsense. This would be true of our infinite line, if by becoming infinite, it lost all the qualities of a line and became something totally different from a line; — let us say, a beam of light or a charge of electricity.

The chance for humbug which lurks in the merely negative use of such a term as "The Absolute" is even more obvious. Absolved from all relations, no reality or imagined thing or person can possibly exist, or be conceived of as existing. All existences are in relations to one another and to the Universe as a whole. Not one of them can possibly be known, or even conceived of, as standing outside of all manner of relations.

Let us admit, then, that the incompatibility of being personal and at the same time absolute or infinite logically follows from these attempts to deliver words from all manner of obligation to represent at least conceivable realities. We have lost nothing in our argument by the admission. With such speculative non-entities as *The* Absolute, or *The* Infinite, the real concerns of personal life are absolutely out of touch, and from them infinitely removed. But against the negative conclusion of Agnosticism, or the positive conception of an impersonal and purely mechanical Universe, reflective thinking may maintain the metaphysical basis of religious belief in somewhat the following way.

"No one of the predicates or attributes of personal being can be conceived of in a perfectly unlimited or absolute way. No one of them is a solitary affair. Of necessity, they limit each other; and both in their essence and in their manifestation they are mutually dependent. Selfhood is not a merely unrestricted aggregate of independent activities. And instead of its perfection requiring or permitting the increase of the unlimited and independent exercise of any of these activities, the truth is quite the contrary. No finite Self makes progress toward an escape from its limitations by letting its psychic forces loose from the control of wisdom and goodness. Neither can wisdom and goodness grow in any human Self, while the core of Selfhood, the control of

will, is slipping away. The very constitution of personality is such that its different attributes are mutually dependent, reciprocally limited. And the nicer and more harmonious the adjustment becomes, in which wisdom and goodness guide power, and power greatens under their control, and for the execution of their ends, the nearer does personality approach toward the type of the infinite and the absolute. Or — to cease from so abstract a manner of speaking — growth toward the perfection of personality can be attained, only as the various forces of personal activity, not only become greater in amount, but also more harmoniously active in the unity of the one personal life.

"On applying these considerations to the Divine Being our conclusion is not hidden, nor does it lie far away. *Because* God is essentially personal, a self-conscious and rational Will, the different predicates and attributes under which he must be conceived are *self*-limiting and *self*-consistent. This is to say that they limit each other according to that conception of perfect personality which is realized alone in God. But the ground of this limitation is, in no respect, essentially considered, outside of, or independent of, God himself. God's infinite power is not blind and brutish force, extended beyond all limit whatever in a purely quantitative way; God's infinite power is always limited by his perfect wisdom. Neither is the divine omniscience

an ability to know, or mentally to represent, as real and true, what is not real or what is irrational. God's knowledge is limited by the laws of reason; but in the case of the omniscient One, these 'laws' are only the forms of his absolute rational life. Reality is only that to which this Absolute and Infinite Will imparts itself according to these rational forms.

"But in even a more special way, it is to be said that the moral attributes of God are *self-consistent* limitations of certain of the metaphysical attributes. If the divine justice or goodness is to be considered as perfect, then these moral attributes must constantly and completely qualify the divine omnipotence. And to say that God 'cannot' do wrong, when once one is satisfied that his righteousness is perfect, is not to limit the divine power from without, or to render it any the less worthy to be called omnipotence. In all discussion of the problems evoked by the attempt to apply such terms as 'infinite' and 'absolute' to God, it is the unifying and harmonizing nature of his personality — or perfectly self-dependent and self-consistent Selfhood — which affords both the theoretical and the practical solution of the same problems. How can God be infinite and absolute, and at the same time personal? To this inquiry, one may answer: Just because he is personal. How shall self-consistency be introduced into this complex of metaphysical predicates and moral attributes

with which man's religious feeling and philosophical thought have filled out the conception of God? By more and more expanding and perfecting this same conception as that of a perfect and therefore infinite and absolute Self.

"This Being of the World is not only real, but it is the exhaustless Source of all that is actual; and It gives laws and life to all the forms and relations of finite realities. It is known to us, and can be conceived by us, only after the analogy of our own personal life. Such is the *reasoned conviction* that comes to enforce the feeling of mystery, majesty, and limitless power and extent, in space and time, that is called forth by man's experiences of the cosmic existences, forces, and processes."[1]

But the most profound and logical defence of the metaphysical basis of religious belief, no matter how consistent with the facts of positive science, or the exigencies of reflection, comes far short of satisfying perfectly the loftier sentiments, the tenderer emotions, and the strictly moral consciousness, of man's personal life. Candid research of the external sort does, indeed, more and more confirm a high degree of wisdom, and a certain kind and amount of conspicuous justice, to the credit of the Universe when regarded in this way. The warning against intellectual pride, and the reminder of the impassable barriers of human reason, are everlastingly

[1] Quoted from the author's "Philosophy of Religion," II, pp. 117 ff.

suitable to us all, whether cocksure theologians, or heretical agnostics, or theists of the more pronounced sort, or taking our position somewhere between the two extremes. Let no one claim to comprehend the infinite and absolute person until he has succeeded in quite unravelling all the problems daily and momently presented by his own dependent and strictly limited Self. But the cry of piety is not to be stopped by the fiction of a blow on the mouth from an alleged divine hand. Reason may fitly — and, indeed, by its divinely appointed nature, is bound to — struggle to remove ever a ittle more the muffler from its blinded eyes.

That there are many cunning contrivances, and not a few supremely wise arrangements for the betterment of things and of men, immanent and active in the Universe, scientific research, as well as daily observation, places beyond reasonable doubt. Of a certain proportion of these man has already learned how to avail himself for effecting a vast improvement in the conditions of his personal life. Were it not for his voluntary ignorance, laziness, and sinful folly, he might make use of many more. He is loud in his complaints of what in the World is against him, without making one tithe of the effort necessary to discover and appropriate the resources that are plainly on his side. There is also scarcely less doubt — though it must be admitted that upon this point the facts are more difficult of

confident interpretation — that a certain irregular and rough favoring of righteousness, and practical discouragement of unrighteousness, is set into the very nature of things. This was recognized by the ancients in the conviction that, although the mills of the gods ground slowly, they did grind, and that "exceeding small." They gave the conviction place in their religion, when the plays of Æschylus exalted the character of Zeus, the supreme God, as the avenger of the righteous against the breakers of divine law. With the Hebrews, Yahweh became established in righteousness as the ruler of nature and of the races of mankind. Among the Persians, and their later Christian copyists, the Manicheans, the problem of evil was not so easily to be solved in terms of monotheistic religious belief. According to the Bundehesh, the Eternal and Absolute Being, or First Cause, produced out of his own substance two great divine beings. Of these one, Ahura-Mazda, was good and true to his Creator, A King of Light; and he became the head of all that is pure and good in the World's existence. But the other was Ahriman, King of Darkness, head of an army of bad spirits, and bringer of all kinds of evils into a good World. Between the two a great world-struggle takes place and continues through immense stretches of time. But at the last Ahura triumphs over Ahriman. For in truth, Ahura is rather the only true and absolute divine being; Ahriman

is but a limitation, a barrier, which will cease in time, to his perfect and absolute goodness. And thus the Persian religion comes very near to the doctrine of a creation by a good God, that is somehow doomed to "groan and travail together," while it waits for the completion of a process of redemption. In cruder form the North Germans and Scandinavians looked on the human experience of good and evil in the one World as though it could be explained by a struggle of "the good world-preserving gods with hostile elemental powers."

In the more tender speculative religions which originated in India and took the forms of a mystical pantheism, this dreadful, everlasting, and as yet unsettled conflict between good and evil is solved by the doctrine of illusion. It is the mistaking of the illusory for the true and the real, of that which is only māyā for Ātman, or the true Self of things, which is the source of all evil both physical and moral. To him who knows Ātman there is no real evil. He can say: "He who knows the Spirit passes beyond all grief." Naturally enough, this way of solving the problem of evil is too high and steep for the naked and bleeding feet of the millions who toil over the rough pathway of life. For them there remains the need of strict compliance with ritual and of obedience to the priest, if they will take the only path which offers some mitigation of the enormous preponderating burden of evil in

their lives. Not much more adaptable to their current needs is the lofty stoicism of the lame slave philosopher Epictetus. "Slave! do you really find fault with the world on account of one bit of a leg? Will you not give it up to the Universe? Will you not let it go? Will you not gladly surrender it to the giver?"

The one personal nature of man, by its progress in positive knowledge of a scientific kind, and its ripest fruit of reflective thinking, has arrived at the conviction that its World is in reality a Unity as respects its being, active energies, and modes of activity, or laws. The same personal nature has shaped its religious belief to the terms of monotheism, — that is, to the belief that one personal Will is the source of all the world's energies, one reason the source of all the World's laws; and that, perchance, some unity of a wise and righteous purpose runs throughout the entire course of the World's evolution. *And so this mighty unending struggle itself becomes enfolded in the personality of God.*

"Is the Universe friendly?" — in some such words as these we may for the moment picturesquely attempt our question in a seemingly unbiased impersonal way. In terms of religious faith: Is God perfectly good and holy, lovingly disposed toward man, and actively seeking his highest welfare, his supreme spiritual good?

The very putting of the question, Is the Universe friendly? shows how insistent and inevitable

is the human, and therefore personal point of view. For friendliness and unfriendliness are alike terms which apply only to personal relations. And he who curses the world for its hideous cruelty and senseless waste, as bearing upon his happiness or the happiness of others, anthropomorphizes as slavishly as does the saint who thanks the good God for all the pains, and losses, and disasters which have come to him or his loved ones, upon his bended knees. *Friend* of mine, I will not call a Universe that does not know what it is about, or in some sort choose what it is about; but neither can I regard such a Universe as unfriendly. "Nature," says Parmenides, "rules over all painful birth and all begetting, driving the female to the embrace of the male, and the male to that of the female." "The formative power of the formless protoplasm calls forth the highest admiration," affirms the materialist Haeckel. But of what fault can the Universe be guilty, or to what praise can it be entitled, if no personal life is thinking, feeling, planning underneath its awful mask?

But what does real and effective friendliness require as between human beings; and what psychological attitude, so to say, would have to be conceived of as evincing friendliness between the Universe and the race of men? And here arises once more the question of personal values. What is it which is worth most in personal life, when judged by the best standards available to

our ignorance and limited range of view? The answer of the cultivated moral consciousness and of the experience of the race is, surely, not altogether dubious on a matter like this. Sensuous happiness is not more worth than established moral character; material prosperity is not of a value beyond righteousness, whether for the individual or for the multitude of the people. And when we come to set the virtues over against their opposites, as the kinds of conduct which the race has agreed to approve as best, we discover that hardship and suffering, and even torturing pain, are the inevitable consequences of shaping society according to their demands. Shall we then, asks Epictetus, complain of the Universe, or of Zeus, "because he has made us to be patient? Because he has made us to be brave? Because he has made them to be no evils?"

Somehow, if we take our counsels from the best of the moral consciousness of the race, the tragedy of this struggle between good and evil is essential to the realization of the higher values of personality, and is indispensable means of its development. So clear to the thinker may this truth become, and so complete his recognition of the good resultant from overcoming the evils which lie in the way of its more perfect realization, as to encourage the declaration of the stoical Emperor: "From Thee all things come; in Thee all things subsist; to Thee all things return; And so I say of the World: Dear City of God."

But calling the World a City of God does not make it really so; and a stoical satisfaction in its present condition as answering to man's longing for happiness and for purity does not represent the highest development of the personal life as moral and religious. The truth is, — strange and superficially unreasonable as it appears on first reflection — that, as the material acquisition of the race increases, the dissatisfaction and the struggle between the forces of good and evil are intensified also. "It is the yearning cry," says one writer, remarking on the dark side of the modern world, "that goes through all the people; as they advance in civilization they feel the value of the goods they have sacrificed for it." It is the World's suffering for its moral failure, for its follies and its sins, the increasingly clear knowledge of which introduces and emphasizes the most terrible of all problems for man's reflection and practical solution, the darkest and most hopeless of his struggles to realize the supreme values of the personal life.

Let it not be forgotten, however, that the very struggle itself, and the more clearly the more bitter the struggle is, affords the most nearly final answer to the questions: What is it to be a person? and What is the last issue, the determination of which, more than any other conceivable, reveals the secret of personality? All through the history of man's moral and religious experiences indications and traces of a longing for

right friendly relations with the gods, or with the one Divine Being of the World, are frequent enough. The "low-thoughted" moral and religious consciousness imagines that this good may be realized, and its opposing evils escaped, by some form of virtual bribery, or some device for covering up the impurities of spirit, and the mistakes or more wilful transgressions of life. It is of the very essence of personal development to expose the foolish fraud involved in all such "ways of salvation." As the individual person, and as the race, comes to a better understanding of its needs, and of the causes of its most dreadful weaknesses and woes, its cry for relief becomes more insistent and continuous. But where shall it look for such relief, — look with fair hope of finding it, if not with an *a priori* demonstration that it cannot be disappointed? The finite person wishes to be on good terms with the Universe which his reason has authorized and compelled him to personify as realizing the perfection of power and of a certain mysterious wisdom and regard for righteousness as such.

As the moral and religious consciousness grows more enlightened and sensitive, the longing for reconciliation and for a spiritual unity with the Divine Being grows correspondingly in the freedom of an unselfish will that seeks help in the struggle with moral evil, and redemption from its low moral estate. But may it reasonably hope that the Universe will answer sympathet-

ically and efficiently to this longing? It is the religion of redemption that answers "Yes" to this inquiry. To its naïve and comforting doctrine of God the Father of mankind, it adds the hope of God the Redeemer. Beyond a mere belief in a perfect Personality, aloof in its perfection from the anguish and struggle of those who, made in his own image, imagine a fair picture for admiration and worship of Him in their image, it favors the faith which is the essence of the filial spirit and the avenue through which the Life of God may enter as a redeeming force into the life of man.

It is the work of theology to examine the grounds of such a faith as that to which reference has just been made, to expound its nature and limitations, its moral obligations, its assurances and its rewards. And we are not writing about it from the theological point of view. Two or three remarks, however, may serve the purpose of suggestions as to its place and value in the development of personal life. Since this experience is a fact in the case of millions of persons, as a fact it must be accounted for. To our thinking, no other explanation even approaches the point at issue but that which places it in the nature of Reality itself. That a Universe whose Spirit, so to say, took no interest in man's longing for filial relations with Itself, and in the faith which opens the way to this reconciliation, and in the intense and prolonged effort to realize

the ideal of sonship fostered by this faith, could give birth to this longing, and this faith and this tragic struggle, baffles our attempts to make even the beginning of an effort to understand. How can the faith in a redeeming God found itself in Reality, except in the fact of God as Redeemer?

But this faith in God as the sympathetic and efficient Redeemer of man, by the way of converting him into the likeness of sonship, if it have any ground in Reality, must be a process of development, a historical evolution, under the conditions of space and time, and of the natures of both things and persons. To attempt at once to free man from elements of ceaseless struggle, of deferred hopes, of bitter suffering and the endurance of self-sacrifice, is to remove him from Reality rather than to establish him the more firmly therein. The secret of man's personal life and development lies hidden in the mystery of a personal God who works in history to win for this life its ultimate perfection.

Once more: For the individual who possesses and cherishes this faith, the experience of its effects is the supreme proof. His question is: Does it actually redeem, or rather put and keep me, so long and so far as I keep to it, in the way of being redeemed? It has been declared by a historian of the early Christian church: The characteristic feature of the primitive community is, that every individual in it, even the very

slaves, possesses a living experience of God. At no time in the world's sad history has a thicker pall been thrown over the hopes of a sudden and complete redemption of the race than in these recent years. But the same faith still clings to the same hope, though as some far-off divine event. Meantime we may remember, as a recent writer on "The Essence of Christianity" has said: "From the point of view of Philosophy the absoluteness of Christianity is an hypothesis, which must be tested by its ability to explain all the facts, and as to the truth or falsehood of which the final decision belongs to the future." But to him who accepts the content of this faith and has experience of its inner life, this religion converts what might otherwise remain a faint but rational hope into a firm and joyful conviction.

CHAPTER XI

THE GOAL OF PERSONAL LIFE

TO what end of good or of evil is this ceaseless procession of human beings, in all the ages of human history, for the most part unwittingly and heedlessly pressing onward? They all have the "potentiality" of personality in them, since they are members of the human species. But as individuals, they have no choice as to their hereditary outfit for developing the ideals of personal life; and few of them have any considerable control over the environment which so powerfully influences this development. Indeed, vast multitudes of this *genus homo* never get any start in the process of unfolding and improving the meagre gifts which nature has so grudgingly bestowed upon them. They are abortions, — if not physically, at least mentally and morally. And if they effect that lower form of "coming to oneself" which was described in the earlier chapters, they get little or no further beyond. Ambition or opportunity fails them; ignorance that is invincible under their circumstances, or oppression and blindness deliberately afflicted by the

few favored ones of their fellows, hamper or extinguish all power to rise even in thought to the appreciation of the higher values of the personal life. They scarcely know themselves *as persons* at all, — however clearly they may represent in their conduct, in a rudimentary way, all the essential characteristics of the more exalted stages of the personal life. Does not the lament so picturesquely described in the line of Greek poetry, "From a tomb forth springing to a tomb I journey," apply to the vast numerical majority of the human race?

This impression derived by a superficial survey of human history is only too amply confirmed by the facts of the biological and psychological sciences. To the researches of the former, Nature appears as indifferent to the values of personal life as to any other form of life; or, for that matter, of inanimate things. Pain, decay, and death are the price that must be paid for living at all; and men are far enough from being an exception to the inexorable law. Indeed, in some respects, taken at their face value, some of her dealings with the choicer aspirations and the finer feelings of humanity seem as though shaped and executed in a spirit of contempt and scorn. It is as though the jealous gods were asking, What right have you to build towers of Babel to withstand the floods we bring upon you? or, as though an angry Zeus were perpetually chaining some Prometheus to the cold rock, and taking pleasure in the vul-

tures plucking at his vitals, just because he had dared to discover fire.

So, too, if we approach the study of human nature from the psychological point of view, but without sympathy and with no care to look into the heart of things moral and spiritual, we cannot in unprejudiced devotion to the so-called "naked truth," form any very high estimate of the mentality or the morality of the average man. We may set on one side the numberless idiots and almost or quite hopelessly defective of the race. But just above their line, and not so very far above it, taking all races in all human history, in the "lump," as it were, lie the vast majority of mankind. In active appreciation of the value of truth, in thirst for the truth, in openness of mind and quick response to the effort to enlarge and heighten the mental horizon, these multitudes seem little above the more intelligent of the animals. The same thing is scarcely less true, when we inquire after that purity of motive, and serious estimate and high prizing of moral issues, which constitute the essence of genuine morality. The current opinions on matters of practical ethics among the multitudes of the "most Christian nations" are incalculably below the standards set by obvious moral ideals; while the current practice is still notably below the level of the current opinions. And when it comes to the religious beliefs that do most honor to the human reason in its struggle to apprehend

truly — not to speak of the impossible task of a full comprehension — the Divine Being of the World, and the nature of the relations which should characterize man's attitude toward God as Father, and to his fellows as brethren with him of the same Father, the universal failure is still more conspicuous. Perhaps the rarest of all the examples of personal culture, and of even a relative success in attaining the ends of the person as religious, are the individuals who, when known profoundly, are gladly recognized as approaching the ideal of sons of God. But as for the community of *His* avowed followers — call it by whatever name you will, and search it out in whatever land and in whatever age you may — the sarcasm of Schleiermacher remains true: "The real Church is mostly invisible; the visible church is mostly not real Church."

This dark picture of the nature, development, and probable destiny of personal life, true to the facts as it undoubtedly is, does not represent the whole truth. If it did, our inquiry, What is it worth while to be a Person? would end in disappointment; the hope of a clue even to the existence of any key to the Secret of Personality would have to be abandoned. But the most purely unemotional and unidealistic point of view, when taken and adhered to in an unprejudiced way, justifies us in drawing a brighter picture of the nature, development, and probable destiny of personal life. For somehow or

other Nature has brought out of her womb a race of personal beings. Under the laws of heredity the creature Man has come into existence and has managed to maintain himself against all the destructive forces of this same Nature. Even the very rigor of his natural discipline has sharpened his intellect and developed the skill of his hand. In the development of the higher nervous centres, in ingenuity of resources, in variety and extent of power to provide for his own wants, and in ambition and success in acquiring the mastery of natural resources for the allurement of his ambitions, he has, in fact, already arrived at a position which enables him to dominate all the other animals. More than this, whatever he may once have been, and however long and tortuous the course of his evolution may have been, he is, in fact, no longer merely animal. He has capacities and qualities of mind and heart and will which are not possessed by the most intelligent species of the animals.

And as, at this stage of inquiry, we pass over from the point of view of the biological sciences to that taken by psychology when it studies human nature in a broad but still unemotional and unidealistic way, we are amazed at what this creature of Nature has, with all his blundering and folly, already accomplished for his own scientific and social development. To note these facts with frank admiration, it is not necessary to glorify science overmuch, or to be greatly

satisfied with any of the existing social and political arrangements. But the outburst of the modern sciences of nature, and the growth of knowledge and of control which they already afford, and which they confidently promise in still larger measure for the future, is a thing very wonderful and highly creditable to the rational nature of man. And if we were at liberty — as we are not — to regard man's contrivances for social and political association with his fellows without emphasizing their moral imperfections, we should be warranted in saying something alike praiseworthy of them. It is because they are in so many respects ethically stupid and iniquitous that we cannot say the same things of man's social and political achievements that we say of his scientific.

It is, however, such a survey as we have endeavored to take of the essential characteristics of personality as they come to their flowering in the higher developments of personal life, that alone avails to set before the mind its choicest excellences, its most sacred obligations, its most favorable opportunities, its supreme values, and its legitimate hopes of an incomparable destiny. This survey enables us to place ourselves firmly on the ground assumed by Immanuel Kant, when illogically but virtually retreating from the agnosticism of his earlier work, he declares, toward the close of his *Analytic of Pure Practical Reason* (Chapter III) his confidence that there

is in man a "higher nature," which, with its respect for the moral law and its well-grounded faith in God, enables him to transcend the limits of time and sense. Of this higher nature he rhapsodizes in the following way: "It can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself (as a part of the world of sense), a power which connects him with an order of things that only the understanding can conceive, with a world which at the same time commands the whole sensible world, and with it the empirically determinable existence of man in time, as well as the sum-total of all ends (which totality alone suits such unconditional practical laws as the moral). This power is nothing but *personality*, that is, freedom and independence on the mechanism of nature, yet, regarded also as a faculty of a being which is subject to special laws, namely, pure practical laws given by its own reason; so that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to his own personality as belonging to the intelligible (supersensible) world. It is then not to be wondered at that man, as belonging to both worlds, must regard his own nature in reference to its second and highest characteristic only with reverence, and its laws with the highest respect." Kant has already said that *respect*, in this meaning of the word, "applies always to persons only, never to things."

It is this *respect for the reality of personal life*,

from which, if from any source whatever, we must derive our true and influential convictions concerning the nature, chances for development, hopes as to destiny, of the individual and of the race. But as we have already seen, — and, indeed, at every step in our attempt at an answer to the question, What is it to be a person? the fact has become more evident, — this reality must be looked at from two points of view; and, thus looked at, the deductions derived from these two points of view are by no means easy to unite in one indisputable conclusion, or even to bring into a tolerable state of harmony. *It is this belonging to two worlds which envelops the personal life in mystery.* As a being strictly limited by the inexorable conditions of the world of time and sense, man is one sort of a thing; as the creature and the creator of a world corresponding to his ideals of knowledge, of morals, and of religion, and of a social condition fashioned after these ideals, he is quite a different being. The problems of personal nature, personal development, personal values, and the goal of the personal life, appear markedly different when approached from the scientific point of view, and from the point of view to which imagination is lifted by moral and religious faiths and hopes. But the Universe, in spite of the fierce and continuous conflict within It of the forces of good and evil, is One; and man — the individual and the race — appears as inextricably involved in

this struggle to attain the unity which can afford the only satisfactory ending of the conflict to realize his true and real Self.

If we ask for the goal of personal life, so far as it can be fixed for the individual by the positive sciences, there is no doubt about the answer. Man's life, like that of every other physical organization, must be limited in duration and opportunity, subject to decay of body and weakness of mental capacity; and it must end in physical death. This is the fixed and irremovable goal of the personal life of the individual man. As to the goal of the race of personal beings the positive sciences have not a few more or less plausible theories, but no sure information. They can present us only with a succession of conjectures. The supply of heat will fail and leave the world unfit for all animal existence, a burnt-out coal, as unable to sustain physical life as is the cold but beautiful moon which poets and lovers celebrate to increase the charms of personal life in the brief moments of the passing present. Or, perhaps, there will be a sudden and disastrous accession of heat through the crashing into this insignificant planet of some star, or fragment of a star, which has broken loose from its regular orbit and run amuck, as it were, across the sky, — that sky which vied with the moral law as an object of pure, supreme sublimity, in the mind of the great philosopher. Or, yet again, according to some Malthusian formula, the will

to live will so unguardedly follow the instinct of propagation as to outstrip all possible food supply; and perforce be limited by starvation to a percentage only of its otherwise possible individual members. Or, since periodically recurrent wars are determined by mechanical laws of illusions and delusions and of lies born of greed and ambition; and since science is constantly increasing the means of precipitate and wholesale slaughter; a goodly portion of the best and bravest of the race, if not the whole of it, is hopelessly consigned to reach its destined goal by the absurd path of needless suicide.

But none of these predictions as to the unavoidable destiny of the race of personal beings are scientifically justified; there are known, or conjectured, or reasonably hoped-for, compensatory forces and laws at work to avert such awful disaster; and on the whole, both the physical and the social sciences look forward rather confidently to an improvement, indefinite in time and quality, "by and large," of the human race.

We find room, then, for depicting a better goal of personal life as it opens before the faiths and hopes of the spiritual nature of man. And while we cannot claim scientific exactness for this view, or support it by a strictly logical demonstration, we need not on that account apologize in a timid or craven way for the insights which come to this nature when by an activity of self-determining

will it releases itself for the appreciation of the truth as it appears when regarded from its own appropriate point of view. For this nature, with its faiths and hopes, is a fact; and it is not for no practical purpose that it is a fact. There is truth which cannot safely be disregarded in the semi-mystical declaration of the *Brahma Baiharta Purana:* "The essence of all divine knowledge is that which opens the spiritual eyes of the ignorant, and destroys doubts and confusion." And we have a personal experience, not to be flouted at but capable of being recited in millions of varying but essentially identical forms, when we quote one of the world's greatest thinkers, the Church-father Augustine: "For when I found Truth, then found I my God, the Truth itself. . . . And now will I stand, and become solid in Thee, in my mould, The Truth." I have said "in millions of varying but essentially identical forms." If, then, "amid the many opinions about the gods and the generation of the Universe, we are not able to give notions that are exact and consistent with one another, do not wonder at that" (Plato). The individuality of personality is both the explanation and the justification of the differences. Every individual, in order to get the fuller value out of his religious belief, must be able to say of his *God:* "He is *my* God." But this does not diminish, but, the rather, increases the significance and the value of the truth: "However men approach me,

even so I accept them, for the path men take from every side is Mine." (*Bhagavadgîta.*)

It is, therefore, with no sense of failure that we close our discussion of the goal of personal life with a series of suggestions, or mere hints, as to that completer answer which every individual person must make more definite and complete for himself, in both its theoretical and its practical aspects. We have been hitherto leading up to the inquiry, What is there really in personal life which makes it best worth while the living; or indeed worth living at all, as regarded from the point of view of its ending? To be stumbling on, in pain and weariness, toward a goal that has no worth in itself and cannot, therefore, consecrate or justify the way; — this would seem to be an absurd folly for a being endowed, from whatever source, with a measure of rationality and freedom of will.

To such an inquiry as that just raised, the first and most obvious reply is this: All values, and all means for the estimate and appreciation of values, must be inherent in the nature and development of personality itself. "Beyond this life" (that is, the personal) itself, there is nothing conceivable that has value, or that can furnish any standard of values. Beyond the value of sharing in the highest and best of this personal life, there is nothing, either as a type of existence, or as a continuous state, that possesses any comparable worth. What shall a man give (or

take) in exchange for his (personal) life? To answer Nothing, as though one were estimating values in a comparative way, does not go to the depths of such a question. For, not only is there nothing in value to be compared with this life, but there is no standard of comparison outside of, or beyond, the issues of this life. *It* embodies all values in itself.

But what is it in this personal life that gives to it its own incomparable value, and its right critically to estimate all other values, whether for purposes of theoretical comparison or practical acceptance or rejection? Our investigation of the inquiry, What is it to be a person? has revealed a scale of values, some higher, some lower, as incorporated into the very nature of personality. Many things are of *worth* to it, and their possession is to a certain extent *worth while* as the reward for personal endeavor. But these are all means to an end, helps to progress toward a goal. To the moral and religious consciousness of the individual, this goal presents itself as the realization of an ideal, the ideal of a perfectly developed Self, — of a Selfhood entitled to be called from the moral point of view, "a really good man," and from the religious point of view, "a true son of God." In this ideal we sum up for the individual, the highest potential values, the supreme end of the personal life. We seem to have discovered that the self-determining will, when guided by intelligence and rightly

motived, which proposes to live loyally in devotion to this ideal, is itself, of all valuable possessions for the individual person, the possession beyond all price. This ideal sets the goal to the personal life. That *this* life has value, and a great deal of value, and a species of value that is unique and supreme, — this has been the fine discovery which we have made, the treasure-trove we have unearthed; and we are not going to throw it away, or *cache* it, or surrender it, to the first argument for a contesting claim. Indeed, as judged by every profoundest argument, as tested by every most conclusive process of analysis, and as weighed in the truest and most delicate scale of judgment, just to lead this life, because it is the only kind of life worthy of a person, appears to us the thing best worth our all to do. In a word, the values of personal life are at their highest as set before us in

> " . . . all our rarer, better, truer self,
> That sobbed religiously in yearning song,
> That watched to ease the burden of the world,
> Laboriously tracing what must be,
> And what may yet be better."

To strive toward the attainment of this goal of the personal life is the end-all of getting, and using, and enjoying goods of every kind. For the perfection of this life, of the life of duty and virtue and courageous and constant loyalty to the personal ideal, is the expression of the total meaning, and the only complete attainment, of

the worthiest and most exalted uses of personality. When we ask, whether flippantly or thoughtfully, What is the use and what the reward of pursuing, and of winning in the pursuit of this ideal? we ask a meaningless question. Its usefulness sets the standard for all other uses; the reward for its attainment is the ineffable but eternally valuable riches.[1]

But this exalted view of the goal of personal life which is demanded for the satisfaction of man's "higher nature," of the capacities and obligations which seem to destine him for existence and development in a so-called "supersensible world," as a perfected person morally and a true son of God, only intensifies the contrast with the matter-of-fact view of the positive sciences. By intensifying the contrast, it deepens the mystery of personality. At the same time it calls upon the beliefs of religion to open a door of relief. This religion does for the individual by awakening and fostering the hope of immortality. Thus the problem, What is the secret of personality? becomes inextricably connected with, if not with perfect strictness dependent upon, the answer to the problem: Does death end all for the individual? May a person, after he has come to his bodily self, and its natural development has terminated in decay and physical death,

[1] Certain sentences contained in the last few pages are, for the most part, taken with one or two verbal changes from the author's "What Ought I to Do?" Chapter XI.

hope that the person as spiritual will continue his journey toward the realization of an ideal personal life?

Neither the natural belief in the immortality of the individual, or the psychological conception of the human soul as an essentially indestructible entity, really affords a satisfactory answer to the question we have just raised. Indeed, when this belief is coupled with the statement that the desire for a life after death somehow commits the consistency inherent in the Universe to provide the satisfaction of this desire, the argument is not true to the facts; nor is it logical in its conclusions. The truth is that countless millions of the human race have been for countless centuries, and in spite of any improvement in their material condition, or — what is yet more important — release from the burdens of superstition, are still looking to the certainty of existence after death with fear rather than with desire or hope. In grief and bitterness, or with a mild or a sullen despair, they are asking themselves the question in Marlowe's Dr. Faustus:

> "Why wert thou not born a creature wanting soul?"

And did not Sakya-muni, the founder of Buddhism, lay the foundations of his hope of relief from the fear of death by the suffering multitudes, in a denial of the substantiality of the human soul? Yet even so, the belief would not die, when the fear that it were true had been

theoretically removed. The doctrine of Karma, or the inescapable and eternal consequences of personal imperfection, remained to excite foreboding and terror rather than to serve as a ground of courage and cheerful struggle toward the perfected goal of personal life. And so the secret of personality was unrevealed to hope, by Buddhism.

It is small wonder, if the continuance of personal life after bodily death offers no improved opportunity for the realization of the ideals of personality, that a positive recoil from the prospect should be the attitude of the rational mind. Even for a person, just to live on, and only that, can scarcely seem worth the while. To live on in the same kind of misery, or even worse, and to struggle on as in this life, only more hopelessly and bitterly, is not a charming future to contemplate. To the emotional and practical demands of the personal life, immortality under such conditions would be no goal worthy of either wish or endeavor. Its failure before the bar of judgment, of the reasoning faculties of human nature, would be no less conspicuous. Indeed, the mystery of personality becomes the deeper and darker, the longer its fruitless and agonizing strife for unattainable ideals is imagined to be continued. Extinction of the personal life with the death of the bodily self would force upon our reason the fateful conclusion: That which alone has the appearance of being valuable and which sets the standard for all estimates of

value, is indeed itself of no real and lasting value. The conclusion of Schopenhauer's philosophy would seem warranted: that the total suppression of the will to live, on the part of the individual and of the race, is the only course of wisdom. Thus into the gulf of night disappears the secret of personality. The disappearance is equally complete, whether it be brought about by physics, physiology, or certain forms of religious belief.

In the sight of a mystical pantheism the goal of effort toward the ideal of personal life is raised to a much higher degree of attractiveness; although a critical examination of its conception of immortality shows that the problem of the meaning and value of personality is still left unsolved. In this view, it is not the extinction of the life of the individual which quite terminates his personality, but the absorption of his personal being as an individual into the universal life of the Absolute. The Brahmanical type of immortality conceives of the soul of the individual as returning, a being no longer having self-determining will or self-consciousness, to Ātman, or the World-Soul, from which it originally came forth. Its coming-forth was into a world of illusion and unreality; its return, if ever at the end of a round of painful existences it at last becomes worthy, is the ideal existence called Nirvāna. But though, as Professor Hopkins has said, "Nirvāna meant to Buddha the extinction of lust, anger, and ignorance," — this primarily and in its negative

aspect, — we seek in vain for any positive conception of the goal set by pantheism to the personal life, which does not either identify it with the extinction of personality, or convict it of internal inconsistencies which deprive it of all application to any psychical reality.

It is, then, to the religious belief in a spiritual union with the Absolute Person, whom religion calls God, a union after the type of sonship, that we must look for a conception of immortality which will conserve the higher and eternal values of man's personal life. This conception may be found very far back in human history, and very widely distributed over the surface of the earth. Traces of it may be discovered among rude tribes and peoples, not ordinarily thought to be far advanced in the theory or cult of religion. They imagined some place over the mountains, or over the seas, or on the top of some mountain, where the more fortunate of their fellows might after death live in happy communion with their ancestors and with the immortal gods. The Chilians located their Paradise among the peaks of Mexico, where was the joyous garden of Tllocan, the abode of their dead ancestors. But it was perhaps Egypt which, of all the nations in ancient times, most prized the promise of an immortality spent in communion with divine beings. To attain this, the "Maxims of Ani" pointed out the way: "Give thyself to God, keep thyself continually for God; and let to-

morrow be like today." Thus an independent individuality might be continued with the gods, in an existence especially devoted to the successful and happy pursuit of agriculture in the "fields of the blessed." The lofty ethics cultivated by the hope of such a salvation as gave the sanction to this hope of immortality, remains on record to this day in the Egyptian "Book of the Dead." But this goal of the personal life, alas! was open only to the few. For at the "ferry of death the profane multitude, not being sufficiently concentrated to resist the inroads of decay, vanish into air, and cease to be; while the favored few, by dint of persevering effort, subdue the animal nature and weave its fibres into a compact unity that defies destruction." Among the ancient Greeks the belief in the immortality of the individual person was well-nigh universal; and in their philosophy the soul of man was held to be akin in its nature to God. It must have an inner purification, however, as the beginning and pledge of a happy immortal life. This culture it was the design of the Eleusinian mysteries to provide. "Blessed is he," says Pindar, "who having seen these rites goeth under the earth." "Thrice happy they among mortals," exclaims Sophocles, "who depart into Hades after having seen these rites. Yea, for them alone is there a life; for all other men there is ill." "He who arrives there after initiation and purification," declares Plato, "will dwell with the gods."

But it remained for Christianity, by transcending, largely under Greek influences, the low and obscure conceptions of the Hebrew Scriptures as to the personal life after death, and by faithfully espousing and developing, under the influences of reflection and practice, the teachings and spiritual influences of Jesus and his Apostles and followers through the succeeding centuries, to open the door of faith and hope to humanity at large concerning the goal of the personal life; and thus to suggest and make reasonable a solution of the mystery of personality. The ideal of personal life, which is not only proposed but made possible by the processes of divine redemption for every individual, is progress in sonship; it is the successful struggle toward a union with God which constitutes a perfect condition of sonship. For all those who will have faith, and who bear the fruit of faith in conduct, the "true life," the "eternal life," "the life in God," is a hope, not only made reasonable but also made secure.

The goal of community personal life as set before the race is neither so manageable for argumentation from the scientific point of view, nor so clearly picturable for religious faith and hope, as is the goal of the personal life of the individual. Under the influence of the rapid development of the physical sciences, and the greatly increased control which they give over the earth's material resources, a too shallow and unthinking optimism has of late possessed the

mind of the most highly civilized peoples, as to the future of the race. The realization of a condition in which there should be no poverty, or at least no need for poverty; in which the mutuality of commercial interests should have done away with war, and universal popular education should have made the populace more intelligent, and therefore of necessity more moral; such a future was declaimed as well within the sight of all prophetic souls. To look askance upon, or to question closely the grounds of, this easy-going optimism was to be a pessimist; and to be a bit of a pessimist was to be in disgrace. Of course, the world was growing vastly better; and what need to inquire what a better world really is? Of course, life was more than ever worth the living; but why should one inquire in what the values of life chiefly consist? To get the most out of the present life, — let alone one's belief about immortality, — was plainly becoming more and more the motto to live by, for all orders of the people; and not least, among the most Christian nations so-called.

This optimism has suffered a rude and cruel shock by the world-involving events of the last few years. The shock, with its complete demonstration of the unrealizable character of the then reigning ideal of man's social future, has produced in not a few minds an insanity of another type. They who have clung to the old estimates of the values of personal life, for the

individual and for the race, have fallen into the madness of malignity or despair. But there is hovering in the air above, if it is not yet planted and rooted in the hearts of the multitude, an ideal, which, though newly fashioned in some of its details, is still, in its essential features, as old as the vision of the best few, the men who of old had insight into the realities of personal life. The picture is forming of another and more valuable goal to be reached in the future, however far away, of the human race.

Of this ideal future, which is to sum up the lasting values of personal existence, and personal development, and personal destiny, in the large, the chief conditions are not given by the so-called sciences of economics and sociology, but by ethics and religion. Some of its lessons are being stamped in hard upon the puzzled brain and bitterly agonized heart of humanity. It is righteousness and not great increase in riches that exalteth a nation. The great adventure is not necesssarily the great disaster. Real right is superior to clamor for fancied rights. The Decalogue is not altogether abrogated; but for its better keeping and enforcement it needs the spirit within rather than the considerations of a utilitarian and selfish policy. The most poignant grief is not povery. And it is nobler to be empty-handed than to have both hands overflowing with what belongs of right to one's fellows. For welfare's sake, in church and state,

there is little to choose between an immoral and irreligious democracy and an immoral and hypocritical autocracy.

Only the learning of these lessons, and the putting of them into practice, by the race, will secure for the race any permanent progress toward its ideal future.

If now, however, we call upon our reason, whether taking the form of avowed knowledge or of imagination that can claim the right to support faith and hope, for a *definite* picture of what this ideal future is destined to be, our call must end in disappointment. As has already been briefly indicated, the problem, as connected with the continuance of the present cosmic system in substantially its present form, is unsolved, and seemingly unsolvable by either science, religion, or speculative philosophy. This is true, even if we grant that the physical conditions will admit of an indefinite advancement of humanity toward the realization of its economical and social ideals. The social ideal which this most hopeful view of the future of the race will realize has, indeed, been imagined in many different forms, all the way down from Plato's "Republic" to the most recent and wild of socialistic dreams.

Religion, however, presents this ultimate goal of social progress under the conception of a so-called "Kingdom of Heaven," or "Kingdom of God." It is a "new heaven and a new earth,"

a "holy Jerusalem, descending out of heaven from God." But the moment we pass beyond the ideas that inevitably attach themselves to a "social aggregate" of those that have realized the highest values of the personal life in the immortal life, we become involved in figures of speech, the translation of which into terms of reality lies beyond our powers. The one thing certain is this: that if the individual may attain the goal of personal life in immortality, this life cannot be led by the individual alone. The goal for the race composed of individuals, that have within their grasp the gift of immortality, must be conceived of as a Social Ideal. But when, and where, and precisely how, — these are questions the answers to which lie still in the lap of God. It is their answer which will fully reveal the secret of personality as it is wrapped up in the future of the race.

CHAPTER XII

FAITH AS AN HYPOTHESIS

THE value of hypotheses in the solution of all problems of the positive sciences and of the practical life is beyond doubt. In the positive sciences, however, the curious mind, with its due "respect for reality," is never quite satisfied to remain at rest. It considers that fidelity to its own nature requires the unceasing endeavor to raise the hypothesis to the standard of a so-called law. It craves a formula that shall take its place among the stores of knowledge which the intellect of man has wrung from a Universe that sells its secrets only at the price of patient and persistent toil. Even in the course which leads to such knowledge of the ordinary processes of nature and the manner of forces at work in them, as has to do with the most common goods of the physical life, the motto holds no less true: "There is no royal (or easy) road to learning."

Of those hypotheses, whether thought of as scientific or practical — since there is no fixed line to be drawn between the two classes — which have to do with material things, their natures, their ways of behavior, and their possible uses,

the favorite method of improving the standing in the estimate of human reason, is the so-called "experimental." Broadly understood, this means putting the hypothesis to a series of testings with a view to discover whether it works in particular cases. To attain the highest results in the way of *proof*, the experiments must be under a control as exact as possible, must have their results statable in terms approaching the mathematical, and must serve the purposes of more or less accurate prediction.

But even in the positive sciences, including those which deal with the most obvious and ratable phenomena, such as astronomy, physics, and chemistry, the best result obtainable is rarely, or never, anything more than a highly probable degree of an hypothesis. The more subtile and complicated the facts of experience become, the more difficult it is to raise any hypothesis to the rank of assured knowledge. The modern discoveries as to the mystery of the constitution of matter, both in its minutest forms and atomic or molecular activities, and also in the building of worlds and systems of worlds, have not yet led to knowledge, but only to the multiplication of hypotheses. When it comes to the science of living organisms, whether it be the life of the individual, or the life of any particular species, or the appearance of all life upon this planet and the evolution from one another, or from some common source, of all the species, the

failure of all the most skilfully devised and curiously combined hypotheses, has become so conspicuous that biologists are turning, not in utter despair but with a pretty complete self-distrust, to a reëxamination of the facts.

In matters of utmost concern to personal life, our attitudes toward it, our conduct in personal relations, and our views as to its nature, its development, and its destiny, it does not exaggerate the truth to say that we live daily, and die at the end, trusting only to more or less probably hypotheses. The propositions on which we base the conduct of the personal life are, for the most part if not exclusively, conditional propositions. In our use of the most useful things, this is in large measure true. The physician says to himself: "*If* I have diagnosed this case correctly, and *if* the drug I prescribe has in this case its normal effect, I shall probably (or perhaps!) do the patient some good." Men and women marry, beget children, form friendships, enter into business and other contracts, and shape their practical, moral, and religious habits and associations, no matter how firmly convinced they may be of their own assured wisdom, no matter how profound and immovable their convictions, building only on probable grounds. We all live and die, as the disciples of correct, or the dupes of false, hypotheses.

Of all the mysteries which man's reason has to encounter, the nearest, the most important, and surely not the least complicated, is the mys-

tery of his own Self, the mystery of personality. But the solution of this mystery, if solution there be, must be found somewhere in the depths of personal life. We have thought to find it in the form of a religious belief that opens before the mind and heart the hope of an immortality which gives a chance for the realization, progressively, of the personal ideal. But this has been put in the form of an hypothesis. *If* the values of personality may be fully realized in an eternal personal life, whose excellence consists in union with God, then the secret of personality may be said to be disclosed to faith, though in hypothetical form.

Let us now briefly review the steps which have brought us to our conclusion. On raising the question, "What is it to be a person?" we were not long in discovering that only a part of its answer could be given by an appeal to experimental and descriptive psychology, or by the history of opinion in the race. Physiology and biology tell us in part, what it is to be a body; psychology, in a measure, what it is to be a soul; common-sense and psycho-physics and physiological psychology, not a little, what it is to be a person as being both body and soul. But we soon passed into the presence of problems that derive little help from the positive sciences. In man's rationality and freedom of will we discovered potentialities, and lengths and depths of development, for which no strict analogy was to be found either in things or in the most intelli-

gent of the animals. Some of this development was present in all normal persons; marvels of it, significant of a godlike nature, in certain favored individuals of the race. It was, however, only when we came to analyze the nature of the Person as Moral and the Person as Religious that the two-fold nature of man broke into the "light of common day." That tragic strife, that ceaseless struggle between good and evil, of which the whole Universe gives token to art as well as to morals and religion, seemed deeply and irremovably bedded in the personal life. For the individual, the world of time and sense, to which he undoubtedly belongs, could give promise only of brief existence, and of the inevitable destiny of decay and death. But the faiths and hopes of morality and religion, where they unite in the conception of God as perfect Ethical Spirit, and man's Father and Redeemer, held up the fair vision of another destiny. As to a being having this higher nature and belonging to this invisible, but no less real, spiritual world, the religious belief offers itself as solving the secret of personality in the form of an hypothesis. *If* the personal life ends its aspirations and its struggles in defeat and death, then its mystery is not lightened, its secret is as dark and deep as ever. But *if* an immortality which shall more and more perfectly realize its higher values may be its destiny, *then*, Who will say that its mystery is no lighter, its secret not less deeply and darkly hidden?

As with every other hypothesis, so with the comforting and illumining faith in immortality which religion offers, attempts are unceasingly made to test it more thoroughly as an hypothesis, or even to establish it as a matter-of-fact knowledge. Never before were the arguments *pro* and *con* the doctrine of immortality considered from so many sides, or in the light of so much fairly well assured knowledge as to the nature of the Universe and the nature of the body and spirit of man. But we have not before us now the formidable task of passing the arguments in review, and of drawing conclusions from them. Not a few have proceeded to the effort of testing the hypothesis in more modern and scientific ways than those of ancient witchcraft and necromancy, and there are some who firmly believe the testing to be successful. Theoretically, however, the faith of immortality depends upon the conception we form, and adopt to guide the will, of the Universe as clearly manifesting the immanence of rational mind and perfect ethical spirit, contending with the race, and in and through the race, to realize in the personal lives of men the divine ideal of personality. We will only notice the incontestable fact of experience that those who attain in the highest degree the faith of immortality not infrequently acquire with it a kind and degree of spiritual insight which takes them deep into the mind and heart of Reality. But we will for the present let our

attempt at disclosing the secret of personality stand as an *hypothesis*. If it is not to the intellect a truth demonstrable by scientific methods, it is to religious faith an unshakable hope.[1]

Nor is this faith as a triumphant conviction, and its hope as a steadfast assurance of reality, confined to the high and mighty in intellectual attainment, or to the select few of saints and philosophers, among the multitudes of men. It is adapted and designed for all the restless, weary, struggling and sinning sons and daughters of the race. And for them all, it may be made a matter of immediate and intimate experience, and subjected in its way to an experimental testing. The very condition of restlessness, weariness, struggling and sinning, sharpens the desire for it, and increases the intensity of its need. And beyond all question, this condition was never in its extremity more obvious and bitter and unbearable than at the present hour.

The faith of religion touching the future of the race extends the hypothesis so as to found and cherish the hope of a blessed community which, in its constitution and conduct, shall realize all the supreme values of the personal life. Its social ideal is a Divine Kingdom altogether composed of the immortals, the faithful sons of

[1] For a detailed discussion of the problem of "Personal Immortality" see the author's "Philosophy of Religion," Vol. II, pp. 479–549; and "What May I Hope," Chap. VII.

God. The salvation of the race is the assumption, at the end of which the secret of personality stands revealed and justified in its collective form. *If* this Kingdom is finally established, *then* the long and weary and suffering way of bitter struggle and seemingly appalling loss is explained as best it can be to finite minds.

The conception of a Kingdom of God established over the race of men is the grandest and most inspiring of all human conceptions. Through the centuries it has motived and made the most truly great heroes and martyrs among all classes of men. To give it form and shape has excited the wildest fancies and the loftiest flights of poetic and pictorial imagination; but it has also been productive of no little of subtile argumentation, vain disputings, as well as soberer reasoning. No details of a sensuous and temporal sort have been established as items of matter-of-fact knowledge. This is not strange, however, considering the other-worldliness of the conception itself. A Divine Kingdom remains the vague but entrancing and effective form of religion's Social Ideal.

The improved economic and political future of the race, which is to continue perpetuating its individuals indefinitely, under essentially the the same conditions of time and sense, is the current form of a social ideal that rivals, and in some respects resembles, that of religious faith. Of late, it has been more definitely shaped than ever before by the rise of the democracy. The

world over, the rise of the democracy is the most astonishing and incalculable phenomenon of the centuries. It is both reason and result of the great European war. It is stirring the torpid millions of India and China. It has penetrated the wilds of Africa, the steppes of Asia, and the remotest islands of the South Seas. It has revolutionized Russia. It is threatening German and Austrian and even Turkish autocracy. It is agitating Great Britain, Japan, and our own country. It is just beginning to marshal its tremendous forces and to advance its more preposterous as well as its more consistent and reasonable ideas. Without doubt, the close of the present century will witness a world of men greatly changed under the influences of this form of the Social Ideal. This undoubted fact renders the ideal itself, to all thoughtful students of human nature and human history, an object both of apprehension and of hope.

But what, in the face of all these threatened changes to the future of the race, whether distrusted and feared or admired and hoped for, stands firm to the end, however long deferred? It is reasoned convictions as to the nature, obligations, opportunities, essential values, and destiny of the personal life. For the social ideal of the democratic faith and hope is itself only an hypothesis. And as an hypothesis, its final testing will depend upon the service it actually renders in securing the unchanging supreme

values of the personal life. Only in securing these can it throw any clear light upon the secret of personality.

If, however, this democracy disregards, in the person of its leaders and of its servile or revolting membership, the warning of the past, breaks loose from the control of moral and religious ideals, and assumes sway in the interests of more multitudinous arrogance, greed, and selfish ambition, then the late state of the world's true welfare will be even worse than it has ever been hitherto. The values of personal life, and personal development, and personal destiny being our chief consideration, we desire to make the "world safe for democracy," only on the condition that it shall be a kind of democracy which makes the world the safer for the practical solution of the secret of personality in the form of the progressive realization for all mankind, of personality's moral and religious ideals.

In closing our discussion, we should like to take that more inclusive view which is open only — and then but partially — to the reflective thinking of philosophy. The spirit of this thinking is constructive, irenic, conciliatory.

"Science, philosophy, and religion, all have their own peculiar theories of Reality, their own proper conceptions of the Being of the World. To science, the sum-total of experienced realities seems best conceived of as an orderly, law-abiding, self-evolving, mechanical system. To

philosophy, with its profounder insights and more far-reaching critical analysis, this same totality appears as the expression of a Unitary Being, that is absolute Will, functioning teleologically as omnipresent, immanent Idea. But religion conceives of the ground of its experience in a way to satisfy more immediately and perfectly æsthetical and ethical cravings, and certain demands for support to the exigencies of the practical life. As its thought becomes more comprehensive and deeply reflective, it frames the conception of God, as perfect Ethical Spirit, the Object of faith, of worship, and of service."

"The World, however, is One, and man is one. Therefore the steady pressure of the demands for some theory of reality that shall take fuller account of the different aspects of this cosmological Unity, and that shall appeal to the *total experience*, in a harmonizing way, of this psychological and anthropological unity, can never be long resisted. Science and religion, and philosophy and religion, cannot long refuse to take account of each other's truths. They are all aiming at the one truth; and this one truth must base itself upon, and be understood in the light of, the totality of human experience. Inasmuch, however, as only a prolonged study of history and psychology can tell us what the so-called religious experience really is, and inasmuch as only the critical, reflective, and speculatively constructive method of thought can fruitfully avail

itself of the data furnished by this study, the Philosophy of Religion is the only arbiter and reconciler of all strife in this domain. But the very data are never all given; the exploration of those which belong to the past is scarcely as yet more than well begun. Moreover, the powers and achievements of reflective thought are taxed to their utmost, and very speedily transcended, when employed upon the profounder problems and larger thoughts of the religious life and development of humanity. Religion itself is an ever-developing experience. Its Object of faith is essentially an ever-expanding Ideal-Real. Therefore any attempt to teach the truths of the religious experience of humanity by the method of philosophy can only terminate in a still imperfect condition of knowledge, although in an improved condition of rational faith."[1] By such a faith, therefore, we test the secret of Personality, while we live and die in the hopes that are the choice possession of the religious nature of man.

[1] Quoted from the closing pages of author's "Philosophy of Religion," II. pp. 570–571.

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